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Reforming Labor Law by Reforming Labor Law
Preemption Doctrine to Allow the States to Make
More Labor Relations Policy
Henry H. Drummonds*
I. INTRODUCTION
The road forward for labor relations policy in the United States
lies not in Washington, D.C., but in state capitols.' As the current
debate over the Employee Free Choice Act (EFCA) reveals,2 stifling
Copyright 2009, by HENRY H. DRUMMONDS.
* J.D., Harvard Law School, Professor of Law at Lewis and Clark Law
School. Prior to becoming a law professor the author represented public and
private sector unions and employees for eighteen years. Since that time the author
has represented public sector management in labor disputes and has served as the
labor relations advisor and representative for two Oregon Governors.
1. Several scholars have challenged the appropriateness of the current
broad labor law preemption doctrines marching under the New Deal-era banner
of a uniform federal labor law policy. E.g., Michael H. Gottesman, Rethinking
Labor Law Preemption: State Laws Facilitating Unionization, 7 YALE J. ON
REG. 355 (1990); Eileen Silverstein, Against Preemption in Labor Law, 24
CONN. L. REV. 1 (1991); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, The Legacy of Industrial
Pluralism: The Tension Between Individual Employment Rights and the New
Deal Collective Bargaining System, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 575 (1992); Henry
Drummonds, The Sister Sovereign States: Preemption and the Second Twentieth
Revolution in the Law of the American Workplace, 62 FORDHAM L. REv. 469
(1993) [hereinafter Drummonds, Sister Sovereigns]; Matthew W. Finkin,
Bridging the "Representation Gap", 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 391, 407
(2001); Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102
COLUM. L. REv. 1527, 1599-1600 (2002) [hereinafter Estlund, Ossification].
More recently Paul Secunda proposes ways to fit state labor relations initiatives
regarding captive audience issues into the existing doctrinal framework. Paul
Secunda, Toward the Viability of State-Based Legislation to Address Workplace
Captive Audience Meetings in the United States, 29 CoMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J.
209 (2008); Catherine L. Fisk & Michael M. Oswalt, Preemption and Civic
Democracy in the Battle Over Wal-Mart, 92 MINN. L. REv. 1502 (2008). For a
view from an economist's perspective, see Richard B. Freeman, Will Labor Fare
Better Under State Labor Relations Law?, 58 LAB. & EMP. REL. ASS'N SERIES
PROC. 125 (2006), available at http://www.press.uillinois.edu/journals/irra/
proceedings2006/freeman.html. To date, however, none of these calls for a
larger state role has received substantial congressional, labor union, or
management support, and no call for congressional authorization for a broader
role by the states to help implement the Section 7 rights is advocated here.
2. Employee Free Choice Act, H.R. 1409, 11 1th Cong. § 4 (2009). Compare
Stewart Acuff & Sheldon Friedman, Union Choice Would Help A Faltering
Economy, Feb. 5 2008, http://www.ourfuture.org/progressiveopinion/union-
choice-would-help-faltering-economy, with Nelson Cary, The EFCA 's Destruction
of Workplace Democracy, LAw360, Sept. 10, 2008, http://www.vorys.com/assets/
attachments/COLUMBUS-10491815-vl-TheEFCAsDestruction of Workplace
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federal labor law orthodoxy grips the private sector union
movement. Indeed private sector collective bargaining faces the
vanishing point;3 to the ninety-two point four percent of private
sector employees who hold their jobs outside the unionized sector,
collective bargaining constitutes, at best, an abstraction.4 Ironically,
public sector unions, governed largely by state law, flourish.5 Why
_Democracy.PDF. Political considerations permeate the issue because unionized
blue-collar workers more often vote for Democrats based on economic issues,
while non-unionized blue-collar workers more often prefer Republicans based on
social issues. E.g., Peter L. Francia, Voting on Values or Bread-and-Butter?
Effects of Union Membership on the Politics of the Working Class, 12
PERSPECTIVES ON WORK, Winter 2009, at 27.
3. While private sector unions now represent only a small fraction of the
private sector workforce nationally in collective bargaining (see infra note 4),
they serve other important interests: (1) they remain a potent lobbying force for
worker-oriented legislation at the state and federal levels (for example, the
Family Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (2006)); (2) they provide
support in political campaigns to candidates more supportive of the interests of
employees; and (3) as my colleague Juliet Stumpf points out, they reduce the
information costs of employees learning about their rights under federal and
state employment statutes. See generally RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JAMES L.
MEDOFF, WHAT Do UNIONS Do? (1984).
4. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, UNION MEMBERS
IN 2008 1 (2009), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/union2.pdf. From a high
of thirty-five point one percent of private sector employment in the mid-1950s,
union representation and membership has gradually declined, at times plateauing
for a few years but then resuming the general downward decline to seven point
six percent today. LEO TROY & NEIL SHEFLIN, UNION SOURCEBOOK (1985). The
Service Employees International Union is an exception to the trend of declining
membership; this union has adopted a strategy of avoiding NLRB processes and
has encountered success in the "Justice for Janitors" campaign and in the
organizing of nursing home and home health care workers. Justice for Janitors,
http://www.seiu.org/division/property-services/justice-for-janitors/ (last visited
Sept. 4, 2009). Despite the decline in representation rates, polls indicate that a
far higher percentage of American workers express a desire for union
representation. For a general discussioii and analysis of the "representation gap,"
see RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JOEL ROGERS, WHAT WORKERS WANT (1999).
5. In sharp contrast, forty point seven percent of public sector employees
are organized under state labor relations laws. UNION MEMBERS IN 2008, supra
note 4. Note that union membership was thirty-six point eight percent in the
public sector and seven point six percent in the private sector. Id. Membership
numbers are lower than representation numbers because not all the represented
are union members. Public employees are excluded from the NLRA. 29 U.S.C.
§ 152 (2006). State and local governmental employees, however, often bargain
under state laws. E.g., OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 243.650-.782 (West 2003 &
Supp. 2008); 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 315/1-/25 (West 2005 & Supp. 2009); N.
Y. CIV. SERV. LAW §§ 200-214 (McKinney 1999 & Supp. 2008). Federal
employees bargain under another federal act, the Federal Labor-Management
and Employee Relations Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7106, 7115-7135 (2006).
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do blue, pink, and white-collar public employees flock to unions
while their counterparts in the private sector do not?
Private sector union membership varies widely from state to
state and industry to industry. New York (twenty-four point three
percent) and California (eighteen point four percent) contrast with
much lower rates of unionization in the South, parts of the
Midwest, and the Mountain states.6
Not surprisingly the twenty-one "Right to Work' 7 states count
among the lowest rates of membership. 8 Despite this widely
varying support for unionization in the states, judicially-created,
broad federal labor relations preemption doctrines ensnarl all states
in a stifling and exclusive, yet strikingly inconsistent, federal labor
law regime.
9
Part II reviews the need for reform of private sector labor
relations law. Sixty years have passed since the last fundamental
revision of private sector labor law occurred when the Republican
Congress overrode President Truman's veto and enacted the Taft-
6. UNION MEMBERS IN 2008, supra note 4, at 11 tbl. 5: New York at
24.3%, Hawaii 24.9%, California 18.4%, Illinois 16.6%, Washington 19.8%,
New Jersey 18.3%, Connecticut 16.9%, Michigan 18.8%, Oregon 16.6%, and
Pennsylvania 15.4% are the highest states in private sector union membership.
Id. Overall private sector union membership rates, however, stood at 7.6%.
Variance in rates of unionization also occurs by industry. Id. at tbl. 3. The
highest industry numbers are transportation (22.4%), utilities (28.3%), and
telecommunications (20.4%). Id.
7. ARCHIBALD COX ET AL., LABOR LAW, 1193 (14th ed. 2006). The "Right
to Work" states are: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Idaho,
Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, North Carolina, North
Dakota, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Wyoming. Id. at
p. 1193. See infra Part IV.
8. The five states with the lowest densities of union membership are: North
Carolina (3.5%), Georgia (3.7%), South Carolina (3.9%), Virginia (4.1%),
Texas (4.5%), and Louisiana (4.6%). UNION MEMBERS IN 2008, supra note 4, at
tbl. 5. All are "Right to Work" states.
9. See infra Part IV. Between 1959 and 1985, the United States Supreme
Court created three distinct strands of labor law preemption doctrine: (1) the
Garinon doctrine under which conduct "arguably protected" by Section 7 of the
National Labor Relations Act (29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2006)), or "arguably"
prohibited by Section 8 of that Act, cannot be regulated by the states (San Diego
Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959)); (2) the Machinists
doctrine under which states cannot interfere with "the free play of economic
forces" impliedly guaranteed in the Act (Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists &
Aerospace Workers v. Wis. Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132
(1976)); and (3) Section 301 preemption under which state law individual rights
claims, available to non-unionized employees, suffer preemption in the
unionized sector if those claims in some way require the interpretation of a
collective bargaining agreement (Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486
U.S. 399 (1988) and Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (1985)).
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Hartley Act in 1947.10 Taft-Hartley, vociferously opposed by the
unions of that time, rebalanced the national labor policy to make it
less hospitable to unions in response to perceived abuses during
and after World War II.11
Today, new conditions exist. After more than a half-century,
another fundamental rebalancing is needed to provide more robust
protection for employees wishing to voice concerns to their
employers as a group.' At the same time labor law must break out
of the confining doctrinal boxes that impede private sector unions
from developing new ways to represent employees in more
democratic structures that attract support from women, minority
employees, younger employees, and those in growing sectors of
the economy such as information technology and health care jobs
in nursing homes, assisted living centers, and home health.
Beyond the fate of private sector unions, the prevailing federal
labor law orthodoxy carries broader public policy implications.
Federal labor law, and the folklore surrounding union-management
relations generally, cabins the potential for unions to help recreate
a structural balance in the allocation of the wealth jointly created
by managers, investors, and employees in twenty-first-century
corporate life.' 3 Corporations and the wealth they create are not the
personal fiefdoms of executives or hedge funds managers and
investment bankers. Yet the times demand new thinking about the
role of unions and the processes under which they operate. At the
same time, collective bargaining offers a private ordering
10. Labor-Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136
(1947) (codified as amended at Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§
141-187 (2006)).
11. E.g., Archibald Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor Management Relations
Act 1947, 61 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1947); Donald H. Wollett, Collective
Bargaining, Public Policy and the NLRA of 1947, 23 WASH. L. REV. 205 (1948).
Thus only twelve years after the enactment of the New Deal Wagner Act (a.k.a.
"National Labor Relations Act") in 1935, the federal policy moved from one
explicitly favoring collective bargaining to a position of "neutrality" balancing
the interests of employees, unions, and employers in "the national labor policy."
See also Nelson Lichtenstein, How Wal-Mart Fights Unions 92 MINN. L. REV.
1462, 1465-66.
12. E.g., Paul Trapani, Old Presumptions Never Die: Rethinking the
Steelworkers Trilogy's Presumption of Arbitration in Deciding the Arbitrability
of Side Letters, 83 TUL. L. REV. 559, 560-61 (2008) (The labor market of the
1950s and 1960s was "very different from the one today .... Unions are getting
smaller and less capable of negotiating strong contracts for their members ....
[T]hese labor-market changes threaten to depose the collective labor system and
destabilize labor-management relations."). See also CHARLES B. CRAVER, CAN
UNIONS SURVIVE? THE REJUVENATION OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT
(1993).
13. See infra Part ll.B.
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alternative to the increasing demands for direct governmental
regulation of economic life in the Great Recession now afflicting
the U.S. and world economies.
14
As Part III shows, the needed new thinking, experimentation,
and flexibility will most likely arise from a less centralized labor
relations system. Not only does the current federal labor law fail to
keep the promises it makes to employees, 15 it further blocks efforts
to enact reforms in the states. Although New Deal-era reformers
were often prone to view the federal government as the protector
of unions, as then Professor Scalia once observed, federalism is "a
stick that can beat either dog."' 6 As the current national debate
over EFCA reveals, federal legislative initiatives in labor law come
hard and require a kind of federal common denominator for new
labor relations policies.' 7 While the fate of that Act remains at this
writing undecided, a review of the ideas in play shows that, while
some suggested amendments to the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA) may help to restore more balance in the national labor
policy, the ideas under discussion will likely not suffice to reverse
the long decline of the private sector unions as collective
bargaining (as distinct from lobbying) agents of employees.
The current focus on federal level reform stands in sharp
contrast to the broader field of employment law. In that broader
area of workplace regulation, federal level support for change most
often follows state and local level initiatives. Indeed shared state
14. Id.
15. E.g., Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-
Organization Under the NLRA, 96 HARv. L. REv. 1769 (1983) [hereinafter
Weiler, Promises to Keep]; see infra Part II.A.
16. Antonin Scalia, The Two Faces of Federalism, 6 HARv. J. L. & PUB.
POL'Y 19, 19 (1982).
17. Employee Free Choice Act, H.R. 1409, 111 th Cong. (2009). The debate
over EFCA dramatically illustrates the difficulty of reaching a compromise that
generates enough support to pass in Congress. E.g., Editorial, The Imperfect
Union Bill: Employer Intransigence Makes Finding Common Ground More
Difficult, WASH. POST, May 11, 2009, at A 16; Mackenzie Carpenter, Specter in
Spotlight Again; Employee Free Choice Act Banks on Veteran Senator,
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETtE, Mar. 15, 2009, at A5. As of this writing, the
federal discussion has shifted from a focus on the "card check" proposal for
gaining union representation rights in lieu of an election to the idea of "quickie"
elections with some guarantee of more equal access for unions to the employees.
See infra Part III.B.
18. See infra Part III.C. See generally Drummonds, Sister Sovereigns, supra
note 1, at 489-509 (1993). Indeed, state level experimentation and innovation
often are the prerequisites to federal level action. For example, long before the
1991 Civil Rights Act amended Title VII to provide compensatory and punitive
damages remedies for sexual harassment and other forms of discrimination, such
remedies were available under state statutory and common law. The leading role
2009]
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
and federal policy making constitutes the dominant model in the
now vast field of employment law generally. 19 Thus, small,
medium-size, national, and global companies conform their human
resources practices to varying state requirements in the area of
status discrimination, wage and hour laws, occupational health and
safety, maternity and family leave laws, privacy regulation, and
wrongful discharge law. 20 The broad federal labor law preemption
initiated by judges a half-century ago stands today as a relic of an
earlier era when the law of the workplace is viewed as a whole.
Considered in a broader context, reexamination of the
federalist balance in labor relations would continue an ongoing
discussion dating to the Founders and continuing across many
other areas of public policy today.21 These include the regulation
of prescription drugs and medical devices, bank lending,
greenhouse gas and automobile emission and mileage standards,
immigration policy, and many others.22 After suffering the vice-
of state 'innovation has also been the case in other policy areas, such as auto
emission and mileage standards, providing a broader federalist context for this
discussion about labor law. See infra Part III.C.
19. Drummonds, Sister Sovereigns, supra note 1, at 489-509 (summarizing
extensive discussion of examples in multiple areas of employment law: "[F]ar
from being a marginal or interstitial aspect of our system of workplace
governance, state law often plays a vital and 'leading edge' role").
20. Id. See infra Part III.C.
21. See generally ALEXANDER HAMILTON ET AL., THE FEDERALIST PAPERS
(Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961); reviewing ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, ENHANCING
GOvERNMENT: FEDERALISM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (2008) (arguing that
federalism should be seen as an empowering doctrine, not a doctrine imposing
structural restraints on government); William H. Pryor Jr., Federalism and
Freedom: A Critical Review of Enhancing Government: Federalism for the 21st
Century, 83 TUL. L. REv. 585 (2008); Erwin Chemerinsky, A Troubling Trend in
Preemption Rulings, 44 TRIAL 62 (2008); Adam Cohen, What Ever Happened to
(the Good Kind o) States'Rights?, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2008, at A24; Bradley
W. Joondeph, Federalism, the Rehnquist Court, and the Modern Republican
Party, 87 OR. L. REv. 117 (2008) (arguing that the Rehnquist Court'sjurisprudence aggressively enhanced state autonomy in decisions construing the
Commerce Clause, the Eleventh Amendment, and Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, but tacked in the opposite direction in federal statutory preemption
and dormant Commerce Clause cases); David A. Dana, Democratizing the Law
of Federal Preemption, 102 Nw. U. L. REv. 507 (2008).
22. Today, the federalism debate resonates across diverse policy areas. E.g.,
Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009) (FDA regulation does not preempt
state law failure-to-warn tort claim for prescription drug); Riegal v. Medtronic,
Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999 (2008) (FDA regulation preempts products liability tort
claim for medical device); Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 129 S. Ct. 538 (2008)
(state law tort claim for "light" cigarettes not preempted); Cipollone v. Liggett
Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992) (some but not all smoker's tort claims against
tobacco company preempted); Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861
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like grip of the broad federal preemption doctrines now prevailing,
labor relations policy must become part of this larger federalism
discussion.
Ironically, globalization erodes the power of the federal
government to effectively regulate transnational corporate entities
whose size and reach now often eclipse the reach of nation-states.
Given the dynamics of globalization, with power and influence
drifting upward toward national and international level actors, an
adjustment of the federalist balance in labor relations, as in other
areas of public policy, creates a countercurrent to this drift. Here
we can learn from our neighbors in Canada and the European
Union where labor relations policies from Ottawa and Brussels
coexist with those of provincial governments and sub-union
nation-states.
Part IV turns to the existing, uniquely broad federal labor law
preemption doctrines that prevent the states from exercising the
shared authority found in other areas of workplace law. Three
distinct doctrines exist: the Garnin doctrine, the Machinists
doctrine, and Section 301 preemption. 23 This discussion shows that
federal labor relations law not only creates a legal environment
inhospitable to collective bargaining, 24 but also simultaneously
prevents reforms and experimentation at the state level.25 Thus the
(2000) (state design defect claims for delay in standardizing use of automobile
airbags preempted); Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass'n, 129 S. Ct. 2710 (2009)
(lending practices). In the area of auto emissions and mileage standards, the
Bush II administration resisted attempts by states like California, Oregon, and
Washington to impose state level regulation. Michael Hiltzik, Pushing Detroit
Onto a Greener Road, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2009, at Cl; Stephan Power,
Obama 's EPA Move Likely to Spur Fight, WALL ST. J., Jan. 27, 2009, at A3;
John M. Broder & Peter Baker, Obama's Order Likely To Tighten Auto
Standards, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2009, at Al. President Obama recently resolved
that issue by announcing new federal standards. Id. The federalism debate also
permeates immigration policy. Juliet P. Stumpf, States of Confusion: The Rise of
State and Local Power Over Immigration, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1557 (2008).
President Obama recently directed federal agencies to review their regulations to
undo the Bush II administration's policy of adopting "preemption" regulations.
Theo Francis, Obama Regulatory Review Could Spur Products Lawsuits,
BusINEss W., May 20, 2009, http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/
content/may2009/db20090520_039748.htm.
For further contemporary discussion of general preemption issues, see Nina
A. Mendelson, A Presumption Against Agency Preemption, 102 Nw. U. L. REV.
695 (2008) and The Supreme Court, 1997 Term-Leading Cases, 122 HARv. L.
REv. 405 (2008).
23. See supra note 9.
24. See infra Part II.A.
25. See infra Part IV.
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states cannot adopt damages remedies for anti-union
discrimination, implement "card check" and other innovative
procedures for determining whether the union has established and
maintained majority support, experiment with non-majority and
non-exclusive representation of employees for those who desire
union representation, regulate the permanent replacement of
strikers or the offensive lockout, provide meaningful remedies for
bad faith bargaining, or develop new processes, such as interest
arbitration, for resolving first contract disputes or an alternative to
the cumbersome and ineffective National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB) process for the vindication of Section 7 rights.26
The mesmerizing mantra of a "uniform" and "expertise based"
federal labor relations policy led generations of judges, labor
lawyers, and academics to support these broad federal preemption
doctrines.27 As shown below, these doctrines find support neither
in the text of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA),28 nor
in any consistent view of federal policy, rights, and remedies. 29
These preemption doctrines generated controversy within the
Supreme Court even when adopted decades ago; nothing in the
federal labor policy compels their continuance in changed
conditions today. Moreover, labor law preemption doctrine exists
within a bodyguard of exceptions making it at once one of the most
complex and indecipherable areas in all of employment law. As the
authors of a leading casebook summarized: "No legal issue in the
field of collective bargaining has been presented to the Supreme
Court more frequently.. . than that of the preemption of state law,
and perhaps no other issue has been left in as much confusion. ' '3°
As in science, excessive complexity in legal doctrine signals a
need for reconceptualization. 3 1
26. See infra Part II.B.
27. Professor Michael Gottesman observed: "An entire generation of labor
law academics focused their scholarship upon perfecting the system of collective
bargaining created by the [NLRA] for ordering the legal relations between
employers and employees." Michael H. Gottesman, Whither Goest Labor Law:
Law and Economics in the Workplace, 100 YALE L.J. 2767, 2767-68 (1991)
(reviewing PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: THE FUTURE OF
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW (1991)).
28. The 1947 Taft-Hartley Act adopted the Labor Management Relations
Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187, and incorporated the 1935 National Labor Relations
Act (sometimes referred to as the "Wagner Act") within the new combined labor
relations statute at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169.
29. See infra Part IV.
30. COX ET AL., supra note 7, at 1004.
31. Even fifteen years ago the Supreme Court, according to a Westlaw
search, had decided more than ninety cases with substantial discussion of labor
law preemption. Drummonds, Sister Sovereigns, supra note 1, at 560 n.509. As
[Vol. 70
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In addition to the mass of exceptions and qualifications, other
parts of the federal labor relations law create striking
inconsistencies to the premises of broad federal preemption. These
inconsistencies render the current law incoherent when viewed as
an overall system. These include:
1. NLRA Section 14-b's provision permitting states to
"reverse preempt" federal law on the fundamental issue of
union security agreements via the option to adopt "right to
work" laws;
2. the concurrent jurisdiction of the federal and state courts to
enforce and interpret collective bargaining agreements and
grievance arbitration;
3. the concurrent jurisdiction of federal and state courts to
hear claims against unions for breach of the duty of fair
representation;
4. the critical role of state property law in the "balancing" of
Section 7 rights on issues like union access and restrictions
on union solicitation in employer email systems and the
like;
5. the concurrent jurisdiction of the federal and state courts to
award damages against unions for recognitional picketing
and secondary boycotts;
6. the exclusion of many employees from the embrace of the
NLRA-including public employees, agricultural
employees, and employees of many small businesses-
leaving those employees to state regulation;
7. the ability of states to directly affect labor disputes by
granting or withholding unemployment benefits to strikers
and locked-out employees;
8. the further anomaly that states may directly regulate the
terms and conditions of employment, even in unionized
shops in "labor standards" legislation, but, inconsistently,
may not take other actions said to interfere with the "free
play of economic forces;" and
9. most ironically, the concurrent jurisdiction of federal and
state courts to decide complex issues of federal labor law
preemption.
32
Professor David Gregory put it, labor law preemption doctrine is "one of the
more intricate structures of legal theory." David L. Gregory, The Labor
Preemption Doctrine: Hamiltonian Renaissance or Last Hurrah?, 27 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 507, 514 (1986).
32. See infra Part IV.
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Part V explores what a more decentralized labor relations
regime might look like. The point is not that the author's ideas for
labor law reform should be the only ones in play, but that there are
many possibilities for reform not discussed in the EFCA debate. A
more decentralized labor relations regime is far more likely to
yield the experimentation, flexibility, and citizen involvement
necessary for fundamental change.
If citizens in the states are to be empowered to make more
labor relations policy through their state governments, reform
must, anomalously, come from the federal Congress. This article,
therefore, makes suggestions for what a 2009-2010 Labor Law
Preemption Clarification Act might look like. These ideas
represent only tentative suggestions. If the debate over labor law
reform shifts, as advocated here, to how citizens in the states could
play a greater role in labor relations policy, surely lawyers and
academics alike will generate many potential paths to follow in a
less centralized labor relations regime.
II. PRIVATE SECTOR UNIONS FACE THE VANISHING POINT WITHOUT
LABOR LAW REFORM, YET UNIONS COULD HELP TO RESTORE
STRUCTURAL CHECKS AND BALANCES IN THE PRIVATE ORDERING
OF ECONOMIC WEALTH BY PROVIDING A MORE INSTITUTIONALIZED
VOICE TO EMPLOYEES IN THE DECISIONS THAT AFFECT THEM AT
WORK
This Part reviews why labor law needs reform. This need arises
from both a negative and a positive argument.
The negative argument in Part 1-A arises from the many
deficiencies in the NLRA as it evolved during the past seventy-five
years. These problems make a mockery of labor law's promise to
allow fair opportunity for employees to chose unionization and
create a structure for the determination of their wages, hours, and
working conditions that gives them a collective voice. While the
defects in the law do not alone explain the decline toward the
vanishing point of the private sector unions as collective
bargaining agents, they contribute to that decline. More
importantly, today's new conditions require a rebalancing of labor
law's conflicting interests. As shown below, many opportunities
exist for a renewed and more robust labor law to fit today's
changed work and changed employees. The EFCA debate,
however, constitutes a far too restricted discussion of the potential
for labor law revitalization.
The positive argument in Part II-B discusses the potential for
labor law to empower today's employees to participate more
equitably in corporate governance. The wealth generated and the
106 (Vol. 70
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power wielded by corporate structures today do not belong alone to
executive suite managers and investment bankers whose judgments
now lie exposed as often fallible. Collective bargaining and new
forms of employee involvement hold the potential for restructuring
economic relationships to better balance the roles and voices of
managers, investors, and employees whose joint efforts produce
wealth.
A. The Many Deficiencies in Federal Labor Law Have Helped
Drive Unions to the Vanishing Point as Collective Bargaining
Representatives, and They Fail to Serve the Interests of Today s
Changing Workforce
Many scholars argue that private sector labor law itself
contributes to union decline.33 Prominent labor leaders concur.34
Far from protecting the right to organize, federal labor law-
heralded by the New Deal generation as the labor relations' Magna
Carta of its day-bit by bit, decision by decision, morphed in
changed circumstances to impede collective bargaining. Its
champions became not working people, union leaders, and their
supporters, but lawyers, corporate executives, and lobbying groups
representing American business. In Professor Estlund's apt
terminology, federal labor law became ossified, unable to adjust to
33. E.g., Weiler, Promises to Keep, supra note 15; Paul Weiler, Striking a
New Balance: Freedom of Contract and the Prospects for Union
Representation, 98 HARV. L. REv. 351 (1984) [hereinafter Weiler, Striking a
New Balance]; Paul C. Weiler, Hard Times For Unions: Challenging Times for
Scholars, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 1015 (1991) [hereinafter Weiler, Hard Times for
Unions], William B. Gould IV, Some Reflections on Fifty Years of the National
Labor Relations Act: The Need for Labor Board and Labor Law Reform, 38
STAN. L. REv. 937 (1986); WILLIAM B. GOULD IV, LABORED RELATIONS: LAW,
POLITICS, AND THE NLRB (2000); Estlund, Ossification, supra note 1; Craig
Becker, Democracy in the Workplace: Union Representation Elections and
Federal Labor Law, 77 MINN. L. REV. 495 (1993); James J. Brudney, Neutrality
Agreements and Card Check Recognition: Prospects for Changing Paradigms,
90 IOWA L. REv. 819 (2005); James B. Atleson, Reflections on Labor, Power,
and Society, 44 MD. L. REv. 841 (1985).
34. Richard L. Trumka, Why Labor Law Has Failed, 89 W. VA. L. REv. 871
(1987) (Mr. Trumpa is currently the Secretary-Treasurer of the national AFL-
CIO); Kirkland Says Many Unions Avoiding NLRB, 132 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 13
(1992) (reporting the then AFL-CIO President's complaint that the federal labor
law often "forbid[s] [union supporters] from showing solidarity and direct union
support"); UE President Calls On Labor Leaders to Take a More Aggressive
Stance, 139 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 417 (1992) (reporting international union
president's calls for "comprehensive labor law reform" or, absent reform, repeal of
the New Deal-era labor relations statutes; "I would rather have no [labor] law at all
than have the laws today that do nothing but stifle us").
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changing circumstances; the brightest in a generation of scholars
despaired. 35 Labor leaders declared their desire to return to the
unregulated labor relations regime pre-dating the NLRA.36 For the
mass of employees, labor law simply shrank into irrelevance.
1. The Paradoxical Decline of Private Sector Unions While
Public Sector Unions Flourish
Scholars often note the decline of private sector unionism, from
a high of approximately forty percent in the non-agricultural
workforce in the mid-1950s to only seven point six percent
today.37 Yet during the same period public sector unionism grew
from virtually zero to more than thirty-five percent of public
employees today.38 Public employees are now five times more
likely to be unionized than private sector employees. 39 Public
employees, of course, are excluded from the LMRA. They
organize, instead, largely under state and local enactments. 40
Why do teachers, firefighters, police officers, highway
department workers, social agency workers, and courthouse
employees flock to the public sector unions while their private
sector counterparts do not? Scholars debate the causes of the
decline in private sector unionism and offer many explanations:
35. Estlund, Ossification, supra note 1; Michael H. Gottesman, In Despair:
Starting Over Imagining a Labor Law for Unorganized Workers, 69 CHI-KENT
L. REv. 59 (1993).
36. See supra note 34.
37. Weiler, Hard Times For Unions, supra note 33, at 1017; UNION
MEMBERS IN 2008, supra note 4. Some reports put the percentage unionized at
plus twelve percent, but this figure includes both private and public sector
employees. Id.
38. THEODORE ST. ANTOINE ET AL., LABOR RELATIONS LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 871 (1lth ed. 2005) (public sector workforce thirty-six percent
unionized in 2004).
39. UNION MEMBERS IN 2008, supra note 4.
40. See supra note 5. Some private sector workers also fall outside the
coverage of the NLRA and are covered instead by state laws, for example,
agricultural workers and employees of small businesses whose revenues fall
under the NLRB's jurisdictional standards. National Labor Relations Act §
2(2)-(3), 29 U.S.C. § 152 (2)-(3) (2006). Farm workers, however, sometimes
bargain under state laws. E.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 1140 (West 2003 & Supp.
2009); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-1381 (LexisNexis 1995 & Supp. 2008);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 450.251 (West 2002). Small businesses often fall below thejurisdictional standards adopted by the NLRB pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 164(c)
(2006); these employees, too, sometimes bargain under state laws. E.g., OR.
REv. STAT. § 662.010 (West 2003 & Supp. 2008).
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1. the shift from blue-collar manufacturing to white and pink-
collar service (including information technology) jobs;4
2. increased competition from abroad in the globalized labor
markets; 42
3. increased bureaucratization in unions;43
4. persistent private sector managerial opposition to unions;
and
5. the rise of individual rights guaranteed in the evolving
common law and many statutorily mandated terms and
conditions of employment;4 5 in this view, employees simply
no longer need the collective bargaining protections afforded
by unions, which fall victim to their own success in seeking
such socially conferred protections for all employees.
41. Leo Troy, Market Forces and Union Decline: A Response to Paul
Weiler, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 681, 682-84 (1992) (decline stems from structural
change in the economy, enhanced foreign competition, and increased employer
opposition to unions).
42. Id. See generally Henry H. Drummonds, Transnational Small and
Emerging Businesses in a World of Nikes and Microsofts (A Retrospective Essay
on the 1998 Lewis and Clark Forum and the Message of Seattle), 4 J. SMALL &
EMERGING Bus. L. 249 (2000). See also the presentations at that forum by
Professors Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Michael Gottesman, Robert Howe,
Eugene Mihaly, George Priest, and Daniel Mitchell collected in 3 J. SMALL &
EMERGING Bus L. (1999).
43. E.g., Troy, supra note 41, at 682-84; Samuel Issacharoff,
Reconstructing Employment, 104 HARv. L. REv. 607, 630 (1990) (reviewing
PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORK-PLACE: THE FUTURE OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT LAW (1990)).
44. See Steven Greenhouse, Study Says Antiunion Tactics Are Becoming
More Common, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 2009, at B5 (reporting on empirical study by
Professor Kate Bronfenbremmer, Director of the Cornell University School of
Industrial and Labor Relations; study used NLRB data and interviews to analyze
more than 1000 union election campaigns, finding threats of plant closure and the
like occurred in more than fifty percent, that sixty-three percent involved "captive
audience" meetings in which employees were interrogated about union
sympathies, and that employees were threatened in fifty-four percent with loss of
jobs or cuts in wages and benefits); John Logan, Consultants, Lawyers, and the
"Union Free" Movement in the USA Since the 1970's, 33 IND. REL. L. J. 197
(2002); Weiler, Promises to Keep, supra note 15; Weiler, Striking a New Balance,
supra note 33, at 357 (1983); Troy, supra note 41.
45. Drummonds, Sister Sovereigns, supra note 1, at 483, 489-509; Clyde
W. Summers, Labor Law as the Century Turns: A Changing of the Guard, 67
NEB. L. REV. 7, 10-12 (1988) (describing the shift from the model of collective
bargaining to the model of socially-conferred individual rights); Joseph R.
Grodin, Past, Present, and Future in Wrongful Termination Law, 6 LAB. LAW.
97 (1990) (noting that the shift to individual rights from private ordering via
collective bargaining seems similar to the European model in which the
government provides basic protections to workers by law).
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It is suggested that, together these factors result in declining
demand for unions among private sector employees.
Yet the success of the public sector unions suggests that some
of these factors at least cannot alone explain the paradox between
public and private sector unions. For example, many white and
pink-collar public employees perform service jobs; teachers'
unions now represent the largest union group. Furthermore,
public sector unions such as the NEA and AFSCME are not
notably less bureaucratic than private sector unions like the UFCW
or the Teamsters. Similarly, the individual rights regime embodied
in protections like the status discrimination and family leave
statutes, and common law torts like wrongful discharge, most often
apply equally to private and public sector employees.
Globalization does seldom directly affect public employees,
but neither does it directly affect many private sector employees-
such as those in the construction, hospitality and restaurant
industries, nursing home industry, domestic service, personal
appearance and cosmetic service industries, and janitorial
industries. 47 As former U.S. Secretary of Labor Robert Reich
explained in 1991, global labor markets affect many employees,
including both manufacturing employees and "symbolic analysts"
(like computer software designers, financial services providers,
48and even lawyers). But some services cannot be provided abroad,
and the global labor markets affect such sectors only via
immigration.4 9 And, even if globalization affects a sector by
introducing labor market competition from abroad, that logically
increases, not decreases, the need for mechanisms for an employee
voice in restructurings and the change that must inevitably come.
Unlike their private sector counterparts, public employees carry
a powerful weapon with which to fight anti-union discrimination.
When governmental employees obtain public employment the
bring their rights to free speech and free association with them.
Union activity, advocacy, and membership fall within these
protections, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a powerful remedy for
violation of these rights, as a review of thousands of cases in the
federal reporters will reveal.
46, The National Education Association now has 3.2 million members.
National Education Association, http://www.nea.org (last visited Sept. 4, 2009).
47. E.g., ROBERT B. REICH, THE WORK OF NATIONS: PREPARING
OURSELVES FOR 21ST-CENTURY CAPITALISM 171-240 (1991).
48. Id.
49, Hoffman Plastics Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002).
50. E.g., Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006). Different standards are,
however, applied to public employee free speech. Id.
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Let us briefly evaluate the ways Section 1983 confers
advantages that deter anti-union retaliation and discrimination in
the public sector. First, under Section 1983 individual managers
who discriminate on the basis of union activity or affiliation in
violation of the First Amendment face personal liability '-in
sharp contrast to the NLRA, under which only employers can be
held responsible for unfair labor practices. 52 Second, Section 1983
allows plaintiffs to resort to courts without any requirement for
exhaustion of administrative remedies-let alone exclusive reliance
on administrative remedies as required under the NLRA. 53 Third,
as a consequence-again in sharp contrast to the unfair labor
practice process prescribed by the NLRA-plaintiffs and their
attorneys control the decision of whether to pursue allegations of
union discrimination; they are not relegated to an unreviewable
discretionary judgment of NLRB officials about whether an
allegation will be pursued to hearing.54 Fourth, as a further
consequence of initial access to the courts, Section 1983 provides
plaintiffs' attorneys with the ability to engage in discovery and to
subpoena witnesses and documents-again important process
rights usually not available to persons filing an NLRB charge
unless and until the NLRB Regional Director or General Counsel
orders issuance of a formal complaint. Fifth, Section 1983 grants
public employees damages remedies, including compensatory,
emotional distress, and punitive damages 55---once again in sharp
contrast to the NLRA, which limits remedies to back pay (minus
required mitigation earnings), "cease and desist" orders, and other
similar equitable relief.56 Sixth, under Section 1983, juries, rather
than career NLRB administrative law judges, determine disputed
issues of fact fairly.
Besides the existence of the powerful remedy for anti-union
discrimination provided by Section 1983, other provisions in state
law aid public sector unions. For example, in states making public
51. E.g., Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978) (state official but not the
state may be sued under Section 1983).
52. National Labor Relations Act § 10, 29 U.S.C. § 160 (2006).
53. Patsy v. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496 (1982).
54. NLRB v. United Food & Comm. Workers Union, Local 23, 484 U.S.
112 (1987).
55. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (local
governmental entity liability for compensatory damages and injunctive relief
where official acts pursuant to policy or practice, or is one whose edicts can
fairly be said to represent official policy); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978)
(compensatory damages include emotional distress damages); Smith v. Wade,
461 U.S. 30 (1983) (officials, but not entities, liable for punitive damages under
Section 1983).
56. National Labor Relations Act § 10, 29 U.S.C. § 160 (2006).
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employee strikes legal,57 civil service laws and political constraints58
impede the use of permanent replacements. When public
employees cannot lawfully strike, some states offer interest
arbitration of bargaining disputes; these provisions are common for
police, firefighter, and correctional officer unions. 59 Finally, state
procedures sometimes give public employees advantages over their
private sector counterparts. For example, in Oregon, unions and
employees charging employers with unfair labor practices
prosecute their own cases, enjoy access to the subpoena power,
cross-examine managers under oath, and have a right to a hearing
for any issue of law or fact.
60
Non-legal factors also contribute to the widely divergent
experience of unions in the public and private sectors over the last
half-century. Public sector managers face political as well as legal
accountability when they retaliate for union activity. School
boards, city and county councilors and commissioners, mayors,
and governors not only sit atop public bureaucracies, but they often
face election campaigns in which public employee unions and their
supporters may wield substantial influence. Additionally, many
public managers simply do not resist unions to the degree prevalent
in the private sector where "American Exceptionalism" finds
expression in deeply imbedded cultural norms of resistance to
unionization within private sector managerial and investment
elites.6
1
2. Ineffective Remedies for Anti- Union Discrimination Make
Such Discrimination a Rational Choice for Managers in the
Private Sector
While ingrained hostility to unions and collective bargaining
occurs more prevalently in the private sector, logically that
generates a need for more, not less, effective remedies than those
enjoyed by public sector employees. Yet ineffective remedies for
anti-union discrimination and retaliation, as Professor Paul Weiler
showed more than twenty-five years ago, 62 stands out as a
57. E.g., Oregon, OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 242.726 (West 2003).
58. Compare the private sector law infra Part III.B.2.
59. E.g., Oregon, OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 243.742-56 (West 2003 & Supp.
2008).
60. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 243.650-782 (West 2003 & Supp. 2008).
61. Greenhouse, supra note 44; see also Derek C. Bok, Reflections on the
Distinctive Character of American Labor Laws, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1394 (1971)
(discussion of American Exceptionalism); Weiler, Promises To Keep, supra
note 15; Weiler, Hard Times for Unions, supra note 33.
62. Weiler, Promises to Keep, supra note 15, at 1788-89.
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hallmark of the NLRA. Many scholars since concurred. 63 Simply
put, discrimination against employees who attempt to lead union
organizing campaigns often makes sense to managers based on a
simple cost-benefit-risk model.
In the current system such discrimination often escapes proof.
The NLRB brings formal complaints to hearing in only a small
percentage of the charges filed.64 Where proof does exist,
individual managers are not held accountable. Even more telling,
toothless cease and desist and back pay remedies leave affected
employees with little to show for challenging illegal discrimination
through the NLRA; back pay is conditioned upon mitigation, and
interim earnings are set off against any back pay awarded.65 Even
this is denied for undocumented workers (although labor law, in
theory, applies to them).66 Litigation of anti-union firings often
takes years with no interlocutory relief.67 For most reinstated
employees life has moved on in the years of litigation, and they
decline reinstatement. Furthermore, many who do accept
reinstatement continue to suffer discrimination, and most wind up
resigning within a year or two. 6 8 Contrast this feeble remedial
scheme with the compensatory (including emotional distress) and
punitive damages relief available to victims of other forms of
employment discrimination.
Consider the effect on other employees. This system inevitably
chills union support amongst many "streetwise" employees who
witness or hear tales about the fate of employees who dare to take
the lead. Most employees bear responsibilities to their families, do
not wish to jeopardize their chances for promotions or future
employment opportunities, or simply are focused on other aspects
of life. The NLRB process takes years to obtain a judicially
enforceable order via the civil contempt power; momentum toward
unionization long dissipates before any consequences occur on the
63. See supra note 34.
64. For example, in 2004, 29,954 informal charges were closed (twenty-
nine percent were withdrawn, often at the suggestion of NLRB officials, thirty-
one percent were dismissed by the NLRB without formal complaint, thirty-six
percent were settled or adjusted, and only two point three percent proceeded to
formal complaint and hearing). COX ET AL., supra note 7, at 99.
65. See COX ET AL., supra note 7, at 263-73 (discussing severe delays,
inadequate enforcement of reinstatement rights, and limited equitable back pay
relief requiring deduction of mitigation income for illegal discrimination under
the NLRA); ST. ANTOINE ET AL., supra note 38.
66. Hoffman Plastics Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002).
67. Id. at 271-73.
68. CoX ET AL., supra note 7, at 266-67.
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ground.69 While management attorneys cannot ethically counsel
violation of federal law, they have a duty to inform their clients not
only of the law, but of the legal consequences for its violation.
Only the most obtuse manager could fail to see the course of action
often making the most sense to the bottom line. Even managers
wishing in earnest to comply with labor law face an unequal
competitive playing field vis-a-vis firms and managers who do not.
3. Other Failings of Federal Labor Law Create an Imbalance
that Favors Managers Resisting Unions and Tilts the NLRB
Elections Process in Favor of Employers
The NLRA promises much but delivers little. The "beating
heart" of the NLRA lies in Section 7.70 That provision, in theory,
assures U.S. employees the right to organize in organizations of
their own choosing, to bargain collectively with their employers
over the terms and conditions of their employnent, and to take
concerted activity for mutual aid and protection.7' Since the 1947
Taft-Hartley Act, Section 7 also guarantees to employees the right
to refrain from these Section 7 rights. All of the other provisions of
the Act elaborate upon and define the contours of these rights. But
federal labor law breaks these promises to employees in multiple
ways. And, once again, even where the law imposes limits on
employer action, the calculus of costs and benefits may make
illegal action the lowest cost solution.
a. Threats, Lies, and Videotape
Beyond the failure to provide meaningful remedies for anti-
union discrimination, consider the further problems of threats, lies,
and videotape. While employers rightfully enjoy free speech
protections under the NLRA,7Z threats fall outside this protection.
The distinction between a lawful "prediction" and an illegal
"threat," however, turns on a finely tuned analytical construct
69. NLRA orders are enforced by a petition to a U.S. court of appeals.
National Labor Relations Act § 10(e), 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (2006).
70. National Labor Relations Act §7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006).
71. Id.
72. National Labor Relations Act § 8(c), 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (2006)
provides: "The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the
dissemination thereof... shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor




created by the Supreme Court forty years ago;73 that fine parsing of
words makes sense perhaps to lawyers and judges in mahogany
lined courtrooms, but it loses much of its value when viewed from
the perspective of rank and file employees hearing legal
"predictions" about closure of the worklace, loss of jobs, and
other dire consequences of unionization. Further, except in rare
circumstances, NLRA law generally ignores lies in union election
campaigns.75 Labor law regulates surveillance of union activity but
allows "polling" of employees with certain safeguards,76 non-
polling questioning,77 and individual, small group, and mass
"captive audience meetings" with supervisors and managers, at
which anti-union views find expression.
Imagine, labor lawyers, students, and professors, that you were
called to your dean's or managing partner's office to discuss his or
her opposition to some organization you were considering
supporting. Would you be willing, with all the demands of work,
and, perhaps, the pressing need to cook a promised meal for the
family or to attend your child's soccer game, to risk your job, your
promotional prospects, your next raise, and all of the assignments
and other decisions that can make work life better or worse? Many
of us would not. Alas, in the real world, this reaction occurs,
perhaps, more often than not.
73. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 618 (1969) ("[The
employer] may even make a prediction as to the precise effects he [sic] believes
unionization will have on his [sic] company. In such a case, however, the
prediction must be carefully phrased on the basis of objective fact to convey an
employer's belief as to demonstrably probable consequences beyond his [sic]
control or to convey a management decision already arrived at to close the plant
in case of unionization."); Crown Bolt, Inc. v. Wholesale Delivery Drivers,
Salespersons, Indust. & Allied Workers, Local 848, 343 N.L.R.B. 776 (2004)
(three-two ruling by Bush II Board reversing longstanding NLRB precedent and
holding that threats and other coercive statements will no longer be presumed
disseminated within bargaining unit absent evidence to contrary).
74. NLRB v. Federbush Co., 121 F.2d 954, 957 (2d Cir. 1941) (Judge
Learned Hand: "Words are not pebbles in alien juxtaposition .... What to an
outsider will be no more than the vigorous presentation of a conviction, to an
employee may be the manifestation of a determination which it is not safe to
thwart.").
75. Midland Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Local 304A, United Food & Commercial
Workers Union, 263 N.L.R.B. 127 (1982).
76. Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local 49 v. NLRB, 353 F.2d 852 (D.C.
Cir. 1965).
77. Bourne v. NLRB, 332 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1964); Rossmore House v. Hotel
Employees & Rest. Employees Union, Local 11, 269 N.L.R.B. 1176 (1984).
78. NLRB v. United Steelworkers of Am., 357 U.S. 357 (1958).
20091
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
b. No Equal Access and No Equal Time
Such rules might do in a system fostering robust debate with
unimpeded access by both sides to employees, but the NLRA, as
interpreted by the Supreme Court half a century a o, denies the
union any right of equal time with the employees. Moreover, a
Supreme Court majority in the Lechmere Square case 80 restricted
union representatives' access to employer property in all but the
most unusual circumstances. 81 Although access in theory cannot be
denied on a discriminatory basis, 82 the NLRB majority appointed
by President Bush II recently announced a loosening of the rule
against discriminatory access.83 That same 2007 decision also
generally denied access through employer e-mail systems even
though the employer generally permits employees to use the e-mail
system for personal matters. 8 While employees may be free to
discuss the New York Yankees or a television show like
"American Idol" while doing their work, they can lawfully be
forbidden from talking about a union unless on a break and away
from the work area.85
c. The Fist in the Velvet Glove
86
These rules apply before and during the period after a union
files for an NLRB-sponsored election to decide if the employees
wish to be represented by a union. The election process extends a
minimum of six or seven weeks, and often much longer,
potentially stretching for years with appeals.
It is as if, in a political election involving Republicans and
Democrats, only the Democrats enjoy unfettered access to the
electorate at work, on company e-mail, and in captive audience
meetings with managers supporting Democrats. Even more
importantly, to carry the analogy of political elections further, it is
as if only the Democratic campaign managers hold power over the
voters' jobs, compensation, promotions, and job security, and can
legally delay even a victorious Republican from taking office for
79. Id.
80. Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527 (1992).
81. Id.
82. NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956).
83. Guard Publ'g Co. v. Eugene Newspaper Guild, 351 N.L.R.B. 1110 (2007).
84. Id.
85. Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945).
86. NLRB v. Exch. Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405,409 (1964).
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months or years. Thus, as many scholars point out, NLRB
elections fall far short of an equal contest.
87
d. The Linden Lumber Rule and Dana Corporation Rules: The
American Belief in Fair Elections
During the first thirty years after enactment of the NLRA in
1935, unions often won representation rights by obtaining
signatures from the majority of employees on authorization "cards"
stating their desire for such representation. (We can return to the
analogy of the political election process where signing cards often
constitutes the method for registering with a political party.) Often
the employers voluntarily "recognized" the union without any
election, and the collective bargaining process desired by the
employee majority began immediately. Indeed, for much of this
period, unless the employer could show a good faith doubt that the
union represented an uncoerced majority of the employees, labor
law required voluntary recognition upon demand from the union
demonstrating a majority via authorization cards.88
For the past thirty-five years, however, the path to unionization
increasingly was led through the NLRB election process discussed
above rather than through voluntary recognition based on card
majorities. While for a time Board law on the right of an employer
to delay collective bargaining by refusing to recognize a union, even
in the face of an overwhelming "card majority" in favor of89
representation, sometimes vacillated. In the 1974 Linden Lumber
87. See Atleson, supra note 33; Brudney, supra note 33; Cynthia Estlund,
Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in an Era of Self-Regulation, 105 CoLUM.
L. REV. 319, 324 n. 15 (2005) [hereinafter Estlund, Rebuilding the Law] ("[T]his
pessimism stems from the fact that the right to form a union is perhaps the most
trampled upon and underenforced of employees' legal rights."); Richard B.
Freeman & Morris M. Kleiner, Employer Behavior in the Face of Union
Organizing Drives, 43 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 351 (1990); Raja Raghunath,
Stacking the Deck: Privileging "Employer Free Choice" Over Industrial
Democracy in the Card-Check Debate, 87 NEB. L. REv. 329 (2008) (the key to
understanding the NLRB process is the "asymmetrical employer power" most
often inherent in the employment relationship); Weiler, Promises To Keep,
supra note 15.
88. Joy Silk Mills, Inc. v. United Textile Workers of Am., 85 N.L.R.B. 1263
(1949); NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 592 (1969) ("The traditional
approach utilized by the Board for many years has been known as the Joy Silk
doctrine .... Under that rule, an employer could lawfully refuse to bargain with a
union claiming representative status through possession of authorization cards if
he [sic] had a 'good faith doubt' as to the union's majority status.").
89. The "Nixon Board," for example, permitted the employer to refuse
recognition even absent a good faith doubt about the union's majority support.
Linden Lumber Div., Summer & Co. v. NLRB, 419 U.S. 301 (1974).
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case90 a five-four majority of the Supreme Court enshrined that
employer option in federal labor law. Since that time, employers far
more often, and quite understandably, take the opportunity to refuse
recognition in the face of union card majorities and force the union
to file for an election, thus delaying collective bargaining for
substantial periods. This provides time for employers to wage an
anti-union campaign in the one-sided election process described
above. 91
In response to this reality, unions during the past ten to fifteen
years increasingly sought ways to avoid the NLRB election process
and the delays and opportunity for employee undue influence
presented in that process. They sought "neutrality agreements" with
employers, "labor peace" agreements, and "card check" agreements
in advance of trying to obtain employee signatures on representation
cards. 92 Under these arrangements employers (perhaps threatened
with consumer picketing or "corporate campaigns," promised union
cooperation on productivity or other issues, or the union's pledge to
forebear use of the strike or boycotts) contract in advance not to
oppose unionization, or at least to accept a card showinj, of the
union's majority without resort to Linden Lumber elections. 3 Some
90. Id. Justices Stewart, White, Marshall, and Powell dissented, noting that
Section 9(a) expressly states that the exclusive bargaining representative "shall
be the union 'designated or selected' by a majority of the employees in an
appropriate unit," that legislative history did not support the majority's rule
requiring an election, and that Section 9(c)(1)(B) (giving employers the right to
file their own NLRB election), on which the majority relied, was not intended to
allow an employer merely to refuse recognition without filing an election
petition. Id, at 311-17. National Labor Relations Act, § 9(c)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. §
159(c)(1)(B) (2006) on its face directs the NLRB to hold an election upon
receiving an employer election petition only where a "question of representation
... exists." Under the earlier Board law, a "question of representation" (known
to practitioners of that earlier era as a "QCR") could arise in various situations
including a "good faith doubt" about the union's majority status, or conflicting
claims by rival unions.
91. Unions consistently lose more than half of such campaigns. Raghunath,
supra note 87, at 334-35 n.27; Adrienne E. Eaton & Jill Kriesky, Union
Organizing Under Neutrality and Card Check Agreements, 55 INDus. & LAB.
REL. REv. 42, 51-52 (2001) (unions won 45.64% of representation elections
during a fifteen year study period). Not surprisingly, support for union
representation typically declines during such campaigns. Laura Cooper,
Authorization Cards and Union Representation Election Outcome: An Empirical
Assessment of the Assumption Underlying the Supreme Court's Gissel Decision,
79 Nw. U. L. REv. 87 (1984).
92. See Henry H. Drummonds, The Union Authorization Card Majority
Debate, 58 LAB. L.J. 217 (2007) [hereinafter Drummonds, Union Authorization].
Legitimate questions exist concerning whether the card majority process
adequately protects employee free choice. See infra Part III.B.
93. See Brudney, supra note 33.
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unions, especially the Service Employees International Union
(SEIU), tasted success with these innovative techniques designed as
they were to avoid anti-union campaigns by employers.
94
In 2007, however, the Bush II Board majority changed the
rules in the Dana Corporation case.95 That three-two decision
96
held that, even after voluntary recognition by an employer based
upon a union's uncoerced card majority, the "recognition bar" 97 (to
bar further contest of the union's majority status for a "reasonable
time, 98) would not be in effect until the employees were allowed a
forty-five day period to seek an election after formal notice of an
employer's recognition of the union based on a card majority.99
This reversed the Board's decades-old "recognition bar"
doctrine.' 00 That doctrine, and its sister doctrines, the election
certification' 0' and contract bar doctrines, 10 2 balance two labor
relations policies that conflict: the need for stability in the
bargaining relationship and the right of employee free choice
guaranteed in Section 7. Under the new Dana Corporation rules,
94. The SEIU, unlike most of its sister unions, expanded its membership in
the past ten years through such campaigns as "Justice for Janitors" and the
organization of home health care workers in California, Oregon, and other states.
95. Dana Corp. v. Int'l Union, United Auto., UAW., 351 N.L.RB. 434 (2007).
See generally Drummonds, Union Authorization, supra note 92, at 221-22.
96. Members Liebman and Walsh concurred in the result but dissented on
the majority's reasoning and announcement of new rules for voluntary
recognition situations. President Obama has nominated member Liebman to
serve as the next Chair of the NLRB. Craig Becker, whose scholarship carefully
explained the one-sided nature of NLRB elections, is President Obama's
nominee to fill another Board seat.
97. Under the "recognition bar," the union was guaranteed representation
rights for a "reasonable time." In one case under the "Clinton Board," time
periods of five, ten, and eleven plus months were deemed within the
"reasonable" bar period. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc. v. Local Joint Executive Bd.,
329 N.L.R.B. 464 (1999).
98. Id.
99. Dana Corp., 351 N.L.R.B. 434.
100. Id. (Liebman and Walsh, dissenting in part).
101. National Labor Relations Act § 9(c)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3) (2006)
(one-year election bar from date of Board election); Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S.
96 (1954) (one-year "certification" bar from date of Board's certification of
union in prior election).
102. See Auciello Iron Works, Inc. v. NLRB, 517 U.S. 781, 786 (1996);
NLRB v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 290 n.12 (conclusive
presumption of union's majority status during term of collective bargaining
agreement, up to three years). To prevent perpetual bars to a challenge to a
union's majority status via successive, back-to-back contracts, the "contract bar"
does not apply during the thirty-day period beginning ninety days before
contract expiration. This "window period" constitutes employees' only
opportunity to seek to decertify a union, or change unions, during the period of
collective bargaining agreements.
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the process of bargaining with a stable bargaining representative is,
under the best of circumstances, delayed for this forty-five day
period (ignoring the period required to give the employees formal
notice of the employer's recognition based on a card majority and
any appeals of the election proceedings). Moreover, under the
approach adopted by the Dana Corporation majority, a mere thirty
percent of the employees can force an election, thus potentially
delaying bargaining desired by a strong majority of the
employees. 1
03
e. Remedies for Violations of Election Rules by Employers
Impose No Penalties and Raise No Deterrent to Illegal Conduct
Sometimes unions successfully win rulings that employer
election conduct violates labor law prohibitions. But even weaker
remedies exist for election conduct violations than the back pay
remedy for anti-union retaliation and discrimination discussed
above. A cease and desist order, accompanied by a required
posting acknowledging an NLRB finding of violations, perhaps
coming after many months and often years of litigation,
demonstrates the impotence rather than the power of the NLRB
remedial process. A "new election," which the NLRB sometimes
orders after illegal employer conduct, long after employees first
sought union representation, similarly fails to vindicate employee
rights. Delay most often aids employers in the delicate situation of
a new organizing campaign. It is not that employers are "evil."
Rather, it is that an employer's quite business-like calculation of
cost and benefit counsels, even if their lawyers are constrained by
ethical considerations, that risking findings of illegal conduct in
order to discourage or avoid unionization pays dividends. Federal
labor law, and not the employers who take advantage of it, bears
the responsibility for the present sad state of affairs in the
American system of labor relations.
4. Weaknesses in the Collective Bargaining Process Further
Contribute to the Decline of Collective Bargaining
The second "beating heart" right in Section 7 of the NLRA
constitutes the right to have good faith bargaining determine the
103. It seems likely that a new "Obama Board" majority will reverse the
Dana Corp. ruling. But this merely demonstrates how "labor law" has become
politicized, with doctrines shifting to and fro based on the political
administration. See infra Part IV.B.
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outcome of the bargaining process. The duty to bargain in good
faith again presents employers with opportunities to delay.
a. The Remedial Scheme Lacks Teeth
Even where unions and employees successfully overcome all
of these obstacles and collective bargaining ensues, the NLRA
suffers inadequacy. Most importantly, no effective remedy for bad
faith bargaining exists. Although Section 10(c) authorizes the
Board to award "cease and desist" orders and "such affirmative
action . . . as will effectuate the policies of this Act,"'1 4 a
straightjacket imposed by the Supreme Court in the H.K. Porter'0 5
case curtails the Board's discretion. That case disapproved of the
Board awarding a disputed contract clause as a remedy for a
refusal to bargain in good faith about that provision. 10r6 As a
consequence, the NLRB fell into a pattern of often meaningless
remedies: cease and desist orders years after the events in question
due to the length of the unfair labor practice process, orders to post
notices or otherwise notify the employees of the violation, and the
like, rejecting more creative remedies. 10 7 In short, NLRB remedies
for bad faith bargaining trigger the proverbial "slap on the wrist."
Finally, beyond the lack of substance in the remedies for bad
faith bargaining, the process itself entails delays of many months
104. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (2006).
105. H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970).
106. Id. at 102 (a "dues check off' clause allowing the union to collect union
dues through a payroll deduction authorized by the employee).
107. See Ex-Cell-O Corp. v. Int'l Union, UAW., 185 N.L.R.B. 107 (1970)
(After union won election in 1964, employer found guilty of unfair labor
practices by administrative law judge in 1967. In 1970-six years after the
election-a three-two majority rejected award of monetary losses suffered by
the employees as the result of the employer's illegal conduct as too speculative,
citing H.K. Porter Co., 397 U.S. 99.) "Punitive remedies" are not allowed. Id.
See also Tiidee Prods., Inc. v. Int'l Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers, 194
N.L.R.B. 1234 (1972). The "Clinton Board," led by Professor William Gould,
made efforts to innovate, which, at least for now, fell by the wayside during the
"Bush II" years. See Care Manor of Farmington, Inc. v. New Eng. Health Care
Employees Union, Dist. 1199, 318 N.L.R.B. 330 (1996) (award of union and
Board's costs of litigation after employer blatantly refused to bargain after
certification). But other cases hold that attorneys' fees cannot be awarded. E.g.,
Unbelievable, Inc. v. NLRB, 118 F.3d 795 (D.C. Cir. 1997). Remedies for the
Board and Union, of course, do nothing to help employees whose right to
collective bargaining suffers delay or denial.
In one area, however, NLRA remedies do bite. Under the unilateral change
doctrine, an employer making a change in working conditions unilaterally,
without any bargaining, or without bargaining in good faith to impasse, may be
liable to make the employees whole for any losses suffered as a result of the
unilateral change. NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962).
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or, frequently, years. All the while employees desiring collective
representation must wait without losing faith in the process. With
an increasingly mobile workforce, union support inevitably suffers
erosion.
b. The Problem of Proof Further Makes the Duty to Bargain in
Good Faith Problematic
Another problem arises from Congress' addition of Section 8-d
to the Taft-Hartley Act.10 8 That section states, among other
provisions, that the duty to bargain collectively with a duly
certified or recognized union representative "does not compel
either party to agree to a proposal or [even] require the making of a
concession."' 0 9 Good faith bargaining about the terms and
conditions of employment constitutes the only command of the
statute." 0 The Supreme Court assumes that economic self-help
measures (strikes, slowdowns, lockouts, and unilateral
implementation of the employer's proposals at "impasse"), or the
threat thereof, drive the parties to compromise and reach
agreement."' No requirement to take "rational" positions at the
bargaining table exists.
This makes proof of bad faith in the bargaining process crucial.
But subjective bad faith in the bargaining process often evades
108. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2006).
109. Id. National Labor Relations Act Section 8(d) embodies a fundamental
principle of the NLRA: it remains neutral on the terms and conditions of
employment and instead imposes requirements designed to implement a
bargaining system, not to control the outcome of that bargaining. Anomalously,
however, the states retain freedom to directly regulate the terms and conditions
of employment being bargained about and to impose minimum labor standards
legislation on a state-by-state basis. See, e.g., Metro. Life Ins. Co. v.
Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985) (mandated mental health coverage in an
employer provided medical insurance plan not preempted by NLRA). See infra
Part IV.B.
110. An early case defined the duty as "[an] obligation . . .to participate
actively in the deliberations so as to indicate a present intention to find a basis
for agreement." NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 133 F.2d 676 (9th Cir.
1943). There have been many varying formulations by changing Boards and
Courts of Appeals over the years.
111. See, e.g., NLRB v. Ins. Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960). (This
case adopted the economic power model rather than the rational model for
collective bargaining. Though the Court held that a union slowdown was not
inconsistent with good faith bargaining in that case, it also noted that the
slowdown and other forms of unconventional strike activity fall outside the
protections of Section 7; such pressure tactics are neither protected nor
prohibited by the Act with the result that the employees can lawfully be fired for
engaging in such tactics.).
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proof." 2 Thus the line between illegal "surface bargaining" and
"dilatory tactics," on the one hand, and lawful "hard bargaining,"
on the other hand, remains an elusive one."1
3
c. The Employer Calculus of Risk and Benefit
These realities again tempt employers. Even though their
lawyers cannot ethically counsel going through the motions to
delay and frustrate the process, employers may very rationally
make the calculation themselves that they risk little but may gain
much by delaying the bargaining process via bad faith bargaining.
d Problems with the Bargaining Process Are Especially Acute
in First Contract Situations
Fragile relationships mark new bargaining relationships.
Employers may still be skeptical and even hostile to the process.
The union carries no demonstrated record to the employees in the
new bargaining unit. Majorities of employees favoring collective
bargaining may be soft. Although collective bargaining resolves
the overwhelming majority of "successor" contracts in established
relationships without strikes or other disruption, 1 4 first contracts
experience a noticeably higher failure rate-at least one-third of
first contract negotiations (and that percentage rose to forty-four
percent 2000-2004) fail to produce a collective bargaining
agreement. 115 But no effective remedy for bad faith bargaining
exists in such situations. Without any past demonstration of the
union's effectiveness in improving their compensation, fringe
benefits, hours or overtime pay rules, job security, grievance
procedures, and other terms and conditions of employment,
employees exhibit less solidarity and backing for the newly formed
union. And again, quite understandably, this tempts employers
who have lost elections and the appeals that typically follow.
112. Some requirements of the bargaining obligation involve objective
elements, for example, the duty to reduce agreements to writing and the duty to
meet at reasonable times and places. National Labor Relations Act § 8(d), 29
U.S.C. § 158(d) (2006). The subjective requirement of good faith remains,
however, problematic from a proof perspective.
113. Thomas P. Brown, IV Hard Bargaining: The Board Says No, the Courts
Say Yes, 8 EMP. REL. L.J. 37 (1982).
114. One study indicated that five point eight percent to seven point seven
percent of renewal contract negotiations resulted in no agreement. Joel Cutcher-
Gershenfeld et al., How Do Labor and Management View Collective
Bargaining?, MONTHLY LAB. REv., Oct. 1998, at 23, 30.
115. From 2000-2004, first contract negotiations failed forty-four percent of
the time. COX ET. AL., supra note 7, at 529 n.4.
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Organizing new groups of employees, even those clearly wanting
union representation, entails major risks of failure. Employees
often grasp this reality.
5. Problems with the Third Section 7 "Beating Heart" Right:
The Federally Protected Right to Engage in "Concerted
Activity for Mutual Aid and Protection"11 6
We turn now to the last of the Section 7 "beating heart" rights
under the NLRA. Here again labor law makes unkept promises.
a. Permanent Replacement of Strikers Makes a Mockery of the
Federally Protected "Right" to Engage in "Concerted Activity
for Mutual Aid and Protection 1 1 7
Union labor lawyers must sometimes explain to bargaining
units facing a strike the law of permanent replacement of
strikers. 118 Imagine the following talk to a group of employees
considering whether to strike:
You have an absolute right under federal labor law, if you
so choose, to band together to strike in support of your
union's bargaining position with your employer. This right
is guaranteed by Section 7 of the NLRA. You cannot
lawfully be retaliated or discriminated against in any way
because you choose to exercise this right. Such
discrimination would be illegal under Sections 8(a)(1) and
(a)(3) of the federal act. However, you can be permanently
replaced while you are on strike. That means that if, before
you cease striking, the employer hires other workers to
permanently replace you and does not commit unfair labor
116. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006).
117. National Labor Relations Act §§ 7, 8(a)(1), 8(a)(3), 13, 29 U.S.C. §§
157, 158(a)(1), 158(a)(3), 163 (2006).
118. The seminal case is NLRB v. MacKay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S.
333 (1938). There, in a case involving discrimination against strike leaders after
a strike, clearly illegal, the Supreme Court, while affirming an NLRB ruling in
favor of the leaders and reinstating them, rather casually declared in dictum:
Although § 13 provides, "Nothing in this Act shall be construed so as
to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike," it
does not follow that an employer, guilty of no act denounced by the
statute, has lost the right to protect and continue his business by
supplying places left vacant by strikers. And he is not bound to
discharge those hired to fill the places of strikers, upon the election of
the latter to resume their employment, in order to create places for
them.
Id. at 345-46 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
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practices over which you are striking,1 19 then the employer
may keep the replacement workers in your place instead of
reinstating you. You do have a right, even if permanently
replaced, to go on a preferential rehiring list in the event of
new vacancies after you make an unconditional offer or
request to return to work (no strings attached).
Of course you know the typical response of employees: "Say
what?"
The employer's right to permanently replace strikers, without
violating their federally protected right to strike, even when those
strikers offer to return to work unconditionally (i.e., on the
employer's terms), stands as one of the most perplexing anomalies
in labor law. Rarely used during the first decades of the NLRA, it
became more popular and known after President Reagan
successfully and permanently replaced striking air traffic
controllers in 1981.1 0
Though the doctrine stems from dictum in a Supreme Court
case in 1938, when the NLRA was in its infancy,12 and further
seems inconsistent with the express language of Section 13,122 a
divided Supreme Court in 1989 reaffirmed the doctrine and
extended it to allow employers to 2 prefer strikers who abandon a
strike before their fellow workers.' 3A bill to overrule the doctrine
in Congress in the early 1990s passed the House of Representatives
but failed in the Senate in the face of a threatened filibuster.'
24
119. Employees who strike over an employer's unfair labor practices do have
a right to reinstatement upon their unconditional offer to return to work. Collins
& Aikman Corp. v. Textile Workers Union of Am., 165 N.L.R.B. 678 (1967).
120. Joseph A. McCartin, Marking a Tragic Anniversary, HIST. NEWS SERV.,
Aug. 3, 2001, http://www.h-net.org/-hns/articles/2001/080301a.html. One study
showed that permanent replacement was used in fifteen to twenty percent of
strikes during the 1970s and 1980s. Seth D. Harris, Coase's Paradox and the
Inefficiencies of Permanent Replacement, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 1185, 1217 n. 118
(2002). "Strikes involving permanent replacement workers tend to be ugly,
emotional affairs. Deep and long-lasting cleavages in personal lives and
communities can result." Id. at 1221. Of course, because of ex ante effects on the
parties' assessment of their relative bargaining strength, the doctrine affects many
more collective bargaining situations, weakening the union's perceived power.
121. MacKay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. at 345-46.
122. National Labor Relations Act § 13, 29 U.S.C. § 163 (2006).
123. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Indep. Fed'n of Flight Attendants, 489
U.S. 426 (1989) ("crossover" flight attendants, who abandoned strike before
union and other flight attendants, did not have to be displaced to make place for
striking flight attendants with more seniority at end of strike).
124. COX ET. AL., supra note 7, at 587-88. President Clinton attempted to
overturn the doctrine as to federal procurement contractors by Executive Order,
but this attempt was struck down by the District Columbia Circuit Court of
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While some countries forbid employers from operating at all
during a strike, the use of temporary replacements to operate
during strikes is less controversial in the United States. But the
inclusion of permanent replacement in the panoply of employer
options during bargaining disputes raises the stakes for employees
contemplating a strike action; the strikers may not only lose the
strike and be forced to accept the employer's terms, but they may
de facto lose their jobs as well. Many employees express
reluctance to take these risks. By the same token, employers
wishing to rid themselves of a union may be tempted to force a
bargaining dispute to impasse, daring the employees to strike, with
the intention of replacing them permanently. Thus the permanent
replacement doctrine affects not only the rights of the parties after
a strike, but it triggers ex ante effects weakening a union's position
as well.
b. The Power to Lockout Employees Both Defensively and
Offensively During Bargaining Disputes
The first lockout situations approved under the NLRA occurred
in situations where the employer acted defensively: to prevent the
union from striking at a particularly damaging time, or in such a
situation or manner, or to prevent "whipsaw" tactics in multi-
employer bargaining units.125 Soon enough, however, the right to
lockout employees extended to offensive lockouts designed to
economically pressure the union and employees to come to
agreement in collective bargaining.' 26 Thus the employer's options
expanded to include the offensive use of lockouts in bargaining
disputes (as well as permanent replacement of strikers,
Appeals in Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Reich, 74 F.3d 1322 (D.C. Cir.
1996).
125. E.g., NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local Union No. 449, 353 U.S. 87 (1957)
(lockout to counter "whipsaw" union tactics, striking one employer in multiple-
employer bargaining unit at a time while continuing work for other employers in
multiple-employer group, held lawful); Int'l Shoe Co. v. Local 198, United
Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastic Workers of Am., 93 N.L.R.B. 907 (1951)
(lockout to avoid unprotected repetitive strike disruptions); Duluth Bottling
Ass'n v. Brewery & Soft Drink Workers' Union Local No. 133, 48 N.L.R.B.
1335 (1943) (lockout to prevent spoilage of perishable goods during strike).
126. See Am. Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965) (reversing the
NLRB's holding that a lockout was for the sole purpose of placing economic
pressure on the employees and was thus illegal); Harter Equip., Inc. v. Local
825, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 280 N.L.R.B. 597 (1986) (temporary
replacements authorized for lockout motivated solely by desire to put economic
pressure on union to resolve bargaining dispute).
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reinstatement preferences for employees who abandon a strike, and
unilateral implementation of an employer's proposals after
reaching a bargaining impasse where there is no strike or lockout).
c. Restrictions on Peaceful Union Picketing and Boycotts: The
I O(L) Provision for Mandated Interlocutory Injunctive Relief
Petitions and the Damages Remedies Under LMRA Section 303
for Illegal Secondary Boycotts
Only one provision in the LMIRA provides for damages
remedies, the Section 303127 action for damages aqainst unions
engage in illegal, albeit peaceful, secondary boycotts. Similarly,
Section 10(1) r 9 includes the only provision of the Act providing
for mandatory interlocutory filings for injunctive relief in the
federal district courts; this provision applies to both secondary
boycotts and illegal recognitional picketing.'30 While nothing in
theory makes these provisions inappropriate, it is striking that these
remedies, extraordinary given the general remedial scheme of the
Act, apply only in actions against unions.
6. Summary of Imbalances in the NLRA and the LMRA
Thus, under current law, private sector unions cannot protect
workers from anti-union discrimination, do not have equal access
to employees considering whether to unionize, possess no effective
legal remedies for failures to bargain in good faith, and find resort
to economic pressure hindered by doctrines like permanent
replacement of strikers, offensive employer lockouts, damages
liability for secondary boycotts, and preferential injunctive relief
for secondary boycotts and recognitional picketing.
The discussion thus far has focused on the many weaknesses in
federal labor law. These weaknesses are especially striking given
the NLRA's professed policy goals:
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States
[in order to protect commerce] ... encourag[e] the practice
and procedure of collective bargaining and ... protect[] the
exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-
127. Labor Management Relations Act § 303, 29 U.S.C. § 187 (2006)
(damages actions against unions engaging in secondary boycotts).
128. National Labor Relations Act § 8(b)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (2006)
(secondary boycotts).
129. 29 U.S.C. § 160(1) (2006).
130. National Labor Relations Act § 8(b)(7), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7) (2006)
(recognitional picketing lasting longer than thirty days).
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organization, and designation of representatives of their
own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and




But more positive reasons exist for favoring change and innovation
in labor law.
B. The Potential of Labor Law Revitalization to Help to Create
More Structural Balance in the Relationships Among Employees,
Managers, and Investors
1. The Failure of Unfettered Free Markets
The Great Recession of 2008-2009 exposed the limits of
unfettered free markets as a guiding ideology in economic
arrangements. 132 Americans at every social level struggle with the
collapse of real estate markets, financial firms, lending, demand for
the goods and services that small and other businesses provide, and
the curtailment ofjob opportunities and work.
Bailouts of the financial industry by the federal government
show that mechanisms for increasing rewards to investment
bankers and hedge fund managers'13  failed to appropriately
balance risks. Much of this risk now falls on taxpayers. A system
that provides great benefits to decision-makers while transferring
the risks of the activities involved to others falls far short of the
free market capitalism espoused by neoclassical scholars. 
134
This failed system benefited not only financial institutions and
fund managers but the executive suite as well. During the past
decades the compensation of CEOs, CFOs, and other top-level
corporate managers increased dramatically in proportion to the
average earnings of employees in those same corporations.
135
131. National Labor Relations Act § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2006).
132. The "dot corn" bubble and scandals involving the Enron Corporation
and other companies during the early 2000s taught a similar lesson and led
directly to attempts at reform such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
133. See Joe Nocera, First, Let's Fix the Bonuses, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 21, 2009,
at B 1 (2008 bonuses on Wall Street totaled $18.4 billion though the financial crisis
resulted in loses in the fourth quarter alone of $15.3 billion. Merrill Lynch, driven
to a forced sale to the Bank of America to avoid bankruptcy, distributed $3.6
billion in bonuses in the two days before the acquisition); Louise Story, Just a
Little.Offthe Top, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 25, 2009, at B 1.
134. See, e.g., Joseph E. Stiglitz, The End of Neo-Liberalism?, PROJECT
SYNDICATE, July 2008, http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/stiglitzlO.
135. Self-dealing characterizes executive compensation. Compensation
committees on Boards of Directors, consisting chiefly of other executives
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American executives in Fortune 500 companies now earn 300-400
times the compensation of average employees; this stands in sharp
contrast to the ratios prevailing in Japan and the European
Union. 36 Moreover, the now prevalent swollen packages of
today's executive officers dwarf the ratios common in the United
States only a generation ago.' 37 Many of the companies managed
by these executive officers have fallen on hard times: bankruptcy,
major restructurings involving the loss of many thousands of jobs,
reductions in wages, salaries, and hours, and disruption of local
communities and smaller businesses-to name a few of the
effects. 138 The executive suite took high compensation but rarely
shared in the direct human costs of flawed decision-making.
appointed most often with the support of the CEO, commission comparability
studies from firms specializing in the study of executive compensation. Not
surprisingly, this system led to the outsized compensation packages seen today.
The problem has been present for more than twenty-five years. See GRAEF S.
CRYSTAL, IN SEARCH OF EXCESS: THE OVERCOMPENSATION OF AMERICAN
EXECUTIVES (1991) 27-28 (documenting declining inflation adjusted earnings
for most American workers in the 1970s and 1980s, demonstrating that
American executive salaries dramatically increased during the same period, and
finding that U.S. CEO's earn far more, as a ratio of average worker pay, than
their managerial counterparts in Japan and Europe); Paul Weiler & Guy
Mundlak, New Directions for the Law of the Workplace, 102 YALE L.J. 1907,
1909 n.6 (1993) (noting that hourly wages for average employees decreased
since the 1970s). These trends, already established in the 1990s, continue today.
See Elizabeth Gudrais, Unequal America: Causes and Consequences of the
Wide--and Growing-Gap Between Poor and Rich, 110 HARV. MAG. 22 (July-
Aug. 2008), available at http://harvardmag.com/pdf/2008/07-pdfs/0708-22.pdf.
See also former U.S. Secretary of Labor Professor Robert Reich's recent speech
as reported in the Miami Herald. Scott Andron, Former Labor Secretary Robert
Reich Critical of Stagnant Wages, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 12, 2009, at Cl; Joseph
Stiglitz, MARKETS AND MORALS infra note 141.
136. U.S. CEO salaries average around 400 times that of average worker pay.
See Politics and Economy: Executive Pay, NOW ON PBS Jan. 20, 2006,
http://www.pbs.org/now/politics/executivepay06.html (last visited Sept. 4, 2009)
(average pay for an American worker was $27,000, compared to the average pay
for an American CEO of $11.8 million).
137. Id. For comparisons of CEO pay rates, including Japan, Europe and the
United States, see Adam Choate et al., CEO Pay Rates: U.S. vs. Foreign
Nations, (Nov. 17, 2005) (unpublished paper), www.cab.latech.edu/-mkroll/
5 1O_papers/fall_05/Group6.pdf (U.S. CEO's paid substantially more than
foreign counterparts). See also Jeffrey Stinson, More Critics, USA TODAY, June
30, 2008, at 3B (comparing German, French, and British CEO pay to United
States CEO pay).
138. See Hubert B. Herring, BULLETIN BOARD: At the Top, Pay and
Performance Are Often Far Apart, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2003, § 3, at 9
(reporting on result of study by executive pay expert Graef Crystal); Graef
Crystal, Gilead's Martin: Super Performance, the Right Incentives, May 18,
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At the same time, many distinguished economists believe that
middle class wages and salaries (adjusted for inflation) have
stagnated; while incomes rose, this resulted from the widespread
growth of the "two earner" family and longer hours at work.1
39
Middle managers, engineering and other professionals, and rank
and file employees command less of the wealth generated by
American business, and income disparities grow.140 For the lowest
half of the American workforce, real income (adjusted for
inflation) has stagnated or decreased. 14 ' This works not only as an
2009, http://graefcrystal.com/images/CRYSREP GILD 5 18 09.pdf (praising
one company's executive pay because it properly measured and compensated for
executive performance in contrast to many of author's other published reports
on executive pay).
139. Andron, supra note 136 ("To hear former U.S. Labor Secretary Robert
Reich tell it, huge as the current recession is, there's a bigger problem facing
America's middle class: Wages have seen little real growth for decades .... In
part to make up for this [many] more women entered the workforce. Then
everyone started working longer hours. Then people increased borrowing.")
Secretary Reich is now a Professor at the University of California at Berkeley. See
also Krugman, infra note 146. (Mr. Krugman won the Nobel Prize in econonics in
2009); Stiglitz, infra note 141 (Mr. Stiglitz won the Nobel Prize in economics in
2001); Noonan, infra note 146; Elizabeth Warren, The Middle Class on the
Precipice:Rising Finnancial Risk for American Families, 108 HARV. MAG. 28
(Jan.-Feb. 2006), available at http://harvardmag.com/pdf/2006/01-pdfs/0106-
28.pdf. (Ms. Warren is a Professor at the Harvard Law School.)
Not all economists agree with this analysis. E.g., Stephen Rose, The Myth of
the Declining Middle Class, STATS, June 2, 2008, http://stats.org/stories/2008/
myth decline middlejune2_08.html (citing many works supporting the
declining middle class theory, but arguing as follows: though Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) per capita rose sixty-three percent between 1979 and 2007, while
median household income rose, adjusted for inflation, only thirteen percent, the
explanation is in changing "demographics" and the growth of "benefits" not
shown in the statistics; when these factors are taken into account the growth for
median middle class households has been thirty-three percent rather than
thirteen percent; further the top half of the middle class did considerably better.)
Still, even this alternative reading of the numbers makes clear that a
disproportionate share of the GDP growth over the past three decades has gone
to the highest income earners.
140. See Michel Fouquin, Globalization and Its Impact on Jobs and Wages,
in OFFSHORING AND THE INTERNALIZATION OF EMPLOYMENT: A CHALLENGE
FOR A FAIR GLOBALIZATION, at 49-50 (2006) (showing growing income
disparity in the U.S.). As a consequence, CNN's Lou Dobbs and other voices
find a popular audience in their persistent critiques of the "fate of the middle
class." See also Joseph Stiglitz, Markets and Morals, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Apr.
2006, at 44 ("'he system has delivered enormous benefits for those at the top,
but incomes at the bottom have stagnated, or even declined.") [hereinafter
Stiglitz, MARKETS AND MORALS].
141. See Richard B. Freeman, Solving the New Inequality, BOSTON REV.,
Dec. 1996-Jan. 1997, http://bostonreview.net/BR21.6/freeman.html.
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increasing perception of inequity, but it also erodes purchasing
power in the world's largest economy. 1
42
2. The Need for Structural Balancing of Economic Forces and
the Contribution That a Revitalized Union Movement and
Labor Law Can Make
The problems lie not in markets but in their imperfections.
Human greed, 143 excessive optimism, information disparities,
transaction costs, and "bounded rationality"' 44 (often ignored or
dismissed as unimportant by neoclassical scholars) require
nuanced regulation in order for free markets to deliver their bounty
to all sectors and social levels. The measure of any economic
system lies not in an abstract theoretical purity but in its ability to
broadly deliver an improved life for its citizens. Free markets work
best to increase the wealth and well-being in a society when they
are constrained by appropriate mechanisms for allocating reward
and risk. The problem arises not from "evil" actors but in flawed
structural arrangements. During the Second Gilded Age, 145 through
142. The erosion of middle and working class income and wealth has been
disguised by the welcome entry of women into the workforce and asset bubbles
in the "high tech" (especially dot corn) and real estate industries. See also
Kuttner, infra note 148.
143. The New'York Times reported on May 30, 2009, that graduates of the
Harvard Business School now take an oath not to be primarily motivated in their
business careers by greed. While increased efforts to teach ethical concepts in
business schools are noteworthy, history teaches that countervailing structures
and institutionalized accountability more effectively control this natural human
instinct. See Leslie Wayne, A Promise to Be Ethical in an Era of Temptation,
N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 2009, at B 1.
144. See Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is
Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 1159 (2003) (using the work of cognitive
psychologists and behaviorists as a starting point for their argument for
paternalistic default mechanisms subject to libertarian individual decisions to
override the default rules).
145. Peggy Noonan, Op-Ed., Rich Man, Boor Man, WALL ST. J., July 28, 2007
("We are living in the second great Gilded Age .... The gap between the rich and
poor is great."); Paul Krugman, For Richer, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2002, § 6, at 62
("Yet you can't understand what's happening in America today without
understanding the extent, causes and consequences of the vast increase in
inequality that has taken place over the last three decades, and in particular the
astonishing concentration of income and wealth in just a few hands. To make
sense of the current wave of corporate scandal, you need to understand how the
man in the gray flannel suit has been replaced by the imperial C.E.O. The
concentration of income at the top is a key reason that the United States, for all its
economic achievements, has more poverty and lower life expectancy than any
other major advanced nation. Above all, the growing concentration of wealth has
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which we have passed in recent years, these lessons were
forgotten.
What do these observations have to do with labor law reform?
Labor unions provide a countervailing force-wielded on behalf
and with the participation of middle and working class
employees-to the swollen power of executives and investment
managers. 146 They provide more structural balance in the economy,
and they do so without direct governmental regulation of the terms
and conditions of employment. 147 Imagine the effect if a union
bargaining on behalf of clerical workers (or production workers or
software engineers) routinely cast compensation proposals for the
represented employees as a percentage of CEO compensation for
the three years past, or some similar measure. Or as recently
demonstrated by the United Auto Workers, what if employees and
unions played a greater role in corporate planning about
restructuring of industries to adapt to new conditions? Or, if, under
a reformed labor law, employees could routinely participate in
corporate governance through work councils at the local,
divisional, and company level? 48
More concretely, studies consistently show that employees
represented by unions receive a premium wage for their work.
1 4 9
reshaped our political system: it is at the root both of a general shift to the right
and of an extreme polarization of our politics .... The New Gilded Age").
146. See Philippe Waquet, The Role of Labour Law For Industrial
Restructuring, in OFFSHORING AND THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF
EMPLOYMENT: A CHALLENGE FOR A FAIR GLOBALIZATION 179 (2006) ("Labour
law . . . aims to enable workers to participate in the life and future of
undertakings which are in operation thanks to their labour; it aims to ensure,
without undermining management authority (which is actually more a
responsibility), that workers have genuine guarantees.").
147. See Robert B. Reich, Does Labor Need More Clout?, S.F. CHRON., Mar.
3, 2008, at B5. President Obama recently expressed his view that passing EFCA
would help reduce income inequality, aid the middle class, and help the U.S.
economy: "'We need to level the playing field for workers and the unions that
represent their interests, because we know you cannot have a strong middle class
without a strong labor movement .... When workers are prospering, they buy
products that make businesses prosper. We can be competitive and lean and
mean and still create a situation where workers are thriving in this country."'
Robert Kuttner, President Obama Wants You to Join the Union, HUFFINGTON
POST, Feb. 1, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/Robert-kuttner/president-
obama-wants-you b 162975.html. See also David Madland & Karla Walter,
Unions Are Good for the Economy, Feb. 18, 2009, http://www.americanprogress
action.org/issues/2009/02/efcafactsheets.html.
148. See EU Works Council Directive, infra note 194.




The unions provide one means of reversing the growing income
inequality in the United States. 150 Equally important, collective
bargaining and other institutional frameworks for employee
"voice" offer a mechanism for more shared power in America.15 1
Corporations involve managers, investors, and employees working
together to create wealth. Economic structures should reflect this
fact of life. A prosperous middle class generates demand for goods
and services, stimulates investment and opportunities for
businesses 5 providing goods and services, and helps the overall
economy.' Unions can help restore this prosperity.
III. LABOR LAW REFORM THROUGH A LESS TRAVELED STATE ROAD
If public policy favors labor law reform, the scope of change
needed will more likely originate from citizen action in the state
Capitols-in Albany, Boston, Harrisburg, Columbus, Springfield,
Madison, Lansing, Sacramento, Olympia, Denver, Baton Rouge,
Tallahassee, and Austin-than from Washington D.C. History
teaches that flexibility for state level experimentation and
innovation consistently leads to federal level reform in the law of
the American workplace. 153 This remains true today. What applies
in the larger field of employment law applies to labor relations
policy as well.
This Part contains three subparts: (A) a review of past efforts at
labor law reform; (B) a review of EFCA proposals and discussion
of how those proposals fail to address many fundamental issues
ripe for labor law reform and innovation; and (C) a review of the
leading role state law generally plays in the vast field of
employment law.
150. See Freeman, supra note 185 (identifying five strategies for addressing
rising income inequality in the United States, one of them, "[e]ncourag[ing] the
growth of those citizen organizations with the clearest stake in improving the
position of low-wage workers-namely unions."). See also Michael J. Zimmer,
Escaping the Westphalian Trap: Unionism and Equality in China, Mexico, and the
United States (Revista Latinoamericana de Derecho Social, Working Paper No. 10,
2009), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1478654.
151. Unions facilitate the "voice" of employees as well as increasing their
compensation and improving their working conditions. Id.
152. See Kuttner, supra note 148; Reich, supra note 148.
153. See infra Part III.B. See generally Drummonds, Sister Sovereigns, supra
note 1.
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A. The History of Labor Law Reform Since the 1947 Taft-Hartley
Act Illustrates the Difficulty of Reform at the Federal Level
Before turning to today's debate about EFCA, some historical
context will be useful. As with marriage, labor law reform efforts
often begin with high hopes that are later dashed by unanticipated
adversity. 54
Since the 1947 Taft-Harley Act,' unions at the Washington,
D.C., level often fared poorly in debates over labor law reform. The
1959 Landrum-Griffith Act 5 5 continued the federal regulation of
unions started in Taft-Hartley by limiting reconitional picketing,
156
revising the regulation of secondary boycotts,' and establishing the
Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA) to
regulate the internal affairs of unions. 158 In 1974 the amendments to
the NLRA 159 expanded the jurisdiction of the federal labor relations
regime to include health care institutions' 60 and added NLRA
Section 19 to provide protections for religious objectors to
unions; the latter provisions were expanded in 1980.162
Several attempts to make labor law more hospitable to
collective bargaining failed over the past thirty-five years. In 1975,
the "common situs" picketing bill 163 passed both houses of
Congress but was vetoed by President Ford. In 1977, the "Labor
Law Reform Act"'164 died for lack of enough votes to end a
154. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-97 (2006). The 1947 Congress reacted to perceived
abuses of union power during and after World War II and passed the Taft-
Hartley Act over President Truman's veto. See Archibald Cox, Some Aspects of
the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1947); Donald
H. Wollett, Collective Bargaining, Public Policy, and the National Labor
Relations Act of 1947, 23 WASH. L. REV. 205 (1948). Thus only twelve years
after the enactment of the New Deal Wagner Act (a.k.a. National Labor
Relations Act) in 1935, the federal policy moved from one explicitly favoring
collective bargaining to a position of "neutrality" balancing the interests of
employees, unions, and employers in "the national labor policy." See also
Nelson Lichtenstein, How Wal-Mart Fights Unions, 92 MIN. L. REV. 1462,
1465-66 (2008).
155. 73 Stat. 519 (1959).
156. National Labor Relations Act § 8(b)(7), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7) (2006).
157. National Labor Relations Act § 8(b)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (2006).
158. 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (2006).
159. 88 Stat. 395 (1974).
160. National Labor Relations Act § 8(g), 29 U.S.C. § 158(g) (2006).
161. National Labor Relations Act, § 19, 29 U.S.C. § 169 (2006).
162. 94 Stat. 3452 (1980).
163. H.R. 5900, 94th Cong. (1975). The bill would have reversed NLRB v.
Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675 (1951) and allowed
construction unions to picket around an entire construction site even if their
dispute was with a single subcontractor.
164. H.R. 8410, 95th Cong. (1977).
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filibuster. (The bill would have, inter alia, strengthened remedies
for anti-union discrimination, given unions more access to jobsites,
and expedited election cases.) In 1994, a bill outlawing permanent
striker replacement garnered majority support in both houses but
again succumbed to a filibuster.'6 5 Finally, in 1997, the "Team
Act' ' 166 (a bill opposed by organized labor for fear that it would
allow a return to "company unions") would have loosened
restrictions on employer-sponsored employee committees but was
vetoed by President Clinton. 167 None of these proposed enactments,
however, involved the broad range of fundamental labor relations
issues presented in the 2007-2009 debates over EFCA.
B. The EFCA Debate Illustrates the Need for More Labor Relations
Policy Making in the States
EFCA raises three fundamental issues of labor relations policy:
1. what process should exist for unions to legitimately
demonstrate their majority support among the employees;
2. what process should exist for resolving bargaining disputes
other than such devices as strikes, permanent replacement
of strikers, lockouts, slowdowns, and unilateral
implementation of employer bargaining demands; and
3. whether employers should face stronger remedies when
they commit unfair labor practices, such as anti-union
activity discrimination, as they now face for racial, gender,
religious, national origin, disabilities, and (often under state
laws) sexual orientation discrimination. 168
The Act addresses these questions in three central provisions:
1. by providing for NLRB certification of a union as exclusive
bargaining representative based on a "card check" showing
the majority of employees signed cards stating they wish
representation by the union;
165. 140 CONG. REc. S88524 (1994).
166. Teamwork for Employees and Managers Act of 1997, H.R. 634, 105th
Cong. (1997).
167. Clinton Vetoes TEAMAct Despite Pleas From Business For Passage, 152
Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 417, at D-19 (1997). Electromation, Inc. v. NLRB, 309
N.L.R.B. 990 (1992), affid, 35 F.3d 1148 (7th Cir. 1994) states the law in this area.
168. Henry H. Drummonds, Beyond the Employee Free Choice Act Debate:
Unleashing the States in Labor Management Relations Policy By Reforming
Labor Law Preemption Doctrines Created by Judges A Half-Century Ago, 19
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y (forthcoming Jan. 2010) [hereinafter Drummonds,
Beyond the Free Choice Act Debate].
169. Employee Free Choice Act, H.R. 800, 110th Cong. § 2 (2007)
[hereinafter EFCA].
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2. by providing for interest arbitration of first contract
bargaining disputes; 170 and
3. by stiffening remedies for employer unfair labor practices
with provisions for triple back pay awards and penalties up
to $20,000.171
As will be shown below, these proposals, while perhaps worthy as
far as they go, fail to adequately address needed reforms in labor
relations policy. 1
72
Although EFCA passed the U.S. House of Representatives in
2007,173 enjoys support from President Obama,174 and generates
support from a majority in the U.S. Senate, the Chamber of
Commerce and other business groups mounted a well-funded
political campaign against it. In 2009, the House of
Representatives deferred action until the issue finds resolution in
the U.S. Senate. That body requires a "super-majority" of sixty
votes to move a bill in the face of a threatened filibuster. Whether
those votes can be generated remains in doubt. As set forth below,
any bill commanding sixty votes in the Senate for cloture will
likely require compromises.
1. "Card Check" or Other Provisions to Reduce Undue
Employer Influence on Employees in the Process for
Determining Whether a Union Represents a Majority
American labor law rests upon the assumption that the majority
of employees in an appropriate bargaining unit choose freely to be
represented. Once that majority status has been demonstrated, the
employer must bargain in good faith regarding compensation
issues, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, such
as job security and grievance and arbitration procedures.
170. Id. § 3.
171. Id. § 4.
172. It is interesting to note that Harvard Professor Paul Weiler suggested
just these reforms a quarter century ago. Weiler, Promises to Keep, supra note
15; Weiler, Striking a New Balance, supra note 33. See also Paul Weiler,
GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE (1990). This both reveals the perceptiveness of
Professor Weiler's scholarship and the poverty of new ideas in the federal
debate today.
173. EFCA, H.R. 800, 110th Cong. (2007).
174. Kuttner, supra note 148. Many persons in the investment and business
communities, who supported President Obama's election campaign, oppose
EFCA. E.g., John Libbert & Holly Rosenkrantz, Billionaire Donors Split With





EFCA's "card check" provision generated the most public
discussion because it would have eliminated NLRB-conducted
secret ballot elections to determine the majority's wishes. 175 As
explained above, the 1974 Linden Lumber case allowed an
employer to force a union claiming representation rights to file for
an NLRB conducted election, even where a strong majority of
employees signed cards indicating they desired representation. 17
6
The unions proposed "card check" as a reasonable alternative to an
election and one that would eliminate much delay.
The elections process and related appeals'77 delay the
collective bargaining wanted by the majority (if, as at least often
must be the case, their signatures on the union representation cards
dependably indicate their wishes). One delay is in the election
itself, which typically takes at least six to eight weeks after the
union files an election petition. Further, where the employer
allegedly has committed unfair labor practices after notice of an
organizing campaign, the "blocking charge" doctrine178 forces the
union to a Hobson choice: at the union's option the election
process can be held in abeyance pending resolution of those unfair
labor practice claims in the NLRB's lengthy process for "ulp"
claims (in order in theory for the coercive effect of the unfair labor
practices on the employees to be dissipated through Board
processes); yet this further significant delay can fatally affect the
union's often fragile majority, extending de facto the time for the
employer to influence the workforce against unionization.
But the most significant opportunities for delay come after the
election. Either side may appeal election rulings. Most
significantly, where a union wins NLRB certification as the
bargaining representative via an election, an employer who claims
error in rulings by the NLRB Regional Director who conducts the
election, or illegal conduct by the union affecting the election,
must, in order to preserve those legal claims, refuse to bargain
inviting an unfair labor practice charge for refusal to bargain. 17
175. See supra note 178.
176. Linden Lumber Div., Summer & Co. v. NLRB, 419 U.S. 301 (1974).
177. One delay is in the election itself, which typically takes at least six to
eight weeks after the union files an election petition. But the most significant
opportunities for delay come after the election when either side may appeal
election rulings.
178. Cox ET AL., supra note 7, at 275.
179. Either side can file objections to the result of an election triggering
administrative review by the NLRB Regional Director, and in a few cases also
obtain a "limited Board review" of the objections. E.g., ROBERT A. GORMAN &
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Not until the lengthy process for resolving that claim has been
exhausted through a charge, formal complaint, an administrative
law judge hearing, NLRB ruling, and an appeal to a United States
Court of Appeals will the employer be under an enforceable
judicial order to bargain.180 Whether or not any of the claims raised
are sustained, this cumbersome process delays implementation and
often crushes the employees' originally expressed desire for a
collective bargaining representative. Thus the system seems almost
designed to present opportunities for delay.
Beyond the issue of delay, the union argument for card check
contends that employers play with a "stacked deck" in NLRB
elections, more akin to "elections" in Russia and other
authoritarian states than to the American political elections that
first spring to the mind's eye. Employers can severely restrict pro-
union communications at work by employees (denying, for
example, the use of company email even though generally allowed
for personal matters), subject the employees to workplace "captive
audience" anti-union speeches during the often lengthy election
period, and all the while deny the union equal access to the
employees. 181 Moreover, the union argument for card check goes,
in the absence of a meaningful remedial scheme in the NLRA,
employers can harass and retaliate against pro-union workers and
generally threaten and suggest dire consequences to unionization
with impunity, making fair elections impossible. 182 This stacked
election deck, say the unions, explains why unions consistently
183lose about half of NLRB-conducted elections, even though
MATrHEW W. FINKiN, BAsic TEXT ON LABOR LAW UNIONIZATION AND
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 66 (2d ed. 2004) (citing statutes and regulations). But
to obtain judicial review, an employer is required to "invite" an unfair labor
practice bargaining charge by refusing to bargain; then raising the election
issues in the subsequent ulp process, and then appealing to a U.S. court of
appeal. E.g., Cox ET AL., supra note 7, at 315. This is because rulings in
representation cases are not generally considered "final orders" subject to
judicial review; only unfair labor practice rulings carry that status. AFL v.
NLRB 308 U.S. 401 (1940).
180. 29 U.S.C. § 160(e)-(f) (2006).
181. See supra Part II.A.
182. Id.
183. COX ET AL., supra note 7, at 108. (Summarizing data from NLRB reports
showing that since 1990 union success rates have fluctuated in the range of
forty-seven to fifty-two percent.) Though unions experience a fifty percent
success rate through the election process, their overall success rate in organizing
campaigns is lower. That is because employers often find out about such
campaigns before the union has gained enough employee support to seek an
election. One estimate puts the overall success rate at one in twenty.
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unions typically do not seek an election until a strong majority of
employees have pledged their support, and polls consistently show
a "representation gap," with far more Americans supporting
unionization than working in unionized workplaces.'
84
Employers reject that theory. They argue that "card check" is
inferior to secret ballot elections for testing employee sentiment for
or against union representation. Employers observe that some
employees might sign union cards under social pressure from other
employees or the union. Further, employers argue, the elections
process, including the employer's campaign against the union,
educates employees about the costs (i.e., union dues and initiation
fees) and limitations of unionization (i.e., global labor markets,
replacement of strikers, and no duty for an employer to agree to
union proposals).
In the court of political and public opinion, the unions, as of
this writing, appear to have lost this argument. 85 It goes against
the grain of American culture to abandon an "election" process.
Several key Senators announced their opposition to the "card
check" provision, and attention shifted to other possible ways to
level the election playing field, such as rules for more equal access
and "quickie" elections. 6
Is the card majority process really superior to secret ballot
elections in ascertaining the unfettered choice of the employees for
or against union representation? Are the consistent votes against
unions in over half of all NLRB elections really the product of an
unfair election process and employer coercion? Or do employees,
when they hear both sides of the argument, simply prefer not to
unionize? Perhaps employees sign union cards out of
embarrassment or because they feel pressure from other
employees. Perhaps they decide they do not wish to pay union dues
and initiation fees. Perhaps employees, when they think about it,
conclude that unionization will not make them, or the goods and
services they produce, more valuable in the global marketplaces.
184. FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 4, at 19-20 (analyzing Hart Research
Surveys indicating that fifty-three percent of American workers said they
favored union representation); Richard Freeman, Do Workers Want Still Want
More Unions? Yes, More Than Ever (Economic Policy Institute, Briefing Paper
No. 182, 2007), available at http://www.sharedprosperity.org/bp l82.html.
185. Kris Maher, Provisions to Ease Unionization Likely to Drop Out of Bill,
WALL ST. J., May 7, 2009, at A4.
186. Editorial, The Imperfect Union Bill: Employer Intransigence Makes
Finding Common Ground More Difficult, WASH. POST, May 11, 2009 ("[O]ne
attractive solution would be to speed up the time frame for holding union
elections while allowing union organizers some access to employees in the
workplace.").
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Which side is right in this great debate? This is not an easy
question to answer. Perhaps more experimentation in the states
could help answer the question. If fairer union election procedures
(equal access, no captive audience speeches, and protection against
union discrimination on par with the protections for other forms of
discrimination) found support in nonpreempted state laws, we
could be closer to a fact-based answer.
Even on the issue of "card check" the states offer flexible
laboratories for experimentation.' 87 The federal debate creates a
false choice between representation elections and the more
expeditious card check process. For today's more educated
workplace, the choice should be neither the employers' nor the
unions', but rather the employees'. Again, we can learn from
experience in the states. Some state public sector laws, for example
Illinois and Oregon, already have "card check.' ' 88
In Oregon a public sector "card check" law was adopted in
2007. The Oregon Employment Relations Board must certify a
union presenting a card majority in an appropriate bargaining unit.
But the law dictates a two-week period for the employees to seek a
representation election. After two years, unions filed eight "card
check" certification elections (the Oregon public sector was
already heavily unionized), and employees exercised their election
option in three, with the union winning representation rights in two
of the three elections held under that process.' 89 Thus, in eight
cases the union wound up with representation rights in seven, with
five coming without the delay of an election.
One can imagine variations to this idea. For example, a "card
check" process "window period" for an election might require,
187. Justice Brandeis stated in his dissent in New State Ice Co.:
[Humans are] weak and their judgment is at best fallible .... There
must be power in the States ... to remould, through experimentation,
our economic practices and institutions to meet changing social and
economic needs .... It is one of the happy incidents of the federal
system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve
as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without
risk to the rest of the country.
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 310-11 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
188. States that use the card check system include: Illinois (County of Du
Page v. Ill. Labor Bd., 900 N.E.2d 1095 (2008) (public)); Oregon (OR. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 243.682 (West 2003 & Supp. 2008) (public)); Massachusetts
(MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 150A, §§ 2, 5 (West 2004 & Supp. 2008)); Minnesota
(MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.16 (West 2006)); California (CAL. GOV'T CODE §
71636.3 (West Supp. 2009)) (public/judicial); New Hampshire (N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 273-A:1 (West 1999 & Supp. 2008)).
189. Telephone Interview with Paul Gamson, Chair of the Oregon
Employment Relations Board (May 27, 2009).
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since more than fifty percent of the employees already have signed
cards asking for union representation, that an election request also
be supported by at least fifty percent of the employees.' 
90
Another approach builds on the idea that a representation
election should be an option for employees, not employers. This
approach would recognize "card check" majorities for certification
purposes where two conditions exist: (1) the signing employees
receive clear notice of their secret ballot election rights; and (2) the
employees clearly and unmistakably waive that right in a
declaration on the union authorization card, stating that they desire
immediate representation by the union and do not wish to wait for
an NLRB secret ballot election. Today's younger workforces
require less paternalism in the law than workers of an earlier era.
When employees clearly and unmistakably indicate their desire to
proceed to representation without an election, those wishes should
be honored in our law.
The argument here is not that any of these approaches is the
"correct" one. Rather the argument is that several imaginable
approaches would be consistent with the fundamental Section 7
rights of employees to make the decision for or against union
representation. Any of them would better protect Section 7 rights
than the existing system. But federal orthodoxy, even if modified
in some way by a compromise on EFCA, forecloses the states from
playing the role in labor relations law that they play in other areas
of employment law: to shape the law to local preferences
consistent with federal minimum standards, to experiment with
new approaches for new times, and to provide a measure of
empowerment and autonomy to citizens in the states over issues
vital to their future. Experience, not logic, ultimately informs and
drives the law. 191 We would have far more experience upon which
to make judgments about federal policy if the states were permitted
the flexibility to experiment, consistent with federal minimum
standards.
190. In Dana Corp., 351 N.L.R.B. 434 (2007), a three-two majority of the
"Bush II" Board reversed longstanding Board precedent and conditioned the
"recognition bar" to challenges to a union's majority status for a "reasonable time"
upon a forty-five day window allowing thirty percent of the employees to force an
election; the NLRB General Counsel (also appointed by President George W.
Bush) argued unsuccessfully for at least fifty percent support for an election.




b. Other Ways to Implement Employee Free Choice
Further, the entire federal "card check" debate suffers from too
much conventional thinking about labor law. The workforce today
is not our mothers' and grandfathers' workforce. To build a labor
law more responsive to today's younger and more diverse
employees requires "thinking outside the box."' 92 When ninety-
two percent of the private sector, non-agricultural workforce labors
in non-union workplaces, what can be done, besides making it less
burdensome for employees to choose conventional union
representation, to serve the interests of these employees?
Let us illustrate with just a few of the ideas that, in a more
decentralized system of labor relations law, might take hold in the
states. First, for mid-size and larger employers, a state might
experiment with "work councils" similar to those common in the
European Union.' 93 Some state laws already require, for example,
workplace safety committees. An expanded role for work councils
at the workplace, division, and company level might allow some of
the "voice" sought in the conventional collective bargaining
regime. This could be implemented in non-union employers.
Imagine, for example, such institutions for Starbucks and Wal-
Mart employees at the regional level. "Work councils" could
contribute ideas of employees to corporate decision-making across
a range of issues (i.e., sustainable business practices, green energy
and waste disposal issues, and human resources policies). Further,
they would provide a statement in the law that employees are more
than cogs in a production machine, that their voices at work are
valued, and, paraphrasing the words of the Clayton Act of 1914
(and still part of the United States Code today), that the labor of a
human being is not merely an article of commerce. 1
94
Second, why should each individual employee's right to union
representation depend on the wishes of the majority? Can a system
of non-exclusive union representation of individuals who so desire
192. Here the writer claims no original ideas but rather borrows from the rich
body of scholarship suggesting new conceptual approaches for the labor law.
193. EU "Works Council" Directive, 94/45, art. 1, 1994 O.J. (L 254) 2 (EC)
(on the establishment of a European Works Council or a procedure in
Community-scale undertakings and Community-scale groups of undertakings
for the purposes of informing and consulting employees). For a description of
the interrelationship between nation-state laws and EU Directives in the labor
relations area, see JAMES B. ATLESON, INTERNATIONAL LABOR LAW 347-55
(2008). Under current law, Section 8(a)(2) might preempt some innovative
approaches in this area.
194. 15 U.S.C. § 17 (2006) ("The labor of a human being is not a commodity
or article in commerce.").
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it in non-union workplaces coexist with exclusive representation in
workplaces where a majority desires conventional union
representation?1
95
Third, when the NLRB law vacillates on issues like
"Weingarten" rights 96 in the non-union sector on the basis of the
political administration, 197 why cannot the states decide that issue?
Section 7 rights generally apply in non-union shops, including the
right to engage in concerted activity,' 98 and it is at least consistent
with NLRB Section 7 rights to allow non-unioh employees faced
with investigatory interviews to insist on the presence of a fellow
employee "for mutual aid and protection."
Now let us venture into some uncharted waters. The NLRA
system places inordinate focus on whether the union commands
majority support at one point in time (when a union seeks
recognition or certification). But, labor law then indulges a
fiction-the union is "presumed" to enjoy continuing majority
status indefinitely. This presumption is irrebuttable at times: during
the "contract" bar period, except for the thirty-day period starting
ninety days before contract expiration, 199 during the one-year
"election" and "certification" bars 200 and during the "recognition
bar" for a "reasonable Reriod. ' '2° 1 The presumption becomes
rebuttable at other times. These doctrines rest on the need to
195. Christine N. O'Brien, When Union Members in a Members-Only Non-
Majority Union (MONMU) Want Weingarten Rights: How High Will the Blue
Eagle Fly? 10 U. PA. J. Bus. & EMP. L. 599 (2008); Charles J. Morris, Minority
Union Collective Bargaining: A Commentary on John True's Review Essay on
the Blue Eagle at Work, and a Reply to Skeptics Regarding Members-Only
Bargaining Under the NLRA, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 179 (2006) (book
review); Clyde Summers, Unions Without a Majority---A Black Hole? 66 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 531 (1990). Several unions have also supported the idea of non-
majority representation. Steven Greenhouse, Seven Unions Ask Labor Board To
Order Employers to Bargain, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2007, at A14.
196. NLRB v. Weingarten, 420 U.S. 251 (1975).
197. E.g., IBM Corp., 341 N.L.R.B. 1288 (2007) (Bush II Board three-two
majority overrules Clinton Board ruling in Epilepsy Foundation, 331 N.L.R.B.
676 (2000) and returns to Reagan Board rule in E.L DuPont De Nemours v.
Slaughter, 289 N.L.R.B. 627 (1988), that Weingarten does not apply in non-
union workplaces).
198. NLRB v. Wash. Aluminum, 370 U.S. 9 (1962).
199. E.g., Auciello Iron Works, Inc. v. NLRB, 517 U.S. 781 (1996) (contract
bars election even though majority of employees allegedly withdrew support
from union less than twenty-four hours after union telegrammed acceptance of
employer's contract offer).
200. E.g., Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96, 104 (1954); 29 U.S.C. § 159 (c)(3)
(2006).
201. E.g., Dana Corp. v. Int'l Union, UAW, 351 NLRB 434 (2007).
202. This presumption is irrebuttable at times: during the "contract" bar period,
except for the thirty-day period starting ninety days before contract expiration,
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balance the employees' free choice rights to reject or change
representation with the need for stability in bargaining
relationships. 20 3 Even when common sense suggests that the union
has lost majority support, for example, where strikers have been
replaced by permanent replacements, the NLRB makes no
presumption that the majority disfavors the union.2°
Again, thinking outside the box of conventional labor law, one
can imagine a different system to serve the twin policies of
stability in bargaining relationships and employee free choice. For
example, unions could be required to stand for reelection as a
bargaining agent periodically, just as are members of Congress and
judges in many states. Keeping in mind the need for stability, a
good time during which to trigger such a requirement would be in
the period immediately after a collective bargaining agreement has
been concluded.20 5 Another idea would be a requirement for union
representation elections periodically in non-union workplaces. 20
6
Section 7 free choice would be promoted, and the ninety-two
percent of the workforce for whom "unions" sound vaguely like
during the one-year "certification bar," and during the "recognition bar" for a
"reasonable period." The presumption becomes rebuttable at other times.
203. E.g., Brooks, 348 U.S. at 96, 100. ("A union should be given ample time
for carrying on its mandate on behalf of its members, and should not be under
exigent pressure to produce hothouse results or be turned out.").
204. NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 494 U.S. 775 (1990) (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (commenting on the counterintuitive nature of the "no
presumption" rule for striker replacements).
205. The author was a union lawyer long enough to know that this will be
anathema to traditional unionists. But period reaffirmation of the majority's
mandate for representation would through time make unions stronger in their
representational roles. And, if in a fair elections process with equal access, e-
mail availability, text messaging, and the like, unions cannot win such elections,
by what normative claim do they have a right to further bargaining rights?
Innovative technology could also make such periodic elections more feasible
from a cost and administrative standpoint.
206. But which union might stand for election? Several solutions to this
problem seem possible. First, experts like the officers of the NLRB or state labor
boards might designate an appropriate union. Second, the election might be held
in the abstract with NGOs (perhaps formed for this purpose by the AFL-CIO or
other labor groups) making the case for unionization; under this approach
employees would first decide the basic issue and then in a second round process
select from unions seeking representation rights. Would union resources be
stretched? Perhaps so. But again solutions can be imagined. In order to promote
the goal of employee empowerment in the new workplaces of the twenty-first
century, the state or federal government might subsidize groups making the case
for unionization. Or technology might allow unions to effectively deliver their




creatures of an earlier time would become more aware of the
possibilities of unions. Moreover, whether the workplace became
unionized or not, such a system would empower employees by
recognizing their rightful voice in the workplace decisions that
affect them and in the bounty produced in corporations by the joint
efforts of employees, managers, and investors.
2. Changes for the Bargaining Process
a. Interest Arbitration for First Contract Disputes
EFCA proposes interest arbitration 20 7 as a mechanism for
resolving bargaining disputes over the terms of first contracts.
20 8
This would constitute a major change in the philosophy of collective
bargaining enshrined in national labor law. Again the states could
contribute to finding solutions to the problems presented.
As the Supreme Court has often noted, the New Deal era
federal labor relations statutes embedded private ordering as a
fundamental premise of our labor law. "Congress intended that the
parties should have wide latitude in their negotiations, unrestricted
by any governmental power to regulate the substantive solution of
their differences. 20
9
The interest arbitration provision of EFCA would at once
change this private ordering premise and leave it intact. It would
change private ordering by requiring a neutral third party to resolve
a bargaining dispute in first contract situations-the resulting
contract would be the product of the third party's choice instead of
both of the parties to the contract. At the same time the
government would not be directly involved in establishing the
terms of the contract, and the interest arbitration process would
apply only in newly established bargaining relationships with
subsequent contract negotiations reverting to the unfettered private
ordering model.
207. Interest arbitration differs from grievance arbitration. In grievance
arbitration, common under collective bargaining contracts, an arbitrator chosen
by the union and employer resolves disputes over the meaning or application of
an existing collective bargaining contract. In contrast, interest arbitration
resolves disputes over what a not yet existing contract should say; in essence,
the interest arbitrator writes the contract in areas where the parties cannot reach
agreement at the bargaining table. JOSEPH R. GRODIN & JUNE WEISBERGER,
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT (4th ed. 1993).
208. EFCA, H.R. 800, 110th Cong. § 3 (2007).
209. NLRB v. Ins. Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 488 (1960). See also
Local 24 Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters Union v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283, 295 (1959).
20091
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
While this provision has thus far received less attention in the
debate about EFCA recent developments suggest its destiny will be
more controversial.Y1 A shift in emphasis by opponents of EFCA to
the interest arbitration provision would not be surprising. Such
provisions generate controversy whenever they are suggested; for
example, interest arbitration constitutes a major goal of the United
Farm Workers Union but is stoutly resisted by agri-business. 1
As shown above, current remedies for bad faith bargaining
under the NLRA reek with inadequacy. 2 12 Section 8-d, added by
the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947, explicitly disavows any obligation to
agree to any bargaining proposal, or even to make a concession. 2 13
While the law requires an honest attempt to reach agreement,
proving bad faith presents a challenge. More importantly the
remedy when such proof exists consists of a "slap on the wrist"--a
cease and desist order and posting of notices acknowledging the
NLRB's ruling. 214 The litigation process takes many months and
often years. First contract situations, with union support often
fragile (since the union appears impotent to employees during the
210. Editorial, Blinding Arbitration: A Union Compromise On Card Check
Deserves a Much Closer Look, WALL ST. J., May 29, 2009, at A14. The
Washington Post recently quoted the "Coalition for a Democratic Workforce,
composed of 580 organizations including the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and
the National Association of Manufacturers," as follows: "Let us be clear and
frank on this matter; there can be no acceptable 'compromise' on any issue of
labor law reform . . . ." As reported in the Post, the Coalition refuses to
"acknowledge any flaw in the existing process." Editorial, Imperfect Union Bill:
Employer Intransigence Makes Finding Common Ground More Difficult,
WASH. POST, May 11, 2009, at A16.
211. The National Labor Relations Act excludes agricultural employment. 29
U.S.C. § 152(3) (2006). Farm workers, however, bargain under state laws. E.g.,
CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1140-1140.4 (West 2003 & Supp. 2009); ARIZ. REV. STAT.
§§ 23-1381-1395 (LexisNexis 1995 & Supp. 2009); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 450.251
(West 2002).
212. See supra Part II.A.
213. National Labor Relations Act, § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2009).
214. The NLRB has experimented with certain other remedies with limited
success. E.g., Tiidee Prods., Inc.,194 N.L.R.B. 1234 (1972) (ordering the
employer in a case of flagrant violation: (1) to pay the Board's and Union's
costs of litigation, (2) to mail a copy of the Board notice of the employer's
unlawful failure to bargain to each employee, (3) to give the union access to
company bulletin boards, and (4) to supply the union with an updated list of
employee names and addresses), affd in part, Int'l Union of Elec., Radio, &
Mach. Workers v. NLRB, 502 F.2d 349 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (the court of appeals
declined to enforce the portion of the order requiring reimbursement of the
Board's litigation expenses); Ex-Cell-O Corp., 185 N.L.R.B. 107 (1970)
(declining to adopt a "compensatory remedy" in failure to bargain cases); H.K.
Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970) (disapproving the Board's remedy of
awarding a disputed contract clause).
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long delay for unfair labor practice litigation), provide an
especially tempting occasion for an employer to make the cost-
benefit calculation that stalling may pay. Yet-even if only for
first contract disputes-the employer objection that interest
arbitration conflicts with the basic policy premise of the NLRA
(private ordering via freely agreed contracts) resonates deeply with
the American tradition.
Whatever the outcome of the debate about interest arbitration
of first contract, the states again provide lessons for any federal
initiative. Arbitration of police, firefighter, and other public safety
officer contracts provides many states with substantial experience
in interest arbitration. 215 Several types of interest arbitration
proceedings are possible. As explained in another article:
Supposing that interest arbitration for first contracts is the
option chosen, what particular interest arbitration procedure
would work best? One process would be for the parties to
present all of their positions to the arbitrator and allow the
arbitrator to write contract language using her best
judgment ("item arbitration"). A second process would be
to have each party present their own proposal for each
disputed subject and have the arbitrator choose one of the
parties' proposals for each subject ("final offer by item
arbitration"). A third process would be to have each party
present the entire package of their contract offers to the
arbitrator and require the arbitrator to choose one package
or the other ("final offer package arbitration").2 16
The pressures and bargaining strategies of the parties vary
depending on the type of interest arbitration chosen. Final offer
package arbitration makes it risky to arbitrate and encourages the
parties to make every possible attempt to reach their own contract
rather than taking a chance with the arbitrator; thus, the more
outlandish a party's bargaining proposal seems, the less chance it
has of prevailing in the final offer package situation. Item
arbitration allows the parties more flexibility since they do not risk
losing the entire contract proposal, and the arbitrator may write a
compromise for the contract award; on the other hand, this form of
interest arbitration may cause the parties to be "bullish," making
few concessions in the negotiations process in anticipation of the
probable compromise result of the arbitrator.
215. E.g., OR. REv. STAT. § 243.742 (West 2003 & Supp. 2008).
216. Drummonds, Beyond the Employee Free Choice Act Debate, supra note
169.
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EFCA remains silent on these questions. Many state labor
relations laws, particularly for public safety employees like police
officers, firefighters and correctional officers, already provide for
interest arbitration. 21 7 Moreover, interest arbitration constitutes a
major goal of the United Farm Workers Union in the agricultural
sector, also governed by state law.
b. Interest Arbitration as a Remedy for Bad Faith Bargaining
Another initiative that a state might pioneer would be
mandating interest arbitration, at the option of the union, where
employers bargain in bad faith. This would directly address the
lack of effective remedy problem for enforcing the duty to bargain
in good faith. Further, it would respond to the "freedom of
contract" objection to first contract interest arbitration because
employers would only face such situations when they violate their
obligations under the law. We can here draw a useful analogy to
judicial orders for a gender or race-conscious hiring remedy in a
case involving a past pattern and practice of employment
discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.2 s
c. Permanent Replacement of Strikers
A free-ranging policy discussion about the NLRA bargaining
process presents other issues not raised in EFCA. Many have
suggested that permanent replacement of strikers, which has been
the law since the 1938 MacKay219 case, tips the balance too far in
favor of employers. 220 Besides permanent replacement of strikers,
217. E.g., Editorial, Blinding Arbitration: A Union Compromise on Card
Check Deserves a Much Closer Look, WALL ST. J., May 29, 2009, at A14
("Michigan has used binding arbitration for 40 years for police officers, and
firefighters... ."); OR. REV. STAT. § 243.742 (West 2003 & Supp. 2008).
218. 42 U.S.C. 2000e (2006); E.g., Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers Int'l
Soc'y v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 445 (1986) (judge awarded racially conscious
relief for egregious racial discrimination).
219. NLRB v. MacKay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938). Though the
NLRA is silent on permanent replacement and affirmatively gives employees a
statutory right to engage in "concerted activity for mutual aid and protection,"
this seminal case, decided just three years after the original enactment of the
NLRA, rather casually assumed a right of permanent replacement in dictum; the
holding of the case was that an employer could not pick and choose who to
bring back to work on the basis of their support for a strike. See generally
National Labor Relations Act §7, 29 U.S.C. §§ 157-158 (2006). James Pope,
How American Workers Lost the Right to Strike, and Other Tales, 103 MICH. L.
REv. 518 (2004).
220. The literature on these points is vast. Perhaps the starting point for the
critique stated in the text is Paul Weiler, Striking New Balance; Freedom of
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employers already enjoy a number of options in a bargaining
dispute:
1. unilateral implementation of the employer's proposed terms
in the event the employees keep working;
2. continued operation with temporary replacements if the
employees strike;
3. "waiting the employees out" by shutting down the
employer's business during a strike; and
4. offensive and defensive lockouts of the employees to force
an unwanted loss of income on them and pressure the union
to come to terms.
221
Permanent replacement gives the employer still another option.
Strikes bring pressure on both the employer and employees to
222find a path to settlement. Important ex ante effects emanate from
the mere possibility of a strike: since strikes are most often
undesirable on both sides of the bargaining table, the parties find
incentive to strive to find contract terms to which they can both
Contract and the Prospects For Union Representation, 98 HARv. L. REv. 351
(1984). There have been many others. E.g., William B. Gould IV, The Employee
Free Choice Act of 2009, Labor Law Reform, and What Can Be Done About the
Broken System of Labor-Management Relations Law in the United States, 43
U.S.F. L. REv. 291, 328 (2008); Joseph P. Norelli, Permanent Replacements:
Time for a New Look, 24 LAB. LAW. 97 (2008); Michael C. Harper, A
Framework for the Rejuvenation of the American Labor Movement, 76 IND. L.J.
103 (2001); JULIUS GETMAN, THE BETRAYAL OF LOcAL 14 (1998); William B.
Gould IV, AGENDA FOR REFORM: THE FUTURE OF EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIPS
AND THE LAW 198-205 (1993); Charles B. Craver, The National Labor
Relations Act Must Be Revised to Preserve Industrial Democracy, 34 ARIZ. L.
REv. 397 (1992).
221. E.g., Am. Ship Bldg. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965).
222. The possibility of a "lose, lose" strike propels the parties toward
moderation and the search for common ground in contract bargaining in order to
avoid a strike. COX ET AL., supra note 7, at 506; NLRB v. Ins. Agents Int'l
Union, 361 U.S 477, 489 (1960) (reversing NLRB's ruling that a union's
slowdown during bargaining was inconsistent with the duty to bargain in good
faith) ("The presence of economic weapons in reserve, and their actual exercise
on occasion by the parties, is part and parcel of the system that the [federal labor
laws] have recognized. Abstract logical analysis might find inconsistency
between the command of the statute to negotiate toward an agreement in good
faith and the legitimacy of the use of economic weapons, frequently having the
most serious effect upon individual workers and productive enterprises, to
induce one party to come to the terms desired by the other. But the truth of the
matter is that at the present statutory stage of our national labor policy, the two
factors-necessity for good-faith bargaining between parties, and the
availability of economic pressure devices to each to make the other party incline
to agree on one's terms--exist side by side.").
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223
agree. Once a strike begins, as noted above, the employer may
lawfully continue to operate with temporary replacement workers,
but that often involves training and productivity costs. An
employer may face undesirable terms in the price of settlement but
calculate that continued strike losses outweigh the benefits of
continued resistance. On the union's side, the employees must do
without a paycheck and in most states are not eligible for
unemployment insurance benefits. 224 Similar to employers, the
employees and union may "lose" a strike; employees individually
or collectively (via the union) abandon strikes if the costs (loss of
income and perhaps loss of medical insurance, etc.) outweigh the
perceived benefits of continued striking.
Permanent strike replacement changes this calculus of costs
and benefits.225 Permanent replacement crosses a line, making the
consequence of losing for the employees involved not just
acceptance of the employer's terms but also de facto loss of their
jobs. 2  After President Reagan successfully and permanently
replaced more than 10,000 striking air traffic controllers in 1981,
the use and threat of permanent replacements in strike situations
became more common.227 This means that even if the employees
and union are willing to end their strike, the employer is not
obligated to return them to work if no vacancies exist because
permanent replacements have been hired or because employees
who crossed the picket line have preference over those who
honored the strike to the bitter end.228
One possibility for restoring more of a balance of power in the
bargaining impasse situation would be to eliminate permanent
replacement. In 1991 the Democratic House of Representatives
passed the Workplace Fairness Act, which would have banned the
223. Other than in first contract situations, the parties eventually reach
agreement on collective bargaining contracts in the great majority of cases. See
supra note 115. In first contract situations, however, the success rate after a
union is certified or recognized as the exclusive bargaining agent hovers
between sixty-seven and fifty-six percent. See supra note 116.
224. N.Y. Tel. Co. v. N.Y. Dep't of Labor, 440 U.S. 519, 534 (1979)
("Unlike most States, New York has concluded that the community in the
security of persons directly affected by a strike outweighs the interest in
avoiding any impact on a particular labor dispute.").
225. See supra note 223.
226. Trans World Airlines v. Indep. Fed'n of Flight Attendants, 489 U.S. 426
(1989).
227. Stephen F. Befort, Labor and Employment Law at the Millennium: A
Historical Review and Critical Assessment, 43 B.C. L. REv. 351, 440-41 (2002);
Joseph A. McCartin, Marking a Tragic Anniversary, HIST. NEWS SERV., Aug. 3,
2001.
228. Trans World Airlines, 489 U.S. 426.
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permanent replacement of strikers in most situations. The bill died
in the Senate under threat of a filibuster.229 President Clinton then
proclaimed that employers party to governmental procurement
contracts could lose their contracts if they utilized permanent
replacement in their labor relations. The District of Columbia
Court of Appeals struck down this Executive Order as inconsistent
with NLRA doctrine. 230  Whether eliminating permanent
replacement of strikers constitutes the best way to try to rebalance
the remedies for resolving bargaining disputes is again fairly
debatable. Experimentation and flexibility in the states would help
to provide more of a basis for judgment at the federal level.
3. Proposal for Enhancing the Remedy Provisions of the NLRA
The third fundamental issue raised by EFCA addresses the
remedy scheme for unfair labor practices.2 3 1 The Act proposes
three changes, and these, thus far, generate the least controversy.
a. Interlocutory Injunctive Relief
First, EFCA strengthens provisions for expedited interlocutory
injunctive relief for illegal employer discrimination (or restraint,
interference, or coercion) during union organizing campaigns and232
first contract negotiations. It seeks to accomplish this by
expanding the reach of Section 10(1)233 of the NLRA to include
those unfair labor practices. 2 34 Section 10(1) requires priority
investigation of certain unfair labor practice charges and further
provides that "[i]f... reasonable cause [exists] to believe that such
charge is true" the Regional Director "shall" seek in federal district
court "appropriate injunctive relief pending the final adjudication
of the Board. 2 35 Since the 1947 Taft-Hartley Act, Section 10(1)
has applied only to unfair labor practice complaints against
unions.736 This provision, therefore, merely opens an avenue of
relief long available to employers.
229. Cox ET AL., supra note 7, at 587-88.
230. Chamber of Commerce v. Reich, 74 F.3d 1322 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(Executive Order contrary to the NLRA as interpreted in NLRB v. McKay
Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938)).
231. EFCA, H.R. 1409, 111th Cong. § 4 (2009).
232. Id. § 4(a).
233. National Labor Relations Act § 10(l), 29 U.S.C. § 160(/) (2006).
234. EFCA, H.R. 1409, § 4(a).
235. National Labor Relations Act § 10(/), 29 U.S.C. 160() (2006).
236. Id. Currently, Section 10(1) applies to charges of illegal union secondary
boycotts (National Labor Relations Act § 8(b)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (2006))
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On a practical level this change would create a mechanism for
employees fired or discriminated against because of their support
of a union to be reinstated during the lengthy NLRB unfair labor
practice process. 237 This could significantly change the dynamics
of organizing campaigns by providing a way for the union to
demonstrate that in can protect its supporters from harassment and
retaliation.
Still, it depends on the resources available to the NLRB
because Section 10(1) enforcement occurs through a judicial
request by the Regional Director. Whether Board funding will be
increased to allow federal officers to seek such interlocutory
injunctive relief in the mass of cases remains problematic,
however, given the ebb and flow of NLRB funding during
Democratic and Republican administrations. And, a potential
loophole exists in that the duty to seek interlocutory relief is
triggered only upon a finding that "reasonable cause" exists to
issue a formal complaint; those judgments are not reviewable by
the courts. 2 3 Here again more authority for state officers, union
attorneys, or private attorneys representing the employee to seek
these injunctions would be entirely consistent with the policies of
the Act. Thus, once more the EFCA provision offers a truncated
vision of what might be possible in a more decentralized federal
labor relations regime.
b. Back Pay
A second remedy change in EFCA provides for triple back pay
awards for willful anti-union discrimination, interference, or
coercion during an organizing campaign or first contract
negotiation.239 While this provision strengthens remedies for anti-
and recognitional picketing (National Labor Relations Act § 8(b)(7), 29 U.S.C. §
158(b)(7) (2006)).
237. National Labor Relations Act § 10j), 29 U.S.C. § 1600) (2009) has
long authorized requests for injunctive relief for unfair labor practices not
covered by Section 10(/). But these provisions are discretionary, not mandatory
as in Section 10(o, and require action by the Board in Washington, D.C., not
action by the Regional Director charged with investigating a charge. In fiscal
year 2008, 22,497 unfair labor practices charges were filed and formal
complaints were issued in 1,108 cases (Id. at p. 8, Chart 6-A). Annual Report of
the National Labor Relations Board for the Fiscal Year Ended September 30, 73.
In these cases, preliminary Section 10() injunctive relief was sought by the
NLRB in eighteen cases. (Id. at p.53.).
238. NLRB v. United Food & Comm. Workers Union, Local 23, 484 U.S.
112 (1987).
239. EFCA, H.R. 1409, § 4(b)(1).
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union discrimination during and after union organizing campaigns,
it does not cover anti-union actions in other situations. Most
importantly, it falls far short of the compensatory damages,
including emotional distress and punitive damages, available for
almost all other forms of discrimination. Back pay must be reduced
by interim earnings, and reasonable efforts to mitigate back pa
losses by seeking other work are required under NLRB case law.
4
Therefore, even triple back pay awards may not be sufficient to
change the calculus of costs and benefits for illegal action.
Why should anti-union discrimination be considered less
worthy of emotional distress and punitive damages than other
forms of discrimination? Again EFCA only begins a discussion.
Nothing requires-except the outdated judicially-manufactured
labor law preemption doctrines discussed in the next section of this
paper-that such remedies await a political consensus in
Washington, D.C. State discrimination laws and public policy
wrongful discharge actions241 could easily provide such remedies.
Additionally, with such state law remedies, private attorneys would
find incentive to police anti-union discrimination through the civil
justice system. As with other forms of discrimination, enforcement
and vindication of the civil right to be free of anti-union
discrimination would no longer depend on pre-hearing, pre-
discovery, non-reviewable discretionary judgments of federal
administrative officers.
240. Cox ET AL., supra note 7, at 265; NLRB v. Midwestern Pers. Servs.,
508 F.3d 418 (7th Cir. 2007). In several recent decisions of the Bush II Board
majority, the requirements for mitigation efforts by employees victimized by
anti-union discrimination, and the rule that interim earnings during the unfair
labor practice process must be deducted from back pay, were modified to make
recovery of back pay more difficult. E.g., Grosvenor Orlando Assocs., 350
N.L.R.B. 1197 (2007) (three-two decision holding that employees fired for
discriminatory reasons must begin a search for new work within two weeks of
their illegal discharge even where strike is ongoing and employees picketed
during period prior to their job search; Board also split two-one in holding the
employees job searches were inadequate.); St. George Warehouse, 351 N.L.R.B.
961 (2007) (three-two majority of Bush II Board placed burden of production of
reasonable mitigation efforts on Counsel representing employee interests where
employer produces evidence of substantially equivalent jobs in relevant
geographical area, shifting prior Board law as dissenters pointed out.);
Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 351 N.L.R.B. 644 (2007) (three-two decision denying
back pay to sixteen employees discharged illegally after employer unlawfully
installed surveillance cameras without prior bargaining with union).
241. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 (2006); e.g., Holien v. Sears & Roebuck, 689 P.2d
1292 (Or. 1984) (providing tort remedy for wrongful discharge where plaintiff
was discharged for resisting sexual harassment); Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co.,
316 A.2d 549 (N.H. 1974).
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Many dedicated officers and attorneys devote their lives to
working within the NLRB. This Article intends no disparagement
of their important work. But agencies through time are subject to
capture by the interests they seek to regulate; further, they can be
starved for resources during political administrations hostile to
their purposes. We do not rely exclusively on the Food and Drug
Administration, Environmental Protection Agency, or Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission to protect our food and
prescription drugs, our environment, or our civil rights, though the
work of those agencies is exceedingly important and valued.
Neither should we place exclusive reliance on administrative
officers in labor relations law. But labor law preemption doctrines,
not originating from the Congress, force that reliance.242
c. The Civil Penalty Provision in EFCA
Finally, EFCA would create a civil penalty capped at $20,000
for employer discrimination, restraint, or coercion during a union
organizing campaign and before completion of first contract
negotiations. 243 While civil penalties serve significant compliance
interests for smaller businesses, why should this provision be
limited to union organizing situations? Moreover, such a penalty,
even if levied to the maximum, only doubtfully would provide
significant deterrence for employers of any size. They would mean
little to the victims of unlawful anti-union discrimination; they
would not compensate for emotional distress or include punitive
damages, as in other types of discrimination cases. Indeed, in many
situations a $20,000 fine, even assuming the maximum was levied,
would be far less than the amount of probable employer attorneys'
fees for defending the unfair labor practice charge; such fines will
change the calculation of the costs and benefits of illegal conduct,
but in many cases only at the margin.
C. The General Rule in the Broad Field of Employment Law
Illustrates the Value of Shared State and Federal Policy Making
Like the little house in the country gradually surrounded by
urban development in a growing metropolis, vast areas of
242. The administration of President George W. Bush did attempt to adopt
administrative regulations asserting that state torts were preempted with respect
to failure to warn claims involving prescription drugs approved by the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA); the Supreme Court rejected the argument in the
context of the "FDA Preamble" in Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009).
243. EFCA, H.R. 1409, § 4(b)(2).
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"employment law" sprung up during the past fifty years to
surround labor relations policy, with most workplace regulation
now under a shared state-federal model. 244 The uniquely broad
labor law preemption doctrines of another era fall out of step with
this larger pattern in the American law of the workplace. Briefly
consider some examples.
1. Status Discrimination
Status discrimination stands as an area uniquely important for
federal prohibition as a matter of fundamental civil and human
rights. Yet, contrary to the perception of many, Title VII of the
1964 Civil Right Act245 did not initiate the regulation of
employment discrimination in the United States.246 A substantial
number of states made racial discrimination in employment
unlawful years before the landmark 1964 federal enactment.
247
And this pattern-state level reforms preceding the required
consensus for federal level reform-permeates the law of
employment discrimination. In the gender discrimination area, for
example, states provided common law damages remedies and jury
244. E.g., Drummonds, Sister Sovereigns, supra note 1, at 489-509.
245. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e17 (2006).
246. Of course there were earlier federal discrimination enactments. Most
notably, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, originally enacted in 1866, bars racial discrimination
(broadly defined) and allows uncapped damages and jury trials. But Section
1981 was largely forgotten after the Civil War era and not "re-discovered" as an
employment discrimination statute by the Supreme Court until McDonald v.
Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976); Comment,
Developments in the Law: Section 1981, 15 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 29, 35-69
(1980) (reviewing Section 1981's legislative history). Section 1981 applies to
some forms of discrimination beyond the modem concept of race
discrimination. Saint Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 613 (1987) ("If
[plaintiff] . . . can prove that he was subjected to intentional discrimination
based on the fact that he was bom an Arab, rather than solely on his place of
origin, or his religion, he will have made out [his 1981 case]."). But after
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989), and prior to the 1991
Civil Rights Act overturning that case, Section 1981 did not reach racial
harassment or other discrimination during the term of employment as opposed to
hiring. Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 101, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981(b) (2006)). Another pre-1964 federal discrimination enactment was the
1963 Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2006), but this statute reached only
gender pay discrimination and, thus far, has been far from effective.
247. E.g., Drummonds, Sister Sovereigns, supra note 1, at 496; Note, The
Right to Equal Treatment: Administrative Enforcement of Anti-Discrimination
Legislation, 74 HARV. L. REV. 526 (1961). Title 42 U.S.C. § 1981, originally
enacted in 1866, provides for uncapped damages and jury trials for racial
discrimination. For example, Minnesota's statute dates to 1955. Bahr v. Capella
Univers., 765 N.W.2d 428, 433 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009).
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trials for sexual harassment both before and after the 1991 Civil
Rights Actz48 provided such remedies under federal discrimination
law.24 9 Even today many states provide uncapped compensatory
and punitive damages for intentional employment discrimination
(or they provide caps higher than those in the federal law); Title
VII damages remain capped at $50,000 for smaller businesses and
$300,000 for even the largest corporations.250 The pioneering of
these jury trial and compensatory remedies in the states marked
significant milestones in the ongoing effort to build a society free
of such discrimination and laid the groundwork for federal reform.
For this reason, Congress wisely preserved both existing and future
state law remedies in the discrimination area 251 (and indeed
required resort to state administrative remedies as a pre-requisite to
federal Title VII remedies). 2 2
The leading-edge role of state law continues in the employment
discrimination area today. "About half the states and the District of
Columbia, and numerous cities have enacted law prohibiting
discrimination in private employment on the basis of sexual
248. 1991 Civil Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071-99.
249. E.g., Stockett v. Tolin, 791 F. Supp. 1536 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (in egregious
sexual harassment case plaintiff wins back and front pay against employer in the
amount of $58,284 under Title VII, and compensatory damages of $250,000,
and punitive damages of $1,055,001 for state law battery, intentional infliction
of emotional distress, false imprisonment, and privacy claims, including
$1,000,000 against the individual harasser-manager); Monge v. Beebe Rubber
Co., 316 A.2d 549, 552 (N.H. 1974) (contract remedy for breach of oral
employment contract where employee was maliciously fired after refusing
sexual advances); Tate v. Browning Ferris, Inc., 833 P.2d 1218 (Okla. 1992)
(plaintiff awarded compensatory damages for state tort of wrongful discharge in
violation of public policy in race discrimination case); Holien v. Sears, Roebuck
& Co., 689 P.2d 1292, 1299-1300 (Or. 1984) (wrongful discharge in violation
of public policy tort action allowed for retaliation for resisting sexual
harassment).
250. Compare OR. REv. STAT. ANN. § 659A.885 (West 2003 & Supp. 2009),
and CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12970 (a)(3) (West 2005) (damages are capped at
$150,000), and TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 21.2585 (Vernon 2006 & Supp. 2009)
(there is a cap on damages in this statute), with 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) (2006)
(capping Title VII damages at $50,000 to $300,000 depending on the size of the
employer as measured by the number of employees). However, federal law
provides uncapped damages for racial discrimination under Section 1981.
251. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 (2006) ("Nothing in this [subchapter] shall be
deemed to exempt or relieve any person from any liability, duty, penalty, or
punishment provided by the present or future law of any State or political
subdivision of a State, other than any such law which purports to require or
permit the doing of any act which would be an unlawful employment practice
under this [subchapter].").
252. Title VII, § 706 (c)-(e), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (c)-(e) (2006).
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orientation. ' 253 Congress still debates whether to explicitly cover
this form of employment discrimination in Title VII.
254
State law remedies in the discrimination area may also differ in
proof standards and employer liability for supervisory harassment.
Two recent decisions in New York illustrate this point. The
Southern District for New York held this year that the New York
City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL) imposes strict liability for
supervisory sexual harassment;255 the court rejected the Faragher-
Burlington two-rong affirmative defense for employer liability
under Title VII. 25 6 Meanwhile a decision of the Appellate Division
in New York arguably lowered the standard for proof of hostile
environment sexual harassment from the federal "severe and
pervasive" standard to a "treated less well" standard under the
257NYCHRL. These cases are merely illustrative of the many cases
applying differing proof or doctrinal standards, often more
favorable to plaintiffs, under the state discrimination statutes.
258
2. State Wage and Hour Regulation
Beyond the shared state-federal authority over issues of status
discrimination, states establish minimum wage and overtime pay
requirements within federal minimum standards under the Fair
259Labor Standards Act (FLSA). State minimum wage laws
preceded federal legislation by a quarter century. 2 6 Today, while
the federal minimum wage rests at $7.25,261 the state minimum
253. MARK A. ROTHSTEIN & LANCE LIEBMAN, EMPLOYMENT LAW CASES
AND MATERIALS 386 n.5 (6th ed. 2007).
254. Whitehouse.gov, http://www.whitehouse. gov/agenda/civil rights/ (last
visited Sept. 4, 2009) (discussing the Employment Non-Discrimination Act
(ENDA)).
255. Zakrzewska v. New Sch., 598 F. Supp. 2d 426 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
256. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998); Burlington Indus.
v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
257. Williams v. N.Y. City Hous. Auth., 872 N.Y.S.2d 27 (N.Y. App. Div.
2009).
258. E.g., Henderson v. Jantzen, Inc., 79 Or. App. 654 (Or. Ct. App. 1986),
rev'd, 303 Or. 477 (Or. 1987).
259. 29 U.S.C. § 218 (2006).
260. Fifteen states plus the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico adopted
minimum wage legislation by 1923-fifteen years before the federal FLSA was
enacted. David Neumark et. al., Minimum Wage Legislation: Questioning the
Paradigm, 92 MINN. L. REv. 1296, 1298 (2008).
261. 29 U.S.C. § 206 (a)(1)(C) (2006). Prior to July 24, 2008, the federal
minimum wage stood at $5.85 per hour ($11, 700 per year assuming fifty forty-
hour work weeks); on that date the federal minimum wage rose to $6.55 where it
remained until July 2009. BUREAu OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
LABOR, CHARACTERISTICS OF MINIMUM WAGE WORKERS 2008 (2009),
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wage is 17.15 in New York 262 $8.00 in California,263 $8.00 in
Illinois,2  $7.21 in Florida, and $8.40 in Oregon.266 Even as
minimum wage laws raise fair questions of public policy (do they
reduce the number of jobs at the margin?), the states make the
policy decision whether to go beyond the federal minimum.
Millions of employees at the bottom of the economic hierarchy
benefit directly, and millions more relatively low-wage workers
benefit indirectly, by the "push" effects of higher minimums. This
illustrates another important advantage of a shared federalist
balance in the law of the workplace. Citizens in the states can
shape standards to local conditions and preferences.
Similarly, legislation of work hours permits tailoring to local
conditions. While the FLSA requires (with many exceptions)
premium overtime pay for work over forty hours per week.2 8 state
laws can provide for overtime pay after eight hours a day2 9 or cap270
work hours altogether in certain occupations.
All of these state wage and hour rules apply to local, national,
and transnational firms and businesses. Thus, in the wage and hour
area, just as with status discrimination, those entities must manage
their human resources departments to comply with differing
standards in the states.
As in the status discrimination area, Congress expressly made
shared state-federal authority over wage and hour issues explicit in
the FLSA.271 Labor relations law cries out for a similar expressionof congressional intent.
http://www.bls.gov/cps/minwage2008.pdf. According to the Department of
Labor, Wage and Hour Division, fourteen states had minimums exceeding the
federal minimum as of October 2009. Wage and Hour Division, Minimum Wage
Laws in the States-Oct. 1, 2009 ( http://dol.gov/esa/minwage/america.htm)
262. N.Y. LAB. LAW § 652 (McKinney 2002 & Supp. 2009).
263. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1182.12 (West Supp. 2009).
264. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 105/4 (2008 & Supp. 2009).
265. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 448.110 (West Supp. 2009).
266. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 653.025 (West 2003 & Supp. 2008).
267. Neumark et. al., supra note 262.
268. 29 U.S.C. § 207 (2006).
269. For example, California requires overtime pay for most workers after
eight hours of work rather than the federal standard for most workers of
overtime pay after forty hours of work. United States Department of Labor,
Wage and Hour Division, (2009) available at www.dol.gov/esa/minwage/
america.htm.
270. E.g., OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 652.010 (West 2003 & Supp. 2008)
(maximum ten-hour day in certain occupations).
271. 29 U.S.C. § 218 (2006) ("No provision of this Act . . .shall excuse
noncompliance with any ... State law or municipal ordinance establishing a
minimum wage higher .. .or a maximum workweek lower [than the federal
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3. Occupational Health and Injury
The prevention and treatment of occupational injury and
disease involves major costs for employees and employers alike.272
Yet workers' compensation generally falls under state law.27 3 The
"no fault" statutes were pioneered in the states during the
Progressive Era274 and continue today as the primary remedy for
workplace injury. In fact these state statutes provided the model for
the later enactment of federal no fault compensation statutes in
areas of unique federal concern. 27 5 State tort law remedies (under
exceptions to the generally exclusive remedies of the workers'
compensation statutes) also mirror remedies for workers in areas of
unique federal concern, such as the damages suits provided under
federal law for railroad workers and sailors.276 Additionally,
"[some] states innovated with these workers' compensation
systems and expanded them to include occupational disease, most
famously asbestos related disease. Congress expressly preserved
these state compensation claims in the OSHA Act."
277
Beyond compensation issues, workplace injury and
occupational disease prevention illustrates another model of shared
federal and state authority. The federal Occupational Safety and
Health Act (OSHA) regulates workplace safety through a system
of detailed federal standards enforceable by federal inspectors
through citations, fines and penalties, and abatement orders.
278
standards], and no provision of this Act relating to the employment of child
labor shall justify noncompliance with any ... State law or municipal ordinance
establishing a higher standard .... ).
272. Drummonds, Sister Sovereigns, supra note 1, at 493.
273. See generally Arthur Larson, The Nature and Origins of Workmen's [sic]
Compensation, 37 CORNELL L. Q. 206 (1952). Federal statutes, however, cover
certain categories of workers: federal civil service employees (Federal Employees
Compensation Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 8101-8193 (2006)), miners (Black Lung Benefits
Amendments of 1981, 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-945), longshoremen [sic] (Longshore and
Harbor Workers Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (2006)), railroad
workers (Federal Employers Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (2006)), and
sailors (Merchant Marine, aka "Jones," Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30104 (2006)).
274. Larson, supra note 275.
275. See infra note 283. Compensation suits by railroad workers and sailors,
however, require proof of negligence (railroad workers (Federal Employers
Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (2006)); sailors (Merchant Marine, a.k.a.
"Jones," Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30104 (2006))).
276. Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (2006),
and Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30104 (2006).
277. Drummonds, Beyond the Free Choice Act Debate, supra note 169;
Occupational Safety and Health Act § 4(b)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 633(b)(4) (2006).
278. Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 655, 658-659 (2006).
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Once again the federal regime stops far short of exclusive
occupation of the field. States may regulate workplace safety
matters in areas where no federal standard exists.279 More
significantly, OSHA Section 18280 permits the states to "reverse
preempt"28 t the federal standards and enforcement scheme by
submitting a more protective state plan for approval by the
Secretary of Labor. Approximately half the states currently operate
under such state plans, enforcing their own standard through their
own enforcement system.
282
4. Family, Parental, and Medical Leave
The same pattern of federalist sharing applies to maternity,
family, parental, and medical leave laws. When the Supreme Court
declared in 1976 that discrimination against pregnant women did
not involve sex discrimination,283 many states refused to follow
this holding under their own statutes.284 Although Congress
reversed the Supreme Court's ruling in the 1978 Pregnancy
Discrimination Act (PDA),285 the episode illustrates another
important advantage of shared state and federal authority-a
safeguard against cribbed federal interpretation of protective
policies. Further, although the PDA required only that women
receive pregnancy leave equal to equivalent disabilities, the states
promptly enacted additional parental and family leave laws
granting women-and men-unpaid leave to care for children,
parents, or other sick family members.286 Many state leave statutes
thus preceded the federal Family Medical Leave Act of 1993.287
279. Gade v. Nat'l Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 117 (1992). (Four
Justices in this five-four decision would have permitted state standards even in
areas of OSHA regulation.).
280. 29 U.S.C. § 667 (2006).
281. This phrase is the author's.
282. OSHA, Factsheet on State Job, available at http://www.osha.gov/
oschDoc/dataGeneralFacts/factsheet-statejob.pdf.
283. Gen. Elec. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
284. E.g., Castellano v. Linden Bd. of Educ., 386 A.2d 396, 402 (N.J. Super.
Ct. 1978), aff'd in relevant part, 400 A.2d 1182 (N.J. 1979); Anderson v. Upper
Bucks County Area Vocational Technical Sch., 373 A.2d 126, 132 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1977); Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 273 N.W.2d 786, 800 (Wis.
Ct. App. 1978); see also Brooklyn Union Gas Co. v. N. Y. State Human Rights
Appeal Bd., 359 N.E.2d 393, 396 (N.Y. 2006).
285. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2006).
286. E.g., Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerro, 479 U.S. 272 (1987)
(rejecting a federal preemption claim against a California statute providing for
four months unpaid leave for pregnancy, thus allowing a state to go beyond the
PDA's requirement of equal treatment); OR. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 659.010-121,
360-370, 560-570 (Butterworth 1989 & Supp. 1991); Drummonds, Sister
[Vol. 70
LABOR LA WPREEMPTION
More recently, several states pioneered paid leave for
employees. Again following these pioneering state laws a federal
paid leave bill has now been introduced in the Congress.
Leave laws carry special significance as U.S. workers-both
women and men-struggle to meet the often conflicting demands
of work and family. Our law does not permit national and global
business to insist on a federal orthodoxy in this area, shutting off
experimentation and innovation in the states.28 9 Labor relations law
demands the same freedoms for citizens in the states.
5. Privacy in the Workplace
Technology also presents other challenges to U.S. workers
today: drug testing, electronic monitoring, employer regulation of
the private lives of employees, employer access to employee e-
mail, and the like. Federal law failed to address many of these
issues for most U.S. employees (drug testing, workplace
polygraphs genetic testing) until long after state regulation showed
the way.29 States ventured into other regulatory waters as well.
Sovereigns, supra note 1, at 503; Wendy Williams, Equality's Riddle:
Pregnancy and the Equal Treatment/Special Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REV.
L. & SOC. CHANGE 325 (1984).
287. Family Medical Leave Act of 1993, 107 Stat. 6, 29 U.S.C. § 2601 (2006).
288. E.g., California (Paid Family & Medical Insurance Act of 2005); New
Jersey (NJ STAT. ANN. §§ 43:21-27 (West 2004)); Bill Would Mandate Paid
Vacation for U.S. Workers, Law 360 (May 22, 2009) (sponsor of proposal states
that twenty-nine percent of U.S. workers get no vacation while more than 100
nations, including all EU countries, have laws providing for paid vacation;
another bill reintroduced to provide paid sick leave).
289. The FMLA expressly allows "[s]tate and local law that provides greater
family or medical leave rights than the rights established under this Act... ." 29
U.S.C. § 2651(b).
290. Public employee drug testing, however, is regulated in certain situations
by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. Nat'l
Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raba, 489 U.S. 656 (1989). See also
O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987) (searches of public employee desks,
office, and file cabinets protected by Constitution where employee has
reasonable expectation of privacy); see also Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives'
Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (accident drug testing of railroad workers permitted
by federal statute). States have regulated drug testing for many years via statutes
and state constitutional provisions. Drummonds, Sister Sovereigns, supra note 1,
at 504-05 nn.191-92.
The federal Polygraph Protection Act, (29 U.S.C. §§ 2000-2009 (1988)), was
preceded by many state statutes. Drummonds, Sister Sovereigns, supra note 1, at
505 n.196 (citing state statutes and cases). In total, eighteen states regulated
polygraphs before the federal statute was passed. MARK RoTHSTEIN ET AL.,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 143 (2d ed. 1991).
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While "supervisory monitoring goes back as far as the pyramids...
what you have [as early as 1989] is a new capacity to use that
supervisory monitoring made possible by computers.",29' While
Congress as yet has not enacted federal legislation, the states long
ago began adopting regulatory provisions in this area.292
6. Wrongful Discharge
Although many other areas might be cited, let us conclude this
review of the vital role played by state law in the workplace with a
look at job security. Professor Clyde Summers long ago noted that
private sector employees-unlike public employees protected by
civil service and unionized employees protected by "just cause"
clauses typical in union contracts-fall under the employment-at-
will rule in the U.S.293 Yet one of the greatest upheavals in the law
of the twentieth-century workplace occurred with the erosion of
that rule via common law exceptions carved out by doctrines like
public policy wrongful discharge, breach of implied contract terms,
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and so forth.
Much of that upheaval occurred exclusively through state law.294
Again, whether local, national, or transnational, employers adapted
their practices to these varying state developments, thus restricting
the most fundamental of employer prerogatives.
7. Summary
This review shows that federal and state regulations most often
go hand in hand. The states most often play a leading-edge role in
status discrimination, wage and hour laws, compensation and
The same pattern holds with protections against genetic testing. Drummonds,
Sister Sovereigns, supra note 1, at 505 n. 197 (citing state statutes); only in 2008
was a federal law in this area adopted. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination
Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 920 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 29 U.S.C .).
291. Columbia Professor Contends Monitoring Does Not Breach Employee
Privacy Rights, 44 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), Mar. 8, 1989, at A7 (cited in
Drummonds, Sister Sovereigns, supra note 1, at 506 n. 198).
292. Drummonds, Sister Sovereigns, supra note 1, at 506 n.205.
293. Clyde Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal: Time
for A Statute, 62 VA. L. REV. 481 (1976). See also Lawrence Blades,
Employment at Will v. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of
Employer Power, 67 COLuM. L. REV. 1404 (1967).
294. E.g., Cornelius Peck, Penetrating Doctrinal Camouflage: Understanding
the Development of the Law of Wrongful Discharge, 66 WASH. L. REV. 719(1991).
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prevention of occupational injury and disease, leave laws, privacy,
and the law of wrongful discharge. Why is it that labor relations
law in the twenty-first century cannot follow this clearly dominant
model of shared state and federal policy making?
IV. THE RATIONALES CREATED BY JUDGES FOR THE THREE BROAD
LABOR LAW PREEMPTION DOCTRINES FAIL TO PERSUADE EVEN IN
THEIR OWN TERMS BECAUSE THEIR PREMISES IN TODAY'S
CONDITIONS ARE FLAWED, AND EXCEPTIONS AND INCONSISTENCIES
MAKE THEM INCOHERENT
This Part examines the three labor law preemption doctrines on
their own terms. All of the doctrines rest upon "implied"
preemption theory.295 To paraphrase Chief Justice Rehnquist's
complaint long ago, these doctrines grew from "acorns of sensible
decision" into a "mighty oak" reaching ever outward, now grown
295. As the Supreme Court cases often explain, three general types of
preemption doctrine exist: (1) express preemption by the Congress; (2)
pervasive federal governmental regulation which occupies an entire "field;" and
(3) implied "conflicts" preemption. E.g., English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72
(1990). This framework, however, sheds little light on the cases. Drummonds,
Sister Sovereigns, supra note 1, at 529 (noting that "field" preemption can be
either express or implied, citing cases; English, 496 U.S. at 79-80 n.5 ("field
pre-emption may be understood as a species of conflict pre-emption."); Gade v.
Nat'l Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88 (1992) (Four-Justice plurality
applied implied conflicts preemption analysis, Justice Kennedy treated the case
as involving express preemption, and the four dissenters characterized the
plurality approach as involving both "purpose-conflict" doctrine, and "federal
occupation of a field...")).
Conflicts preemption is of two types: (1) conflicts arising from impossibility of
complying with both state and federal law simultaneously (generally not
controversial); and (2) conflicts from state law that "stand[] as an obstacle[s]" to
the full attainment of congressional objectives as divined by the courts. Gade, 505
U.S. at 98; Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc., v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43
(1963). The second type of conflicts preemption, "obstacle preemption," gives the
courts almost unbridled discretion. Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009)
(Thomas, J., concurring); Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 120 (1994). Labor
law preemption doctrine fits into this later category. E.g., 520 S. Mich. Ave.
Assocs. Ltd. v. Shannon, 549 F.3d 1119, 1125 (7th Cir. 2008) ("[T]he issue facing
us is one of implied preemption").
In theory, implied "obstacle preemption" falls under the "clear statement"
doctrine, requiring a "clear and manifest" or "clear and unambiguous" indication
of congressional intent to preempt state law. As will be seen, much of labor law
preemption doctrine ignores this general presumption against implied preemption
clearly part of the broader law of preemption. Drummonds, Sister Sovereigns,
supra note 1, at 530-31; Estlund, Ossification, supra note 1, at 1599-1600; Fla.
Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc., 373 U.S. at 146-152 (1963); Rice v. Santa Fe
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 236-37 (1947); Cippllone v. Leggett Group, Inc.,
505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992).
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beyond all usefulness296---except as a shield from the reform of
labor law to more meaningfully implement the ideal of employee
free choice through initiatives by citizens and legislators in the
states. As many commentators, and indeed several of the Justices,
acknowledge,2 97 Congress remains silent after fifty years of
judicially-created preemption doctrine. Yet preemption in theory
rests upon congressional intent. Judges, not Senators and
Congressmen, create and continue to extend the doctrines that
displace state authority. 2
98
First, this Part will review the Garmon doctrine and show that
both its "primary agency jurisdiction" and "uniform national labor
policy" rationales were hotly debated even in their inception and
simply fly in the face of reality in present conditions.299 Second, it
will examine the Machinists doctrine and show that its "free play
of economic forces" rationale rests upon implied "rights" not
found in the text of the NLRA (piling an implied preemption
doctrine on an "implied right") and suffers a striking inconsistency
with other vital parts of labor law. 30 0 Finally, it will show that
"[S]ection 301" preemption, while arising from a valid policy
concern about the preferred interpretation of collective bargaining
agreements by arbitrators, does not justify depriving unionized
employees of individual state statutory and common law rights that
their non-unionized cousins enjoy, and, in any event, could be fully
accommodated by a deferral or exhaustion doctrine rather than a
preemption doctrine.
30 1
An additional general point must be made about claims that
"the national labor policy" requires exclusive federal law making
in the labor relations area. The claims is not true. NLRA Section
14-B 302 already authorizes a state option on the fundamental issue
296. Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 475 U.S. 608, 622
(1986) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
297. E.g., Id. at 622 (Rehnquist, J. dissenting) ("From the acorns of [two
earlier] sensible decisions has grown the mighty oak of this Court's labor
preemption doctrine, which sweeps ever outward, though still totally
uninformed by any express directive from Congress.").
298. See discussion supra notes 25-29.
299. See infra Part IV.A; San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359
U.S. 236 (1959).
300. See infra Part IV.B; Int'l Assoc. of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740
(1961).
301. See infra Part IV.C, see supra note 9 and accompanying text.
302. 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (2006). Twenty-one states have the "right to work"
laws authorized by Section 14(b), "most of them in the more agricultural states
of the south and Midwest." COX ET AL., supra note 7, at 1193. For a list of these
states, see supra note 7. Agricultural employees' collective bargaining rights,
moreover, are determined by state law.
[Vol. 70
2009] LABOR LA WPREEMPTION 165
of union security-whether all members of a unionized bargaining
unit must contribute financially to the costs of representation in
order to prevent "free rider" problems. 30 3 Additionally, some
federal labor law analyses, for example, questions regarding a
union's access to employees on employer property, depend upon a
balancing of state law property rights. 4 Thus, for example,
California may allow union organizers access to a shopping center
while other states may not-as a matter of state, not federal, law.
30 5
Finally, under the many exceptions to labor law preemption
doctrines announced during the past half-century, states decide
many issues arising from, and can often affect the balance of
power in, labor disputes.
30 6
A. The Garmon Doctrine's Rationales Suffer from Fatal Flaws and
Inconsistencies in Today's Conditions
Garmon307 sprang from the New Dealers' faith in federal
administrative agencies. When Justice Frankfurter wrote the
Garmon majority's decision in 1959, his focus was on the rights of
unions under the NLRA, then only a quarter century old, and on
his long-seated distrust of judicial policy making in the labor
relations area.30 8 His seminal opinion became the foundation for
303. The term in this context is the Supreme Court's. Machinists, 367 U.S. at
761; see also Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977) (public sector)
and Marquez v. Screen-Actors Guild, 525 U.S. 33 (1998) (NLRA).
304. E.g., NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox, 351 U.S. 105 (1956); Lechmere, Inc.
v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527 (1992).
305. E.g., Glendale Assoc., Ltd. v. NLRB, 347 F.3d 1145 (9th Cir. 2003).
306. See infra Part IV.A.2.c; see infra notes 364-76 and accompanying text.
307. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
Garnon involved two California unions' picketing of a lumber yard. Depending
on its purpose, the picketing could either have been protected by Section 8(b) (if
to coerce the employees and lumber yard to unionize even though a majority of
the employees disfavored unionization). The California Supreme Court
sustained a state trial court injunction and $1,000 damages award on the ground
that the NLRB had declined jurisdiction over the case. In Garmon I, 353 U.S. 26
(1957), the Supreme Court reversed that ruling, holding that the NLRB's refusal
ofjurisdiction did not leave the state with power over a dispute from which state
power would otherwise be preempted. The California Supreme Court on remand
sustained the $1,000 fine against the union, reasoning that while the NLRB
could issue a cease and desist order to stop the picketing, that agency lacked any
statutory authority under the NLRA to award damages. The Supreme Court in
Garmon II [the case now known as "Garmon"], 359 U.S. 236 (1958), found the
California judgment preempted.
308. See FELIx FRANKFURTER & NATHAN GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION
(1930). In 1932, just before President Franklin Roosevelt took office, Congress
passed the Norris-LaGuardia Anti-Injunction Act, ch. 90, 47 Stat. 70 (1932),
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (2006)). That enactment was
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labor law preemption doctrine. Even so, four Justices of that day
refused to join his opinion, deeming Frankfurter's preemption
doctrine far too broad.309 Moreover, Justice Frankfurter freely
acknowledged in Garmon that it was he, not the Congress, who
was creating the broad preemption doctrine that he narrowly
convinced a majority of the Court to join.310 Thus, right from the
start, the Garnon doctrine stood on a disputed rationale, and one
that generated controversy, even in that day, among the Justices.
However, it is not the result reached by Justice Frankfurter in the
1959 dispute about the unions' picketing at a California lumber
yard that concerns us today, but rather the reasoning and doctrinal
framework announced in that decision.
1. Garmon's "Arguably Protected" or "Arguably Prohibited"
Test and the Two Rationales Supporting It"'
The doctrine created by the Frankfurter majority exuded an
appealing simplicity: "When an activity is arguably subject to
[Section] 7 or [Section] 8 of the [NLRA], the States as well as the
federal courts must defer to the exclusive competence of the
National Labor Relations Board if the danger of state interference
with national policy is to be averted., 312 The Garnon "arguably
designed to keep federal judges out of labor disputes by severaly curtailing their
jurisdiction and powers. Frankfurter and Greene's book provided much of the
intellectual rationale for the enactment. Frankfurter, a former Dean of the
Harvard Law School, shared with Harvard Professor Archibald Cox a profound
faith in federal administrative agencies and broad federal preemption, and Cox's
views were influential in Supreme Court preemption and other labor law rulings.
Drummonds, Sister Sovereigns, supra note 1, at 515 n.265, 562 n.517 (citing
Cox's articles, cases adopting his ideas [often with express attribution], and
academic acknowledgement of Cox's giant-like contributions to labor law).
309. Garmon, 359 U.S. at 249. Justice Harlan, joined by Justices Clark,
Steward, and Whittaker, concurred on much narrower grounds (that "the unions'
activities for which the State has awarded damages may fairly be considered
protected under the Taft-Hartley Act and that therefore state action is precluded
until the National Labor Relations Board has made a contrary determination..
Id.
310. Id. at 239-40 (Labor law preemption doctrine "involve[s] a more
complicated and perceptive process than is conveyed by the delusive phrase,
'ascertaining the intent of Congress').
311. The author here borrows from his forthcoming article in the Cornell
Journal of Law and Public Policy: Beyond the Employee Free Choice Act
Debate: Unleashing the States In Labor Management Relations Policy by
Reforming the Labor Law Preemption Doctrines Created by Judges a Half-
Century Ago.
312. Garmon, 359 U.S. at 245.
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protected" "arguably prohibited" test rested upon two policy
concerns. 13 First, as recently explained by the Seventh Circuit,
Garmon "seeks to prevent conflicts between state and local
regulation and... [federal] regulation embodied in Sections 7 and
8 of the NLRA.''314 Second, "Garmon preemption further seeks to
protect the NLRB's primary jurisdiction in cases involving
Sections 7 or 8 of the NLRA."' 1 Generations of labor lawyers,
professors, and students have worshipped at this doctrinal shrine.
2. The Critique of Garmon Offered in This Article
Whatever its value in 1959, the Garmon doctrine today stands
as an aging relic. This Article offers several arguments why it
should be revised in light of the near death of private sector unions
as bargaining agents and the paramount societal interest in
fostering structural balance in our economy through a more robust
protection for employee free choice and participation.
First, this Section examines the foundational premises of
Justice Frankfurter's doctrinal creation and shows their flaws in
today's conditions. The fear of clashing state and federal law
policies no longer, assuming it once did, justifies Garmon's
overbroad displacement of state law; this especially holds true in
the preemption of state law enhancement of remedies for illegal
conduct violating the Section 7 rights of employees. The primary
agency expertise jurisdiction rationale, moreover, lies shredded in
the light of the now well-known politicization of the Board, the
refusal of federal courts (including the Supreme Court) to accept
and enforce many important policy judgments by the Board, and
the proliferation of situations in which both federal and state courts
already apply federal labor law.
Second, a maze of exceptions and limitations announced over
the half-century following Garnon make it less predictable in its
application; many of these exceptions found expression in cases
filed against unions. Thus, while Justice Frankfurter's focus in the
1959 lumber yard picketing dispute may have been on the
protection of federal union rights from state encroachment, today
the doctrine protects employers far more often than unions and
employees.
313. See generally Cox ET AL., supra note 7, at 1005.
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a. Garmon's Premises: The Clash of Substantive Federal and
State Rights
Let us start by analyzing Garmon's first rationale-preventing
a substantive conflict between federal and state law. That remains
a valid purpose for any preemption analysis. Suppose the picketing
of the lumber yard in Garmon was in fact protected picketing
under Section 7.316 Obviously, under the Supremacy Clause,
California state courts cannot award damages for conduct that the
Congress protected under federal law. That follows from a
straightforward conflicts analysis: the union's picketing at the
lumber yard would enjoy no federal protection if the state could
award injunctive or damages relief against the unions as a result of
that conduct. Why did not the Frankfurter majority simply decide
that question? This, after all, provided the basis for Justice
Harlan's concurrence for four Justices. 317 (The answer, of course,
is the majority's primary agency jurisdiction rationale. That
rationale will be discussed below.)
On the other hand, suppose the union's picketing in Garmon
was in fact, as found by the California courts, for the purpose of
coercing the employees and lumber yard to agree to a union shop
absent majority suport for the union-a clear violation of Section
8(b), then and now. 18 How could a state remedy for a violation of
the NLRA interfere with federal rights any more than state
remedies for acts of racial, national origin, and sex discrimination
interfere with Title VII rights? And why did not the Court simply
decide whether the union's picketing conduct promoted the
federally forbidden purpose?
Two rationales explain the "arguably prohibited" prong of the
Garmon formulation. First, the only substantive difference
between state and federal law on the "prohibited" question related
not to the conduct but to the remedy for illegal conduct. The
Garmon majority was concerned about state court damages awards
for union conduct that, even if illegal under the NLRA, could not
be the subject of damages awards under the scheme devised by the
316. National Labor Relations Act § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006).
317. Garmon, 359 U.S. at 249. Justice Harlan would merely have deferred
(not preempted) a state court's jurisdiction pending a decision by the NLRB as
to whether the conduct enjoyed protection under federal law.
318. National Labor Relations Act § 8(b), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1) (2006). This
statute makes it an unfair labor practice for a union or its agents "to interfere
with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed [in
National Labor Relations Act § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006)]." Section 7 gives
employees the right to refrain from organizing, collective bargaining, and
concerted activity for mutual aid and protection.
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Congress for the remedy of unfair labor practices under the Act.
Thus, to the majority, the California court's award of damages was
inconsistent with the weaker NLRA remedy, which would have
been merely a cease and desist order and similar equitable relief.
319
In this view, Congress created a carefully balanced remedial
scheme and intended to prevent states from supplementing these
federal remedies.
It remains doubtful, to say the least, that the 1947 Congress
intended any such displacement of state law. While clearly the
Congress must have meant to supplant state law condemnation of
federally protected conduct, it is not a given that Congress meant
to ban state remedies for conduct prohibited by federal law. For
one thing, in this area of implied conflicts preemption, the
presumption against preemption applies; no mention of this
presumption appears in Frankfurter's opinion. Second, four
Justices of the Supreme Court refused to find preemption of state
remedies that differed from federal remedies; though today this
notion finds acceptance among labor lawyers with little debate, the
Justices in 1959 were almost evenly divided on this proposition. 32 0
Third, as Justice Harlan explained, for the twelve years between
the 1947 Taft-Hartley Act and the Garmon decision in 1959,
Supreme Court majorities followed a more traditional and far
narrower preemption analysis. Several cases seemed to uphold
state remedies for NLRA-prohibited conduct that were different
from federal remedies; there was no intervening action by the
Congress.3
21
The unnecessarily broad doctrine created by Justice
Frankfurter, not the Congress, today prevents the states from
extending the compensatory (including emotional distress) and
punitive damages that now exist for other forms of discrimination
other than anti-union activity. Neither may the states apply the new
tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy.322 The
same holds true for state creation of meaningful remedies for bad
faith bargaining. Indeed, the states cannot, under Garmon, even
319. National Labor Relations Act § 10, 29 U.S.C. § 160 (2006). The only
conduct for which damages can be awarded under the LMRA presently is for a
union's violation of the secondary boycott, hot cargo, and recognitional
picketing prohibitions of the Act. See National Labor Relations Act § 8(b)(4),
(7), 8(e), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4), (7), 158(e) (2006), and Labor-Management
Relations Act § 303, 29 U.S.C. § 187 (2006).
320. Garmon, 359 U.S. at 249.
321. Garmon, 359 U.S. at 250-54 and cases cited therein.
322. E.g., Luke v. Collotype Labels USA, Inc., 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 440 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2008); Rodriquez v. Yellow Cab Coop., Inc., 253 Cal. Rptr. 779 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1998); Lontz v. Joyce Tharp, 647 S.E.2d 718 (W. Va. 2007).
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channel tax monies used in state procurement contracts away from
"three time loser" employers found guilty of unfair labor practices
by the NLRB!3 23 Thus, NLRA Section 8 now effectively operates
more as a shield against state innovation and experimentation, via
the "arguably prohibited" prong of Garmon, than as a sword
against illegal employer conduct. This holds more relevance today
given the widespread awareness of the ineffectiveness of NLRB
remedies and the proliferation of state remedies under the shared
federal and state authority found in the status discrimination, wage
and hour, occupational safety and health, family and other leave,
and privacy areas.
Moreover, as with the "arguably protected" prong of Garmon,
preemption is triggered even when the conduct only "arguably"
stands prohibited by the federal law. The reach of the Garmon
doctrine to cover conduct only "arguably" protected or prohibited
rests, not on a substantive conflict between federal and state law,
but rather upon the primary agency jurisdiction rationale to which
we now turn.
323. Wis. Dep't of Indus., Labor, & Human Relations v. Gould, 475 U.S.
282, 287-89 (1986). At the time at least four other states had similar laws:
Connecticut, Maryland, Michigan, and Ohio. Id. at 288 n.6. Under this case,
states were denied the same right that a private sector employer, who favored
business partners who were not recidivist unfair labor practice violators, would
enjoy. Id. at 290.
324. See supra Part III.C. The reader may observe that the "arguably
prohibited" prong also prevents unions from falling victim to state created
remedies for union unfair labor practices under the National Labor Relations Act
§ 8(b), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (2006). As developed more fully below, several
points apply. First, employers more often than unions are charged with unfair
labor practices falling within the prohibitions of Section 8. In Fiscal Year 2008,
for example, 22,497 charges were filed, of which 16,169 alleged employer
misconduct and 6,210 alleged unfair labor practices by unions. 73 NLRB ANN.
REP. 5 (2008). Second, the focus of the reforms in labor law preemption law
proposed in this article is to allow states to play a role in creating processes and
remedies to implement the protection of Section 7 rights of employees. Only
employees, and not unions and employers, enjoy Section 7 rights. Third, while
Section 7 rights include the right to refrain, no serious argument exists that
remedies are insufficient for union interference with that right; indeed unions are
already liable for damages in both state and federal courts for mistreatment of
employees rising to the level of a breach of the duty to fair representation;
further a host of exceptions to Garmon carved out over the past fifty years
already expose unions to a variety of state tort claims including trespass, assault
and battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and malicious
defamation. See infra Part IV.A.2.c. Unions thus have far more to gain from the
creation of effective mechanisms in state law for the vindication of Section 7
rights than do employers. Moreover the rebalancing necessary today requires a
more favorable system for union organizing, and the preemption reforms urged
below (See infra Part V) would express that congressional purpose in permitting
more leeway for state experimentation and innovation.
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b. Garmon's Premises: The Primary Agency Jurisdiction of the
NLRB
Though Justice Frankfurter's Garmon decision preempted a
state court's jurisdiction, the primary agency jurisdiction rationale
applied to federal courts as well.325 A generation before the Garmon
decision, the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932326 largely banned
federal judges from issuing labor injunctions. A primary intellectual
foundation for that anti-labor injunction enactment was a book327 by
then Professor Frankfurter that chronicled the use of judicial
injunctions in labor disputes, often to the detriment of workers and
unions. 328 A few years later, the New Dealers turned to a host of
federal administrative agencies to fill the perceived need for
regulation of the Depression-era economy. To the New Dealers,
agencies, rather than courts, promised an expertise-based and
uniform set of federal policies to implement the new thinking of that
time. Justice Frankfurter's Garmon opinion reflects this background.
In his vision, the NLRB would fashion and enforce a uniform
national labor policy to which the courts would largely defer.
i. The Primary Agency Jurisdiction Rationale in 1959
Let us first examine Justice Frankfurter's primary agency
jurisdiction rationale on its own terms. First, if state law suffers
displacement whenever conduct is "arguably" protected or
prohibited by the NLRA, then that displacement will obviously
occur in some cases where the conduct was neither protected nor
prohibited. It is extraordinary to attribute such an intent to
Congress, particularly in light of the presumption against implied
preemption. Second, the doctrine as applied does not merely defer
to the NLRB in the sense of exhaustion. Rather, the jurisdiction of
the NLRB is exclusive under Garmon.329 Yet, exhaustion would
suffice to access the presumed expertise of the Board, the
justification for this branch of Garmon's foundational premises.
Thus, even in its day, Garmon's "arguably" protected or prohibited
concern with NLRB expertise did not justify preemption of state
325. Garmon, 359 U.S. at 245.
326. See supra note 314.
327. FELIX FRANKFURTER & NATHAN GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION
(1932).
328. Cox ET AL., supra note 7, at 49-54.
329. William C. Bryson, A Matter of Wooden Logic: Labor Law Preemption
and Individual Rights, 51 TEX. L. REv. 1037, 1039 n.8 (1973); Justice Harlan's
concurring opinion in Garmon seems to suggest that a deferral, rather than
preemption doctrine, might be defensible. Garmon, 359 U.S. at 249.
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law as opposed to deferral of state claims pending resolution of
any issues properly before the federal agency.
ii. The Primary Agency Jurisdiction of the NLRB Today
Today, the hopes of the New Dealers seem naive. A half-
century after Justice Frankfurter persuaded a majority of the
Supreme Court to join his broad Garnon preemption doctrine, the
primary agency jurisdiction rationale has suffered fatal erosion
from three directions.
First, the NLRB increasingly became politicized. Presidential
elections, not the expertise of the Board, determine the labor versus
management leanings of a majority of its members. This trend,
long underway, accelerated in recent years.330 NLRB "law" swings
to and fro with the political administration.331 Indeed, because of
political gridlock concerning appointments, the five-member
Board sometimes lacks three members to constitute a majority to
hear cases, as in all of 2008, and as of this writing in June 2009.
-332
330. Victoria Bar, National Labor Relations Board Members Reflect on
Their Legacy, 37 LAB. & EMPLOY. L. (ABA Section of Labor and Employment
Law, Chicago, Ill.), Fall 2008, at 4; James Brudney, Isolated and Politicized
The NLRB's Uncertain Future, 26 CoMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 221 (2005);
Thomas Kochan, A Silver Anniversary Not Worth Celebrating: the Impasse
Over American Labor and Employment Policies, 25 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J.
79 (2003); Joan Flynn, A Quiet Revolution at the Labor Board: The
Transformation of the NLRB 1935-2000, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1361 (2000).
331. E.g., Bush Labor Board Decisions: Pendulum Shift or Permanent
Changes, 56 LAB. L.J. 212 (2005) (Interview Professors William R. Corbett,
Ellen Dannin, & Michael C. Harper); David L. Gregory, The NLRB and the
Politics of Labor Law, 27 B.C. L. REv. 39 (1985): David P. Twomey,
Policymaking Under the Bush II Labor Relations Board: Where Do We Go
From Here?, 59 LAB. L.J. 141 (2008) ("The Politicization of the NLRB and
Current Effects").
332. Since the beginning of 2008, the Board has had only two members. The
Board was only able to function at all during this period because the Justice
Department wrote an opinion saying that the full five-member Board (while it
still had five members) could delegate its authority to a three member panel and
that these three could in turn delegate their power to two members when one of
those three subsequently left the Board. Thus during the past two years the
remaining two members decided cases upon which they could agree, but not the
many cases on which they did not agree. This double delegation has been
challenged in eight courts of appeals; the D.C. Circuit and the Seventh Circuit
have issued contradictory decisions on the validity of the two-member decisions.
Laurel Baye Healthcare of Lake Lanier v. NLRB, 564 F.3d_469 (D.C. Cir.
2009); New Process Steel v. NLRB, 564_F.3d_840_(7th Cir. 2009). The cases
decided by the two-member panels in any event did not involve substantial legal
issues, the two remaining members could not agree on twenty to twenty-five
percent of the new cases, and a "significant number of major cases [remain]
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Second, the federal courts undercut the claim that the NLRB's
expertise would shape the national labor policy by frequently
reversing the Board on policy questions. Thus, before and after
Garmon, the Supreme Court repeatedly rejected the "expertise"-
based judgments of the NLRB.
Consider this non-exhaustive list of the broad-ranging
questions over which the NLRB suffered reversal by the Supreme
Court:
1. the highly factual but important determination of the
supervisory exclusion; 333
2. union access to the employees on employer property;334
3. the duty to bargain over partial closure of a business33
4. the duty to provide information necessary for the union to
carry out its responsibilities in a grievance matter;
336
5. the use of economic weapons like the slowdown strike as
an economic pressure tactic during the period of good faith
bargaining and prior to impasse;
6. the denial of equal access and discriminatory aplication of
an employer's rule against union talk at work;
3
7. the reinstatement of sit-down strikers protesting employer
unfair labor practices;
339
8. what remedies for bad faith bargaining might "effectuate
the policies" of the Act;
340
pending [from] when the Board still had 5 members." 37 LAB. & EMPLOY. L.
(ABA Section of Labor and Employment Law, Chicago, Ill.), Fall 2008, at 4.
333. E.g., NLRB v. Ky. River Cmty. Care, Inc., 532 U.S. 706 (2001)
(reversing NLRB on question of supervisory exclusion).
334. Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527 (1992) (NLRB order granting
union organizers access to shopping center reversed).
335. First Nat'l Maint. Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981) (reversing
Board decision that company had duty to bargain before implementing partial
closure decision).
336. Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 301 (1979) (NLRB order that
company disclose information relevant to union's grievances under collective
bargaining contract partially reversed).
337. NLRB v. Ins. Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960) (NLRB ruling
that concerted slowdown during bargaining process constituted failure to
bargain in good faith unfair labor practice reversed).
338. NLRB v. United Steelworkers of Am., 357 U.S. 357 (1958) (affirming
court of appeals' reversal of NLRB finding that employer enforcement of non-
solicitation rule was discriminatory).
339. NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240 (1939) (Board's
order reinstating sit down strikers protesting employer's unfair labor practices
reversed).
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9. the remedies for anti-union discrimination against
undocumented workers;
34 1
10. the Board's position that on the question of back pay no
mitigation was required;
342
11. the Board's position that a union could validly waive
initiation fees to employees who joined the union before
the election;
343
12. the Board position that an offensive lockout was
unlawful;
344
13. the Board position that an employer could not lawfully
insist on a "management rights" clause in collective
bargaining;3
45
14. the Board's ruling that an employer's unilateral reduction
in union retiree health benefits was unlawful;346 and
15. the Board's position that a successor employer was bound
by the seller's labor contract with the union.
347
This article does not quarrel with any of these Supreme Court
rulings. Rather the point is that the Supreme Court, not the NLRB,
made them.
Moreover, perhaps led by the example of the Supreme Court,
the courts of appeals refuse to enforce the Board's orders in about
fifteen to twenty-five percent of its cases.348 The courts of appeals
340. H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970) (NLRB remedy for bad
faith bargaining ordering employer to sign contract with union dues check off
provision reversed).
341. Hoffman Plastic Compounds v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002) (back pay
without reinstatement remedy for undocumented workers fired for union activity
reversed by Supreme Court majority).
342. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941) (rejecting Board
position that back pay remedy did not require duty to mitigate).
343. NLRB v. Savair Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 270 (1973) (reversing Board ruling
that Union could waive initiation fees for employees joining union before NLRB
election).
344. Am. Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965) (NLRB holding that
employer lockout was unfair labor practice reversed).
345. NLRB v. Am. Nat'l Ins. Co, 343 U.S. 395 (1952) (reversing Board's
holding that employer violated Act by seeking "management rights" clause in
collective bargaining agreement).
346. Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S.
157 (1971) (reversing Board's holding that unilateral change in retiree medical
benefits was unlawful).
347. NLRB v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., Inc., 406 U.S. 272 (1972) (reversing
Board on successor's obligation to abide by predecessor's employer's labor
contract).
348. Venable, Taking the Board to Court: Winning Appeals Against the
NLRB, (June 2003), http://venable.com/files/publication/fld48314-e83a-4f93-
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disagree with one another. Absent a Supreme Court decision, the
Board refuses to consider itself bound to follow legal
interpretations of the courts of appeals beyond the case under
review. Thus, at any given point in time prior to resolution by the
Supreme Court, the NLRB may apply one "national labor policy,"
the Second Circuit another, and the Seventh Circuit still another.
A third development also undercuts the claim of exclusive
NLRB competence to fashion federal labor law. Garmon's
assumption that judges cannot be entrusted to faithfully follow
federal labor law announced by the NLRB (and Supreme Court)
finds no support in other aspects of modem labor law. For
example, federal and state courts share concurrent jurisdiction over
Section 301 suits to enforce collective bargaining agreements;
349
state courts are charged in those cases with applying the federal
law of collective labor contracts, includinv the duty to arbitrate and
review and to enforce arbitration awards."50 Further, both state and
federal courts entertain cases involving union breach of the duty of
fair representation under the federal labor law;351 unions face
liability in these cases for damages in jury trials;352 the NLRB
shares this authority over union breach of fair representation.
353
Judges also decide damages actions against unions for illegal
secondary boycotts by unions under Section 303 of the LMRA;
state and federal judges share concurrent jurisdiction over these
damages claims and must interpret and apply the complex federal
labor law of secondary boycotts under NLRA Section 8(b)(4) in
ac23-be92ed494968/P; 73 NLRB ANN. REP. 134, tbl. 19A (showing that Board
was affirmed in full seventy-seven point four percent of time in courts of
appeals, 2003-2007.); ROBERT GORMAN & MATTHEW FINKIN, LABOR LAW:
UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 12-13 (2004) (In 2000, "the
courts of appeals handed down 99 decisions on review of Board unfair labor
practice decisions, affirming the Board in whole or in part in about 79% of the
cases. In the five-year period 1995-1999, the courts of appeals handed down
572 such decisions, affirming the Board in whole or in part in 73% of these
cases"). Of course the courts of appeals exercise only "substantial evidence"
review over Board rulings of fact. National Labor Relations Act § 10(e)-(f), 29
U.S.C. § 160(e)-(f) (2006).
349. Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 506-09 (1962).
Further, even where conduct constitutes both an unfair labor practice within the
jurisdiction of the NLRB, it can also be a breach of a collective bargaining
agreement actionable before federal and state courts under LMRA § 301. Smith
v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
350. See Charles Dowd Box Co., 368 U.S. at 507-10.
351. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
352. Bowen v. U.S. Postal Serv., 459 U.S. 212 (1983); Chauffeurs, Local No.
391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558 (1990).
353. Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962).
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such cases.354 And, paradoxically, federal labor law preemption
doctrine, "one of the more intricate structures in legal theory,"
355
must be applied by state courts faced with claims of federal labor
law preemption.
35
Even if the hopes of the New Dealers were justified in their
own time, events since Garmon carry lessons that can no longer be
ignored. Just as we do not rely exclusively on federal agencies to
protect the environment or reasonably safe access to prescription
drugs with proper research and disclosure of risks, so too must
labor relations discard the myth of the exclusive federal agency
regulatory model.357
c. Garmon's Many Exceptions and Doctrinal Caveats
In the fifty years since Garmon, numerous "exceptions,
limitations, refinements, and qualifications ' 358 have developed.
Two vague exceptions were introduced in Garmon itself. One
arises from matters "deeply rooted in local feeling and
responsibility," under which state tort and criminal law remedies
for violence, mass picketing, or property destruction withstand
354. National Labor Relations Act § 8(b)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 187 (2006);
GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 350, at 388-93.
355. Gregory, supra note 31, at 514.
356. E.g., Willard v. Khotol Servs. Corp., 171 P.3d 108 (Alaska. 2007);
Barbieri v. United Techs. Corp., 771 A.2d 915 (Conn. 2001); Foreman v. AS
Mid-America, Inc., 586 N.W.2d 290 (Neb. 1998); Ohio State Bldg. & Constr.
Trades Council v. Cuyahoga County Bd. of Comm'rs, 781 N.E.2d 951 (Ohio
2002); J.A. Croson Co. v. J.A. Guy, Inc., 691 N.E.2d 655 (Ohio 1998); Lontz v.
Tharp, 647 S.E.2d 718 (W. Va. 2007).
357. Of course federal agencies in and outside the field of employment and
labor law play an important role. The Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) provides regulations and guidelines under Title VII, the
Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Family Medical Leave Act; it also brings
important "impact" litigation and attempts to conciliate some of the thousands of
cases filed each year for administrative exhaustion purposes. It does not, however,
displace resort to judicial litigation after receipt of a "right to sue" notice, nor does
it, as shown earlier in Part III.C, displace state remedies or foreclose states from
the broader application of their own discrimination statutes to additional categories
of discrimination such as sexual orientation, transgender, and marital status. The
Department of Labor investigates wage and hour violations, brings "impact"
cases, and issues administrative regulations under the FLSA, but does not displace
state law. The Food and Drug Administration approves prescription drugs and
their labeling, but does not after Levine v. Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009), displace
state common law claims-so also with the Environmental Protection Act. Thus,
the argument here is not that the NLRB should be abolished but that exclusive
reliance should not be placed on it to vindicate society's interest in a rebalanced
labor relations system to meet the needs of today.
358. Drummonds, Sister Sovereigns, supra note 1, at 565.
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Garmon preemption. 359 Another concerns matters of "merely
peripheral concern" to the federal labor law.36 ° Other exceptions
soon appeared: some state laws of "general applicability" escaped
preemption as did others where "properly understood, federal
regulatory policy can be narrowly construed and the state policy
readily accommodated.", 361 Thus, in the Supreme Court cases
alone, state tort claims for malicious defamation in labor disputes,
fraud and misrepresentation, trespass, and intentional infliction of
emotional distress362 escape the embrace of Garmon preemption.
As Professor Gregory noted more than twenty years ago: "The
litany of exceptions to Garmon, in areas wholly removed from the
well-established violence and local concerns exceptions, threatens
to swallow the doctrine, and has compromised the practicality of
its application." 363 Many of the cases announcing exceptions to
Garmon, moreover, involve state tort claims against unions or
state laws regulating unions, an ironic twist to Justice Frankfurter's
concerns in 1959 about state court actions hostile to unions. 364
Not only exceptions but doctrinal inconsistencies infected the
Garmon doctrine as well. In the Sears trespass case against a
picketing union, the Court suggested that the "arguably prohibited"
prong of Garmon might be limited to cases in which the state and
NLRB proceedings address the identical controversy; the NLRB
case involved the purpose and nature of the picketing while the
state trespass action focused on its location.365 Other cases
359. Cox ET AL., supra note 7, at 1005; San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v.
Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244 (1959); UAW v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958);
United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954).
360. See Garmon, 359 U.S. at 243.
361. COXETAL., supra note 7, at 1005.
362. Drummonds, Sister Sovereigns, supra note 1, at 565-66 and cases cited
therein.
363. Gregory, supra note 31, at 527.
364. Compare Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers of Am., 383 U.S. 53
(1966) (knowing or reckless defamation claims against union and officers not
preempted), with Old Dominion Branch No. 496 v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264 (1974)
(non-malicious libel claim against union preempted), and Farmer v. United Bhd.
of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., Local 25, 430 U.S. 290 (1977) (intentional
infliction of emotional distress claim against union and union officials not
preempted), and Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of
Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180 (1978) (state trespass action against union not
preempted), and Brown v. Hotel & Rest. Employees & Bartenders Int'l Union
Local 54, 468 U.S. 491 (1984) (state regulation of eligibility for union office in
casino bargaining unit not preempted).
365. Sears, 436 U.S. at 198 n.28, 200. Thus even though the union picketing
at issue in Sears was arguably prohibited recognitional picketing under the
National Labor Relations Act § 8(b)(7), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7) (2006), since the
state trespass action focused on the location rather than the purpose of the
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suggested that a "balancing test" is superimposed on the Garmon
analysis. 366 A recent case involving a union's drumming ("a banging
racket") and hand billing outside the Empire State Building shows
how fluid the revised and evolved Garmon doctrine can be.36 7 The
NLRB decided the union "was engaged in protected hand billing or
leafleting" and that "the use of the drum... was [not] sufficient to
transform the leafleting activity into unlawful conduct., 36' But the
New York Court of Appeals nonetheless allowed a state law
nuisance action, reversing the Appellate Division that had
dismissed the action under Garmon, 36 applying a balancing test.
37 °
In summary, neither Garmon's "clash of federal/state
substantive rights," nor its "primary agency jurisdiction" rationales,
supports its broad labor law preemption today. Doctrinal
inconsistency and many exceptions further undermine its utility.
Certainly the continued broad displacement of state law in labor law,
in contrast to the shared federal and state regime in most areas of
employment law, grows more and more anomalous.
B. The Machinists Doctrine Implies Preemption from Rights
Themselves Implied by the Supreme Court, Further Unnecessarily
Displacing State Law in a Broad Variety of Settings Involving
State Efforts to Aid Unions
1. The Machinists Case and Its Analytical Content
A different strand of labor law preemption doctrine grew from
a labor dispute almost forty years ago in Wisconsin. The employer
proposed an extension of work hours in contract negotiations for a
successor contract. When the union declined to agree, the
employer announced it would unilaterally implement the changes.
The union members voted to decline work longer than their
traditional hours during continuing negotiations; this constituted a
partial strike. The NLRB Regional Director declined to prosecute
picketing, it was not preempted. Under the original Garmon formulation, of
course, it is the arguably protected or prohibited status of the conduct, not the
legal issue, that controls analysis.
366. See Farmer, 430 U.S. at 300; Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S.
202, 214 n.9 (1985).
367. Helmsley-Spear, Inc. v. Fishman, 11 N.Y.3d 470 (N.Y. 2008), rev'g, 39
A.D.3d 361 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007).
368. Id. at 473.
369. Id. at 476-77.
370. Id at 477-83 (Read, J., dissenting) (distinguishing the Sears case as one
in which the NLRB had not ruled on the conduct).
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the employer's unfair labor practice charge on the ground that
concerted economic pressure during bargaining is neither unlawful
nor protected under the NLRA.37 1 The employer then challenged
the overtime refusal under Wisconsin law. The Wisconsin
Employment Relations Commission found that the overtime
refusal was neither arguably protected nor arguably prohibited
under the NLRA (and hence was not preempted under Garmon)
and that the refusal violated state law, ordering the union and
employees to cease and desist.372
The Supreme Court reversed in a six-three decision.373 Justice
Brennan's majority opinion agreed that the union members'
conduct was not arguably protected or prohibited by federal law
under Garmon but nonetheless held that the state law fell to the
preemption axe. Congress, said Justice Brennan, intended such
disputes to be resolved by "the free play of economic forces."
374
"[T]he use of economic pressure by the parties to a labor dispute is
not a grudging exception [under] . . . the [federal] Act; it is part
and parcel of the process of collective bargaining. ' 375 The
presumption against implied preemption of the sister sovereigns
was ignored.
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Stewart and then-Justice
Rehnquist, dissented on the grounds that the union's "partial strike
activity" was neither arguably protected nor arguably prohibited
under the NLRA, that a 1949 case 376 upholding state regulation of
partial strike activity was never overturned by the Congress, and
that the dissenting Justices were unpersuaded "that partial strike
activity is so essential to the bargaining process that the States
should not be free to make it illegal."377
Significantly, the conclusion that the Wisconsin statute
conflicted with the NLRA required three analytical steps not made
explicit in the majority's opinion. First, unconventional strike
activity-such as a slowdown, sit down, and the partial strike
activity (concerted refusal of overtime) involved in Machinists-
371. NLRB v. Ins. Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 481 (1960).
372. Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Wis.
Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132, 134-37 (1976).
373. Id.
374. Id. at 140; see also Ins. Agents', 361 U.S. at 489.
375. Machinists, 427 U.S. at 149 (quoting Ins. Agents', 361 U.S. at 495);
Justice Powell and Chief Justice Burger concurred, emphasizing that the states
could apply "state laws that are not directed toward altering the bargaining
positions of employers or unions" such as "their law of torts or of contracts ....
Id. at 155-56.
376. See Int'l Union v. Wis. Employment Relations Bd. (Briggs-Stratton),
336 U.S. 245 (1949), overruled by Machinists, 427 U.S. 132.
377. Machinists, 427 U.S. at 158-59.
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falls outside Section 7's general protection for "concerted activity...
for mutual aid and protection. 3 7' Though inconsistent with a
literal reading of Section 7, a series of cases starting soon after the
NLRA's enactment in 1935 held these concerted activities fell
outside the protections of Section 7.379 Second, the Machinists
majority assumed that Congress intended such strike-related
activity, though unprotected by Section 7, nevertheless to be
among a range of self-help activities that the NLRA implicitly
allowed.3 80 Third, having taken those two analytical steps, the
Machinists majority then took an analytical leap to find that
Congress further implicitly intended, contrary to the Court's own
earlier decision in the 1949 Briggs-Stratton case, 381 to displace
state regulation of these same activities.
Whether one considers such preemption of state authority to be
wise or unwise, the Machinists decision rested not on any intent of
Congress but on a federal labor law policy fashioned by the Court
majority in 1976.382 And, as with Garmon, again the Machinists
decision seemed at the time to offer protection from state
restriction of union activity.38
3
378. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006).
379. NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 256 (1939) (sit
down); NLRB v. Local Union No. 1229 Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 346 U.S.
464, 472 (1953) (hand billing during labor dispute not protected where handbills
attacked quality of employer's conduct and did not relate to labor dispute);
Briggs-Stratton, 336 U.S. at 265 (1949) (intermittent strike activity not protected
under NLRA); Ins. Agents', 361 U.S. at 490 (concerted slowdown not protected
by NLRA Section 7). As unprotected activity the employer can lawfully fire
employees who engage in such activity.
380. This assumption derived in turn from the 1960 case, Insurance Agents',
361 U.S. 477.
381. Briggs-Stratton, 336 U.S. 245.
382. Justice Stevens made just this point in his dissent for three Justices:
"Despite the numerous statements in the Court's opinion about Congress' intent
to leave partial strike activity wholly unregulated, I have found no legislative
expression of any such intent . . ." Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists &
Aerospace Workers v. Wis. Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132, 157
(1976).
383. Represented employees, however, seldom draw solace from the
Machinists holding that states cannot regulate slowdowns. That is because the
self-help rationale also means that employers facing concerted slowdowns can
fire employees participating in the slowdown. Under the self-help right created
by the Supreme Court, slowdowns are unprotected under the federal labor law,
and the two-way street of self-help applies to the employer as well.
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2. How Machinists'Preemption Hinders State Law Efforts to
Protect or Foster Unions
Cases striking down state law favorable to union interests
followed Machinists. In 1986, the Court majority extended
Machinists to an action by the Los Angeles City Council to deny
renewal of a taxicab franchise unless the cab company settled a
labor dispute with its drivers. 384 It seems hard to imagine that
either the 1935 or 1947 Congress meant to limit the powers of
municipal governments in this way or to impinge upon the right of
union members to seek and gain the support of their local
governments in labor disputes; again there is displacement of the
constitutional division of powers by the Court, not the Congress.
Similarly, state efforts to limit or ban striker replacement fell under
the federal shield of Machinists preemption.
38 5
Recently, despite the Supreme Court's rulings in the 1980s
holding that the states retained authority under the NLRA to adopt
labor standards legislation, 386 the Seventh Circuit applied the
Machinists doctrine to preempt an Illinois statute governing rest
breaks and meal periods for hotel attendants in Cook County
(enacted during a strike by hotel attendants against a hotel
384. Golden State Transit Corp. v City of L.A., 475 U.S. 608 (1986). (Justice
Rehnquist dissented). In 1989, moreover, the Court held that local governments
that violate the Machinists doctrine by interfering with the free play of economic
forces in a labor dispute governed by the NLRA faced liability under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (2006). Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of L.A., 493 U.S. 103 (1989)
(three Justices dissented).
385. E.g., Employers' Ass'n, Inc. v. United Steelworkers of Am., 32 F.3d
1297 (8th Cir. 1994) (Minnesota Striker Replacement Law preempted under
Garmon and Machinists doctrine); Kapiolani Med. Ctr. for Women & Children
v. Hawaii, 82 F. Supp. 2d 1151 (D. Haw. 2000) (statute imposing liability on
employment agencies aiding employers seeking striker replacements
preempted); People v. Fed. Tool & Plastic, 344 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. 1975) (Illinois law
requiring disclosure of labor dispute in advertisements seeking striker
replacements preempted); Mich. State Chamber of Commerce v. State, No. 83-
256399, 1984 WL 61212 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Jan. 25, 1984) (Michigan
Strikebreakers Act preempted under Machinists); Midwest Motor Express, Inc.
v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 512 N.W.2d 881 (Minn. 1994) (Minnesota Striker
Replacement Act preempted under Machinists doctrine). For a recent argument
for changing the permanent replacement doctrine at the national level, see
Norelli, supra note 222. As Lance Compa has pointed out, the U.S. position on
permanent replacement violates obligations under international law as
interpreted by the International Labor Organization. LANCE COMPA, UNFAIR
ADVANTAGE xvii-xviii (2004).
386. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985); Fort
Halifax Packing Co., Inc., v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1 (1987).
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owner);387 the court interpreted Machinists to apply where labor
standards legislation was not "a law of general application;" since
the Illinois Hotel Attendant Amendment applied only "to one
occupation, in one industry, in one county," it fell to Machinists
preemption.38 8 The Seventh Circuit purportedly relied on rulings in
the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits making the same distinction.389
Many occupation and industry-specific state hours of work statutes
are vulnerable under this reasoning.
To take another example, in the Empire State Building
390drumming case, the New York Court of Appeals refused to
apply Machinists preemption doctrine to bar a state nuisance action
(even though the NLRB dismissed unfair labor practice charges
against the union) because "[1]oud drumming is not an 'integral
part of the legislative scheme' of the NLRA. '' 71
Project labor agreements between unions and local
governmental bodies also generate debate under the Machinists'
"free play of economic forces" doctrine. The Supreme Court upheld
such an agreement in a case involving the federally required clean-
up of Boston Harbor.392 Distinguishin between "government as
regulator and government as proprietor," the Court cautioned that
the agreement "was specifically tailored to one particular job, the
Boston Harbor cleanup project. ' '394  Thus state and local
387. 520 S. Mich. Ave. Assocs., Ltd. v. Shannon, 549 F.3d 1119 (7th Cir.
2008).
388. Id. at 1139. The Illinois statute applied to counties with populations
exceeding 3,000,000; Cook was the only such county in the state. Id. at 1130 n.7.
389. Id at 1130 (citing Barnes v. Stone Container Corp., 942 F.2d 689, 692(9th Cir. 1991); Chamber of Commerce v. Bragdon, 64 F.3d 497, 503 (9th Cir.1995); Hull v. Dutton, 935 F.2d 1194, 1198 (11 th Cir. 1991)). See also Cannon
v. Edgar, 33 F.3d 880 (7th Cir. 1994) (striking down under both Garmon and
Machinists a provision of Illinois law requiring cemeteries and gravediggers to
negotiate for pool of workers to perform religiously required internments during
labor disputes); Levy v. Verizon Info. Servs., Inc., 498 F. Supp. 2d 586, 600(E.D.N.Y. 2007) (wage deduction law claims preempted); New Eng. Health
Care v. Rowland, 221 F. Supp. 2d 297 (D. Conn. 2002) (payment of Medicaid
subsidies and transportation of replacement and non-striking workers
preempted); United Steelworkers v. St. Gabriel's Hosp., 871 F. Supp. 335 (D.
Minn. 1994) (Minnesota successor statute preempted).
390. Helmsley-Spear, Inc. v. Fishman, 11 N.Y.3d 470 (N.Y. 2008).
391. Id. at 477.
392. Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council of Metro. Dist. v. Associated Builders
& Contractors of Mass./R.I., 507 U.S. 218 (1993).
393. Id. at 227.
394. Id. at 232; compare Metro. Milwaukee Ass'n of Commerce v.
Milwaukee County, 431 F.3d 277 (7th Cir. 2005) (labor peace agreement
required for contract transporting and providing other services to elderly and
disabled citizens preempted), and Ohio State Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v.
Cuyahoga County Board of Comm'rs, 781 N.E.2d 951 (Ohio 2002) (holding
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governments can prefer union labor agreements for projects ad hoc,
but not as a general policy. Again, such intent cannot, with
credibility, be attributed to the Congress in 1935 or 1947.
Additionally, "Worker Freedom Act" legislation proposed in
several states, which would restrict captive audience meetings and
give employees other rights, remains vulnerable to challenges
under Machinists,395 especially after the Chamber of Commerce
case. For example, in Oregon, the 2009 Legislature adopted Senate
Bill 519 which employer attorneys call a "gag rule" law; it
prohibits employers from holding mandatory meetings for the
purpose of communicating the employer's views on religious or
political matters.
396
3. Chamber of Commerce v. Brown
397
California legislators adopted, after lobbying by unions, a
statute prohibiting "employers that receive state funds from using
those funds to 'assist, promote, or deter union organizing.' ' 398 As
expressed in the Preamble to the statute, its purpose was to
"prohibit an employer from using state funds... for the purpose of
influencing employees to support or oppose unionization and to
prohibit an employer from seeking to influence employees to
support or oppose unionization while those employees are
performing work on a state contract." 399 However, the California
statute expressly exempted employer expenditures, allowing union
representatives access to and expenses for the negotiation of a
"voluntary recognition agreement" with a union.4 °0
An en banc majority of the Ninth Circuit upheld the California
statute because "Congress did not intend to preclude the States
that state statute could not under NLRA prohibit "project labor agreements" in
public works contracts), with Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc. v. S.F.
Airports Comm'n, 981 P.2d 499 (Cal. 1999) (upholding a "project stabilization
agreement" that specified procedures for resolving labor disputes), and George
Harms Constr. Co. v. N.J. Tpk. Auth., 633 A.3d 76 (N.J. 1994) (upholding
agreement).
395. See generally Secunda, supra note 1, at 211 nn.13-17, 212-13 & 226-27.
396. Naomi Levelle-Haslitt, It's a Wrap! 2009 Oregon Legislature Adjourns
After Creating New Employment and Labor Concerns and Considerations For
Employers, Aug. 6, 2009, http://www.martindale.com/labor-employment-
law/article Miller-NashLLP 767158.htm.
397. Ch-mber of Commerce v. Brown, 128 S. Ct. 2408 (2008).
398. ld.at2410.
399. Id. at 2411. The California statute tracked the language of several federal
statutes that similarly restricted the use of federal funds. Id. at 2417-419.
400. Id. at 2411.
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from imposing such restrictions on the use of its own funds.' 4°
The majority drew a distinction between a condition on receiving
state funds (condemned by the Supreme Court in the Gould
case) 40 2 and a condition on use of such funds.
The Supreme Court in a seven-two decision ruled that the
contested provisions of the statute are preempted under Machinists
because they touch a protected area; "[Congress meant] to shield a
zone of activity from regulation." 40 3 Justice Stevens, who dissented
in the seminal Machinists case,40 4 wrote the majority decision
thirty years later in Chamber of Commerce v. Brown. The opinion
reasoned that NLRA Section 8(c)405-which provides that non-
coercive free speech "shall not constitute or be evidence of an
unfair labor practice"---constituted an "explicit direction from
Congress to leave non-coercive speech unregulated." In effect, the
Chamber of Commerce majority elevated an employer's desire to
speak against unionization, neither protected nor prohibited in the
statute, to an affirmative NLRA right; this was so even though
Section 8(c) (on which the Court relied) is explicitly phrased
merely as a restriction on the use of speech in unfair labor practice
proceedings. 40 6 The "mighty oak" of judicially-created preemption
doctrine continues to grow without Congressional guidance. Justice
Breyer, joined by Justice Ginsburg, dissented on this further
extension of the Machinists doctrine. Pointing out that the
Wisconsin statute struck down in Wisconsin. Department of
Industry, Labor, and Human Relations v. Gould4°7 was assumed by
the Court in that case to be for the purpose of deterring unfair labor
practices, a violation of the Garmon doctrine's "arguably
prohibited" prong, Justice Breyer declared that "California's
statute.., does not seek to compel labor related activity ... [or] to
forbid labor related activity."40 8 It would only violate the
Machinists doctrine, according to Justice Breyer, if it unreasonably
restricted or discouraged the use of the employer's own funds.40 9
401. Id. at 2412.
402. Wis. Dep't of Indus., Labor, & Human Relations v. Gould, 475 U.S.
282 (1986).
403. Chamber of Commerce v. Brown, 128 S. Ct. 2408, 2414 (2008).
404. Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Wis.
Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132 (1976).
405. National Labor Relations Act § 8(c), 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (2006) provides:
"The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the dissemination thereof,
... shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice . . . if such
expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit."
406. Chamber of Commerce, 128 S. Ct. at 2414.
407. 475 U.S. 282 (1986).
408. Chamber of Commerce, 128 S. Ct. at 2419-420.
409. Id. at 2421-422. Justice Breyer would have remanded on this issue.
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4. The Machinists Doctrine Loses Coherence When Considered
in the Light of Other Rulings
Like the Garmon doctrine, Machinists makes even less sense
when considered in its context. Though the doctrine protects "the
free play of economic forces" as an NLRA-implied right, other
Supreme Court rulings allow a state to directly affect those
economic forces. First, states, while not permitted in cases like
Golden State, Chamber of Commerce, and Boston Harbor to award
governmental franchises, restrict the use of state tax monies,411 or
generally require union contractors on state projects 4 12 (in the name
of an implied right to the "free play of economic forces"), may
nonetheless adopt labor standards legislation directly establishing
the terms of employment.413 Thus, the Supreme Court rejected
Machinists challenges to the state of Massachusetts' statute
mandating that medical plans contain mental health benefits even if
covered employers negotiated union contracts covering those
medical plans.4 1 Similarly, Maine could adopt a severance pay law
for plant closures that applied to unionized workers.415 Second,
states may directly affect a strike situation, the classic scenario for
the "free play of economic forces," by granting or withholding
unemployment benefits to strikers.4 16 Third, states may award
breach of contract and tort damages for workers affected by a
dispute over permanent replacement in strikes.4 17 These cases fly in
the face of the assertion that Congress impliedly meant to preempt
410. See supra note 389.
411. Chamber of Commerce, 128 S. Ct. at 2410.
412. Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council of Metro. Dist. v. Associated Builders
and Contractors of Mass./R.I., 507 U.S. 218 (1993).
413. Viceroy Gold Corp. v. Aubry, 75 F.3d 482 (9th Cir. 1996) (California
statute permitting only unionized miners to work over eight hours per day not
preempted). See also NBC v. Bradshaw, 70 F.3d 69 (9th Cir. 1995) (state
overtime pay statute not preempted in context of impasse in dispute between
employer and union); Babler Bros., Inc. v. Roberts, 995 F.2d 911 (9th Cir. 1993)
(Oregon statute requiring overtime over eight hours on public works projects,
absent collective bargaining agreement, not preempted); Wash. Serv.
Contractors Coal. v. District of Columbia, 54 F.3d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (district
enactment requiring contractors taking over service contract from predecessor
contractors to retain employees not preempted); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v.
Commonwealth of Mass., 471 U.S. 724 (1985) (Massachusetts mandated health
plan benefits statute not preempted); Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482
U.S. 1 (1987) (Maine severance pay law for plant closure not preempted).
414. Metro. Life Ins., 471 U.S. 724.
415. Fort Halifax Packing Co., 482 U.S. 1.
416. N.Y. Tel. Co. v. N.Y. Dep't of Labor, 440 U.S. 519, 526 (1979) (3
Justices dissented).
417. Belknap v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491 (1983).
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state actions that interfere with an implied right to "the free play of
economic forces."
C. "Section 301 " Preemption: The Federal Policy Basis for This
Labor Law Preemption Doctrine Could Be Completely Vindicated
by Deferring to Rather Than Preempting the Claims of Union
Members Asserting Individual Rights Claims Under State Law
Employees do not forfeit their individual rights under state and
local employment statutes and common law when they unionize. 8
Thus, unionized employees maintain their protections under status
discrimination law, wage and hour laws, family leave laws and
other developments that make up the individual rights revolution in
the American law of the workplace. Indeed, the Supreme Court
recently held in the 14 Penn Plaza case 4 19 that "clear and
unmistakable" clauses in collective bargaining agreements may
bind unionized employees to arbitrate such disputes regarding their
individual employment rights through contractual grievance-
arbitration provisions. 420 But still another labor law preemption
doctrine announced by the Supreme Court in the 1980s sometimes
unnecessarily preempts the individual rights claims of unionized
employees (but not their non-union cousins). This doctrine is
known as "Section 301" preemption. Again the rationale offered
fails to support it.
4 2 1
Section 301 preemption started with the sensible requirement
that state law could not control the interpretation of a collective
bargaining agreement. 42 2 But, in 1985, in Allis-Chalmers Corp. v.
Lueck,423 the Supreme Court preempted a unionized employee's
tort claim against an insurance company for breach of the state law
covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied in insurance
contracts; the insurance coverage involved was incorporated in the
union contract.424 The Court held that the employee's state claim
was preempted because it was "inextricably intertwined" with the
collective bargaining contract. 425 Anomalously, a non-union
employee could sue for bad faith processing of insurance claims,
418. E.g., Wright v. Universal Mar. Serv., Inc., 525 U.S. 70 (1998);
Barrentine v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728 (1981); Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
419. 14 Penn. Plaza v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1462 (2009).
420. Id.
421. See generally Drummonds, Sister Sovereigns, supra note 1, at 574-82.
422. Id. at 575 and cases cited therein.
423. 471 U.S. 202 (1985).
424. Id. at 204.
425. Id. at 213.
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but a unionized employee could not sue if her contract mentioned
the insurance plan involved. This preemption of the employee's
individual rights claim under state law occurred even if the union
labor agreement provided no similar protection.426
Three years later the Court clarified this holding in Lingle v.
Norge Div. of Magic Chef Inc. 427 Section 301 preemption
occurred, according to the Court in Lingle, only when resolution of
the state law individual rights claim required interpretation of a
union labor contract. "[A]s long as the state law claim can be
resolved without interpreting the [collective bargaining] agreement
itself, the claim is 'independent' of the agreement for § 301 pre-
emption purposes. '' 42 8 As explained by the Court: Section "301
pre-emption merely ensures that federal law will be the basis for
interpreting collective bargaining agreements, and says nothing
about the substantive rights a State may provide to workers when
adjudication of those rights does not depend upon the
interpretation of such agreements. '
'A29
But individual rights claims under state law arguably do
involve interpretation of a union contract in a variety of situations.
For example, a right to privacy claim may depend on the
reasonable expectation of privacy, and that in turn may involve
expectations under the labor contract. An intentional infliction of
emotional distress claim may require analysis of the conditions of
work specified in the union contract to help the court's
consideration of the "outrageousness" element. Even a state law
discrimination claim, moreover, may require examination of the
labor contract on the issue of treatment for "similarly situated"
employees.
The courts struggle to apply the Lueck-Lingle doctrine
consistently. Both the American Bar Association and the federal
circuit courts of appeals have expressed frustration with the
workability of the doctrine.
430
Other, more fundamental, problems arise. As noted above, the
policy concern with Section 301 preemption is that federal law
must be applied in the interpretation of collective bargaining
agreements. Yet the state courts enjoy concurrent jurisdiction over
426. The doctrine does not affect non-union employees because they are not
subject to collective bargaining agreements; Section 301 preemption requires the
presence of an applicable collective labor contract in order for the federal policy
favoring arbitral interpretation of such contracts to trigger.
427. Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399 (1988).
428. Id. at 409-10.
429. Id. at 409.
430. Drummonds, Sister Sovereigns, supra note 1, at 578 and notes cited
therein.
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Section 301 claims and apply federal law when they exercise that
jurisdiction.431 No reason exists, therefore, to preempt state court
judges from deciding a unionized employee's individual rights
claim merely because a collective bargaining agreement must be
interpreted to decide the state claim; state court judges decide
union contract issues routinely in the exercise of their Section 301
jurisdiction.
But what if the labor contract provides for interpretation by an.
arbitrator? Federal law favors arbitration of disputes under
collective bargaining contracts. The answer seems obvious: an
individual rights claim requiring some interpretation of the labor
contract could simply be deferred pending resolution of the
contract interpretation issue by an arbitrator. In short, the disease
(or federal policy concern) does not require the strong medicine of
Section 301 preemption-which leaves union employees with
fewer remedies than non-unionized employees. 432 Mere deferral
suffices to serve the federal policy interest even in the situation in
which the union and employer agreed to an arbitrator's
interpretation of the labor agreement. Once again we see an
unnecessarily broad federal labor law preemption doctrine
needlessly created by the Supreme Court. And again the practical
effect disfavors unionized employees.
V. ONE VISION FOR A LABOR LAW PREEMPTION CLARIFICATION ACT
The reform of labor law preemption doctrine must come from
Congress. Even Justices generally opposed to broad judicially-
created preemption doctrines sometimes feel bound, by stare
decisis or other policy considerations, to acquiesce to labor law
preemption precedents now decades old.433 Most disturbingly, the
United States Supreme Court's 2008 decision in Chamber of
431. Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 506 (1962); Local
174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 103 (1962).
432. Drummonds, Sister Sovereigns, supra note 1, at 581-82.
433. For example, Justice Stevens (joined by then-Justice Rehnquist and
Justice Stewart) dissented in Lodge 76, International Association of Machinists
& Aerospace Workers v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission, 427
U.S. 132 (1976), but joined the majority extending that doctrine thirty-two years
later in Chamber of Commerce v. Brown, 128 S. Ct. 2408 (2008). Justice
Thomas, whose eloquent concurrence in Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187
(2009), decried broad federal preemption implied by the courts in the context of
state tort suits involving failure to warn claims for prescription drugs,
nonetheless joined the majority in Chamber of Commerce,_extending the implied
preemption theory in labor law.
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Commerce4 34 makes clear that a majority of the current courts
continue to expand the labor law preemption doctrine even to the
point of striking down California's law seekin to prevent the use
of taxpayer monies for anti-union campaigns.
Further, as shown below, all three strands of labor relations law
sprang not from Congress, but entirely from the Supreme Court's
own policy making. Yet, as a matter of constitutional principle,
Congress, not the courts, holds the power to make decisions that
displace state law-making.436 Thus, the legitimacy of federal labor
law preemption rests upon congressional intent in the labor
relations area. Once again, Chief Justice Rehnquist aptly described
the reality: labor preemption doctrine started from "acorns" of
sensible decisions but has now grown into a "mighty oak" without
any guidance by Congress.4 37 Judges on opposite ends of the
jurisprudential spectrum at various times voiced similar
complaints.438 Indeed, Justice Felix Frankfurter, who wrote the
seminal labor law preemption opinion a half-century ago,
forthrightly acknowledged the silence of Congress in that
decision. It is time for the Congress to speak.
What might a 2009 Labor Law Preemption Clarification Act
look like? Three principles should guide the analysis. First, the
changes must allow the states to play a role in creating innovations
that rebalance our labor relations law system in the direction of
434. Chamber of Commerce, 128 S. Ct. 2408 (Justices Breyer and Ginsburg
dissented).
435. See supra Part IV.
436. See generally Drummonds, Sister Sovereigns, supra note 1, at 513-14,
525-28 (citing cases).
437. Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of L.A., 475 U.S. 608, 622 (1986)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
438. Justice Brennan, for example, voiced a similar point: "Preemption cases
in the labor law area are often difficult because we must decide the questions
presented without any clear guidance from Congress ... [Our] standards are by
necessity general ones which may not provide as much assistance as we would
like in particular cases." Belknap v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491, 523 (1983) (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
439. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 239-41
(1959) (labor law preemption doctrine involves a more "complicated and
perceptive process than is conveyed by the delusive phrase 'ascertaining the
intent of the legislature' . . . '[T]he statutory implications concerning what has
been taken from the States and what has been left to them are of a Delphic
nature, to be translated into concreteness by of the process of litigating
elucidation."'). As Professor Gregory summarized: "The core reality in [labor
law] preemption doctrine is judicial policymaking in the face of congressional
silence, disguised by the occasional cosmetic judicial 'divination of
congressional purpose' and 'fabrication of intent," Gregory, supra note 31, at
516-17.
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offering more protection for employee free choice. Just as the 1947
Taft-Hartley Congress rebalanced labor relations policy to correct
abuses by unions in that day, reform today must rebalance to
correct abuses by employers.4 ° Second, NLRA Section 7 rights
belong to employees, not labor unions or employers. States should
be allowed to play a larger role in the protection and fostering of
the exercise of those rights. Third, the broader field of employment
law teaches us that shared federal and state authority most often
creates the conditions for innovation and change in the law. As in
the law of the workplace generally, federal labor law should set
minimum standards but not displace state law-making consistent
with those minimums.
Consider ten areas of potential state law-making that fit within
these principles:
1. authorization for state level damages for discrimination
based on union activity or pro-union speech similar to that
provided in many states for race, national origin, religious,
sex, disabilities, sexual orientation, marital status, age, and
other forms of discrimination, and which the federal civil
rights law already extends to public employees;
2. allowing states to experiment with restrictions on
permanent replacement of striking workers and the use of
offensive lockouts during labor disputes similar to their
already existing power to grant or withhold unemployment
benefits to strikers and to directly establish conditions of
employment through labor standards legislation;
3. allowing states to experiment with "card check"
recognition with adequate protection for employees (not
employers or unions) to seek an NLRB election to
determine representational issues;
4. state level experimentation with "equal access" rules to
make the election process fairer to those supporting unions;
5. state regulation of "captive audience" employer meetings
with employees to discourage unionization (with adequate
protection as well for employer free speech);
6. state level flexibility to require that exclusive
representatives periodically demonstrate their continuing
majority status via "equal access" elections or "card
checks," or to periodically require, in non-union
440. As noted above, the federal labor law already imposes considerable
accountability on unions. Unions are already liable for damages for breach of
the duty of fair representation, secondary boycotts, and for torts committed




workplaces, an employee election on the question of union
representation;
7. "reverse" preemption provisions, similar to those in OHSA
and in NLRA Section 14-B ("Right to Work" laws),
allowing the states to establish alternative procedures for
the vindication of NLRA rights subject to the approval of
the Secretary of Labor or other federal officials;
8. authorization for states to allow non-exclusive
representation by minority unions for those employees who
want it;
9. provisions for flexibility for states to require "work
councils" in non-union workplaces to provide a mechanism
for employee voice in corporate governance; and
10. authorization for states to experiment with different forms
of interest arbitration in first contract bargaining disputes or
as a remedy for bad faith bargaining.
To be sure, most of the revitalized state authority in labor
relations embodied in these ten suggestions would favor employees
wishing for more collective voice in the workplace. That, indeed,
is the point. Just as the changes sixty-two years ago in Taft-
Hartley sought to rein in rogue union behavior, today labor law
must be reformed to rein in the many weapons employers can now
quite legally employ to dampen, and too often suppress, the
exercise of unfettered employee free choice rights.
At the same time, the Section 7 right of employees to refrain
from collective action must also be respected. Rebalancing labor
law to respond to new conditions is entirely appropriate. But the
scope of needed change and experimentation demands that states,
not the federal government, show the way.
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